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ABSTRACT 
What is effective insolvency law?  Effective insolvency laws play an important role in 
the health of an economy, and particularly upon the framework of investment 
decisions.  Understanding how this works is particularly relevant during a period of 
financial crisis.  International Monetary Fund and World Bank guidelines for  “Orderly 
and Effective ? insolvency laws were intended to encourage law reforms that would 
stimulate investment by improving returns to investors in the event of insolvency.  
The guidelines were strongly influenced by an efficiency approach to insolvency.  This 
approach posits that absolute priority for secured creditors is allocatively efficient 
and therefore the best means to achieve maximum social welfare.  The guidelines 
also ĚƌĞǁŚĞĂǀŝůǇŽŶƚŚĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐĂŶĚƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐŽĨ ‘ĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌĨƌŝĞŶĚůǇ ?ŶŐůŝƐŚůĂǁ, 
seen by some as a paragon of efficient insolvency.  But how accurate is this appraisal 
of English law or the impact of efficient insolvency? 
The Enterprise Act 2002 sought to develop a rescue culture by improving inclusivity 
and increasing distribution of both control and returns amongst stakeholders.  
Instead of reducing overall returns, as an efficiency model would suggest, research 
into insolvency outcomes suggests that the revised administration procedure may 
provide better returns to all groups of creditors, including secured creditors.  This 
thesis uses empirical data to explore the limitations of an efficiency approach to 
insolvency, and explain why in a developed legal regime inclusivity improves returns 
by increasing the likelihood of effective rescue.  The changes in English law are 
reflective of an increased private sector investment in informal workouts and a 
growing emphasis on reputational and relationship concerns.  An element of 
redistribution and inclusivity will provide better global returns to investors than a 
slavish approach to secured creditor priority.  
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CHAPTER 1:  ORDERLY AND EFFECTIVE INSOLVENCY 
REGIMES 
What makes insolvency law effective?  This question was explored by the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund in their guidelines for Orderly and Effective 
model laws, intended to encourage investment by promoting economic stability and 
thereby reducing the cost of credit.  These models were strongly influenced by 
English Law.  The effectiveness of English law was ascribed to the notion that it was a 
creditor friendly system, with a laissez-faire approach to private ordering, that 
provided strong creditor control in the form of predictable outcomes and hard and 
fast liquidation returns.  This analysis in turn had clear links to the efficiency 
approach to insolvency law, made influential by scholars like Jackson, Baird and 
Rasmussen.  The efficiency approach is predicated on the belief that absolute priority 
for secured creditors maximises both returns and social welfare, and that as such the 
only mandatory rules in an insolvency system should be those related to structure.   
Both the Orderly and Effective model and English law itself clearly go beyond the 
merely structural.  They include a variety of redistributive interventions from 
protection for workers to prescribed parts in floating charges.  If the efficiency 
approach is correct, then these compromises will reduce returns to creditors and in 
turn welfare more generally.  This thesis challenges that view by re-examining the 
notions of creditor friendliness, insolvency efficiency and how parties bargain in the 
shadow of the law.  Rather than a low-cost hands-off approach, English law provides 
a forum for augmented negotiation.  This offers stakeholders a wide range of options 
for seeking resolution along with professional specialist support that allows them to 
customise solutions according to their own needs and difficulties.  The intuitively 
higher cost of this approach is compensated for by greater aggregate returns to 
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creditors, due to improved economic stability and likelihood of the business 
surviving.  Whilst strong secured creditor rights and efficient realisation of those 
rights are an important part of effective insolvency, the principles of insolvency 
efficiency are not an ideal state against which any compromise inevitably reduces 
returns and general welfare.  Insolvency law which adheres too slavishly to the 
principles of efficiency will be less effective, both globally and for secured creditors as 
a subset, than laws which take into account redistributive issues.  
This thesis seeks to advance this argument and make an original contribution to the 
body of insolvency research in two stages.  First, by combining and exploring the 
empirical insolvency outcomes research of scholars including Frisby, Walters, 
Armour, Mumford, and Katz, in order to get a clearer picture of how changes in the 
Enterprise Act have impacted upon creditor returns and what this says about the role 
of inclusivity and redistribution in insolvency law.  This is then considered in the 
broader context of the cost of credit argument and the changing ways in which banks 
interact with distressed firms.  Second, through an exploration of the behavioural 
impact of business failure, starting with a history of failure as a quasi-crime, 
continued in a new experiment to illustrate the impact of information in business 
failure on decision making, and then considering how lessons from mediation and 
reintegrative shaming can help improve insolvency outcomes. 
This re-appraisal of the operation of English insolvency law is important because the 
recent financial crisis has raised serious questions about some widely applied 
principles of economic theory, in particular the fashion in which market pricing 
mechanisms operate and the extent and limits of consumer rationality.  Market 
efficiency principles have proved pervasive in the economic analysis of insolvency 
law, but their application by legal theorists has on occasion proved one dimensional.  
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The danger is that lawyers and legislators continue to apply outmoded approaches to 
market theory just as they are being abandoned by economists, and in doing so 
ignore the qualities of our laws that are actually attractive to investors.  Instead it 
should be accepted that stakeholder rationality cannot be presumed and that part of 
the service they require is assistance in achieving the best possible returns.  Our 
growing understanding of the reality of decision making during business failure helps 
us to provide mechanisms that improve insolvency outcomes in accordance with 
creditor needs.   
This thesis uses a variety of different methods, including quantitative and qualitative 
analysis, economic experiment and theory.  It seeks to demonstrate alternative 
approaches to empirically testing the behavioural impact of insolvency law that may 
be more illuminating than simple reliance on basic market models.  It also attempts 
to show that the common understanding of what makes English insolvency law 
Orderly and Effective is based upon misconceptions about how negotiations in the 
shadow of the law actually take place.  It is hoped that these illustrations of method 
will in the future allow for more specific, targeted, empirical projects looking at 
bargaining by parties to insolvency.  
As the research involves human participants it was subject to internal ethical review 
and meets the standards of the ESRC Research Ethics Framework.1  For convenience 
 “ŚĞ ?ĂŶĚ “ŚŝƐ ?is used for all gendered pronouns where no specific gender is 
involved.  Naturally this should not be taken to imply that women are any less 
capable than men of performing as judges, insolvency practitioners, bankers, 
bankrupts or economically-irrational creditors.  Finally, unless otherwise noted, all 
translations from French into English are my own, as are any errors. 
                                                          
1 Economics and Social Research Council (ESRC), Research Ethics Framework, found at 
http://www.esrc.ac.uk/ESRCInfoCentre/Images/ESRC_Re_Ethics_Frame_tcm6-11291.pdf (website) (Accessed 14th 
December 2007) 
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The rest of this chapter will introduce the key themes and terms of the thesis.  First, 
the nature of insolvency and its role as a constitution of commerce is defined.  
Second, the IMF Orderly and Effective insolvency model is introduced as an effort to 
describe a virtuous insolvency law that will improve economic stability and 
productivity.  Third, the strengths and weaknesses of insolvency efficiency theory are 
described.  Finally, the two pillars of Orderly and Effective insolvency are defined as 
predictability and protection of value, clearly linked to the principles of insolvency 
efficiency.   
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1.1  WHAT IS INSOLVENCY? 
Corporate Insolvency is defined in two ways: the inability to pay debts when they fall 
due (cash flow insolvency), or having liabilities that exceed assets (balance sheet 
insolvency).2  Insolvency laws are 
a series of legal rules and principles which determine, in the first instance, the extent of the 
corporate estate at the point of commencement of insolvency proceedings, in the second how 
it might be inflated, either by exploitation of existing corporate assets or through claw back of 
those disposed of prior to insolvency, and, finally, who, out of many claimants, is entitled to it 
and in what proportion.
3
 
Insolvency law manages the settlement of debts from the insolvent personality.  You 
will note in this definition that there is no requirement that the personality be 
extinguished.  English law makes the distinction between insolvent enterprises and 
bankrupt individuals, where: 
The ultimate objective of the bankruptcy process is to discharge the bankrupt from his 
liabilities, so that he can begin again with a clean slate, free from the burden of his debts, and 
thus rehabilitate himself into the community.  The ultimate fate of a company in winding up is 
not discharge but dissolution, that is, the termination of its existence.
4
 
This distinction between rehabilitating bankruptcy and terminal insolvency is 
occasionally unhelpful.  It can give the impression that insolvency does not 
rehabilitate.  Winding up and dissolution represent only one of many possible 
outcomes from insolvency proceedings, and a business may survive beyond the life 
of the company that housed it - achieving exactly the clean slate Goode reserves for 
the bankrupt.  Insolvent does not mean unprofitable or unviable.  Iƚ “ĚŽĞƐŶŽƚŝŶ
ŝƚƐĞůĨĚĞŶŽƚĞĂůĂĐŬŽĨŵŽŶĞǇŽƌĂƐƐĞƚƐ QǁŚĂƚƐĞƚƐŝŶƐŽůǀĞŶĐǇĂƉĂƌƚĨƌŽŵƉŽǀĞƌƚǇŝƐ
                                                          
2
 Insolvency Act 1986, s123(1)(e) and s123(2) 
3
 &ƌŝƐďǇ^ ? “/ŶƐŽůǀĞŶĐǇ>ĂǁĂŶĚ/ŶƐŽůǀĞŶĐǇWƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ PWƌŝŶĐ ƉůĞƐĂŶĚWƌĂŐŵĂƚŝƐŵŝǀĞƌŐĞ ? ? ?Current Legal Problems 
64(1) (2011) 349-397, p350 
4
 Goode R, Commercial Law, 3
rd
 Ed, Penguin (London:  2004), p830 
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that the debtor has in some way spent or utilised the money of some other party 
ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶũƵƐƚƐƉĞŶƚŚŝƐŽǁŶ ? ?5  This definition, that insolvency concerns the 
ĚŝƐƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶŽĨĂŶŽƚŚĞƌƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐĂƐƐĞƚƐ ?ĐŽƵůĚďĞĂƉƉůŝĞĚĂƐĞĂƐŝůǇƚŽĂďĂŶŬƌƵƉƚĂƐĂŶ
insolvent. 
Indeed, most ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞƵƐĞƐƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ “ďĂŶŬƌƵƉƚĐǇ ?ŝŶƚĞƌĐŚĂŶŐĞĂďůǇfor 
both firms and individuals.  But the difference is important.  Insolvency law is 
principally about managing the relationship between creditor and debtor, where 
insolvency itself is by no means fatal to future profitable relations between the 
ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?dŚĞǁŽƌĚ “ďĂŶŬƌƵƉƚ ?, however, is beset with social meaning and the 
implication of moral as well as financial failure.  Adam Smith observed that 
 “ďankruptcy is perhaps the greatest and most humiliating calamity that can befall a 
man ?6 ĂŶĚŝŶĨƌĂƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŽŶďĂŶŬƌƵƉƚĐǇƐƚŝŐŵĂŚĞŽďƐĞƌǀĞƐƚŚĂƚan appreciable 
number of people believĞ “ďĂŶŬƌƵƉƚĐǇŝƐĂŶĂĐĐĞƉƚĂďůĞƌĞĂƐŽŶĨŽƌĐŽŵŵŝƚƚŝŶŐ
suicide. ?7  dŚĞŝŶƐŽůǀĞŶĐǇŽĨĂĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ “inevitably generates dismay and, in many 
cases, resentment, among a variety of stakeholders in the corporation. ?8  This can 
spread far beyond immediate stakeholders:  
failure may have wider implications. It may force customers and suppliers into insolvency; it 
may, in causing job losses, tear the heart out of the local community; in the case of a major 
bank or industrial company it may even affect the national economy, for example by 
undermining confidence or by removing a key player from the export market.  The community 
ĂƚůĂƌŐĞŵĂǇĂůƐŽŚĂǀĞĂŶŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ƐŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƐ
in public law.
9  
                                                          
5
 Dennis V, Insolvency Law Handbook, 2nd Ed, Law Society (London: 2007), p1 
6
 Smith A, Wealth of Nations, Oxford University Press (Oxford:  2008), Book 2, Chapter 3, p204 
7
 ĨƌĂƚZ ? “dŚĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶŽĨĂŶŬƌƵƉƚĐǇ^ƚŝŐŵĂ ? ?Theoretical Inquiries in Law 7(2) (2006)365-393, p379  Wreferencing 
the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Survey 1972-2000 Cumulative Codebook, available at 
http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/GSS/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2004) (reporting that 4.4% to 9.6% of the respondents find 
ƚŚĂƚďĂŶŬƌƵƉƚĐǇĨŝůŝŶŐŝƐĂŶĂĐĐĞƉƚĂďůĞƌĞĂƐŽŶƚŽĞŶĚŽŶĞ ?ƐůŝĨĞ ) ? 
8
 Frisby S (2011), p350 
9
 Goode R, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, 4th ed, Sweet & Maxwell (London: 2011), p68 
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The emotional and psychological impact of business failure will be an important 
theme in this thesis because of its behavioural consequences.  A creditor who is 
angry or upset is less likely to be able to correctly identify the best commercial 
outcome.  A debtor for whom their business repreƐĞŶƚƐƚŚĞŝƌůŝĨĞ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŵĂǇƉƵƌƐƵĞ
unrealistic rescue outcomes or be too ashamed to admit that their efforts have 
failed.  These sentiments impact upon insolvency outcomes.  If we value rational and 
impartial decision-making it is not too much of a leap to consider this impact as 
unwelcome.   
Insolvency law emerges as a response to credit10 just as its importance stems from its 
role as the foundation of credit.  It  “ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇĂƌŝƐĞƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶŽĨĐƌĞĚŝƚ ?
for without credit there can be no debt. ?11 ĞďƚŝƐ “ĂůĞŐĂůůǇĞŶĨŽƌĐĞĂďůĞůŝĂďŝůŝƚǇ ?
whereby a party known as a debtor can be compelled to render what is due at the 
ŝŶƐŝƐƚĞŶĐĞŽĨĂƉĂƌƚǇŬŶŽǁŶĂƐĂĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌ ? ?12  It can be seen that those things which 
qualify as credit can be extremely broad, encompassing money, goods or services, be 
it a loan of cash or the arrangement for deferred payment.  The most influential 
analysis of English insolvency law13 ?ƚŚĞŽƌŬZĞƉŽƌƚ ?ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚĐƌĞĚŝƚĂƐ “ƚŚĞ
ůŝĨĞďůŽŽĚŽĨƚŚĞŵŽĚĞƌŶŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂůŝƐĞĚĞĐŽŶŽŵǇ ? ?14 Credit allows forward thinking 
enterprises to achieve optimal investment decisions and directs capital towards 
those who would seek to make productive use of it,15 and Goode observes a  “ǁŽƌůĚ
ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚĐƌĞĚŝƚǁŽƵůĚďĞŝŵƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚŽŝŵĂŐŝŶĞ ? ?16  Insolvency law defines the terms 
of credit.  Paulus describes insolvency law as the  “ĨůƵĐŚƚƉƵŶŬƚ ?17 Žƌ ‘ǀĂŶŝƐŚŝŶŐƉŽŝŶƚ ?,
                                                          
10
 Jackson TH, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law, Beard Books (Washington: 1986), p7 
11
 Goode R, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, 3
rd
 ed, Sweet and Maxwell (London:  2007), p2 
12
 Dennis V (2007), p1 
13
 Frisby S (2011), p358 
14
 Insolvency Law and Practice: Report of the Review Committee (Cmnd 8558, HMSO 1982) ? “dŚĞŽƌŬZĞƉŽƌƚ ? ?ĐŚ ?
para 10  
15
 A detailed explanation of the borrowing and lending as investment decisions and the advantages of being able to 
acquire credit can be found in Gravelle H and Rees R, Microeconomics, 3
rd
 ed, Pearson Education (Harlow:  2004), 
from p233, and in most undergraduate microeconomics textbooks. 
16
 Goode R (2007), p2 
17
 Paulus C, Der Internationale Währungsfond und das international Insolvenzrecht, I Prax (1999), p148 
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which in a one point perspective drawing is the position from which all depth lines 
are drawn.  Falke translates this ĂƐ “ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ?18, those fundamental principles 
around which all other laws are defined.  Insolvency law is the constitution of credit 
because it defines the boundaries and fundamental principles within which one 
borrows or lends. 
There are two principal fashions in which laws are typically considered to govern 
behaviour.  The first is the cornerstone of economic analysis of a law, neatly summed 
ƵƉďǇƚŚĞƉŚƌĂƐĞ “ĂĨŝŶĞŝƐĂƉƌŝĐĞ ?19, which is to say the one will compare the cost of 
obeying the law against the cost of disobeying the law and choose the option that 
costs the least.  The classic example, attributed to Gary Becker by Gneezy and 
Rustichini20, is that if the cost of a parking fine multiplied by the probability of getting 
caught is less than the cost of the parking ticket, then you will not buy the parking 
ticket, i.e. where fine * probability of sanction < price, you will commit the 
sanctioned behaviour. 
The second fashion in ǁŚŝĐŚůĂǁƐĚƌŝǀĞďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌŝƐƚŚĞŝƌŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞǀĂůƵĞ P “ĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐ
ƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐĚŽǁŚĂƚůĞŐĂůƌƵůĞƐƐƚŝƉƵůĂƚĞƐŝŵƉůǇďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞǇĂƌĞůĞŐĂůƌƵůĞƐ ? ?21  This 
ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐĂŶĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐ ?ŽďĞĚŝĞŶĐĞŽĨůĂǁƐǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞƐĂŶĐƚŝŽŶ
costs less than complŝĂŶĐĞƚŽƐŝŵƉůĞŵĂƚŚĞŵĂƚŝĐĂůŝŶĐŽŵƉĞƚĞŶĐĞ ?ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚ^ŵŝƚŚ ?Ɛ
argument that economic analysis of law tends to focus exclusively on material 
incentives22 should not be taken to imply that there is no economic analysis of the 
behavioural impact of normative values.  The application of insights from behavioural 
economics to the law will form a significant part of the second half of this thesis.  
Cross pollination between disciplines is slow however, and mainstream recognition of 
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 Falke M (2003), p23 
19
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 Ibid, 1 
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 ^ŵŝƚŚ^ ? “dŚĞEŽƌŵĂƚŝǀŝƚǇŽĨWƌŝǀĂƚĞ>Ăǁ ?, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 31(2) (2011) 215-242, p215 
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  “EĞĂƌůǇĂůůĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƐĂƐƐƵŵĞƚŚĂƚƉƌŝǀĂƚĞůĂǁŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞƐďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌĞǆĐůƵƐŝǀĞůǇďǇĂƚƚĂĐŚŝŶŐŵĂƚĞƌŝĂů
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behavioural economics is relativelǇŶĞǁ ?ƚŚƵƐ^ŵŝƚŚ ?ƐƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǀĂƐƚ
majority of law and economics focuses on rational materialism as the determinant of 
behaviour is persuasive.  Even so, the study of the role of normative behaviour in 
commerce is become increasingly important.  In their description of the normative 
ƌŽůĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘>ŽŶĚŽŶƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ?ŝŶŶŐůŝƐŚďĂŶŬŝŶŐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁŝůůďĞĚŝƐĐƵssed in more 
detail in Chapter 5, Armour and Deakin state that  “ǁhere once it was commonplace 
to assume that laws take on a directly price-like character in individual optimisation 
calculations, it is now understood that norms may bypass (or substitute for) law's 
ŝŵƉĂĐƚĂůƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ? ?23   They continue: 
If the function of norms is to save on the transaction costs of endlessly searching for the 
solution to commonly recurring co-ordination problems, it may be said that norms are a kind 
of information resource they embody information about ƚŚĞůŝŬĞůǇƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐŽĨƉůĂǇĞƌƐ Q ?In 
the context of the commercial transactions which we are considering here, in addition to 
numerous tacit and uncodified conventions, there are many institutionalised norms which 
derive from the legal system, as well as from the activities of trade associations and 
professional bodies.
24
  
So insolvency laws can be described as determining the conditions of credit and the 
conduct of business both through materialistic and normative factors.  Whether the 
impact on behaviour is principally materialistic or normative, that insolvency laws do 
impact on investment and consumption is uncontroversial.  The IMF, effectively 
expressing western insolvency orthodoxy, recognises insolvency law ?s constitutional 
ƌŽůĞǁŚĞŶĚĞƐĐƌŝďŝŶŐŝƚƐ “ŵĂũŽƌƌŽůĞŝŶƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚĞŶŝŶŐĂĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?s economic and 
financial system. ?25  In the context of American law it has been argued that 
insolvency law preserves the national economy by providing an important safety net 
ƚŚĂƚ “prevents secured creditors from collectively starting a downward spiral of 
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foreclosures and bank failures that could result in the failure of the entire economy, 
ĂƐŝƚŶĞĂƌůǇĚŝĚŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?26  Other qualities of insolvency regimes include the 
following. 
x They define the conditions for investment, as banks adjust their lending 
and reorganisation practice in response to changes in insolvency law.27  
x They help remove poor performers from the market28, making space and 
freeing up resources for more effective players. 
x They limit the public cost of financial crisis by ensuring the participation 
of private creditors.29 
x They are the arbiters of the bottom line for social and political values, 
such as the relative importance placed on the protection of employees or 
ƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇŚŽŵĞ ?ĂŵŽŶŐƐƚǁŚŝĐŚ “the key question will often be how to 
ĨŝŶĚƚŚĞĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞďĂůĂŶĐĞ ? ?30 
dŚĞƉŚƌĂƐĞ “ŝŶƚŚĞƐŚĂĚŽǁŽĨƚŚĞůĂǁ ?31 is used by both the IMF and the World Bank 
and repeated in insolvency literature.  The phrase originates in Mnookin and 
Kornhauser ?Ɛ32 1979 work on the impact of divorce law on marriage, which in turn 
has clear links with the concurrently developing notion of territoriality.  Territoriality 
describes the way in which use of space communicates ownership, authority and 
                                                          
26
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ƉƌŝŵĂƌǇƌĞĂƐŽŶĨŽƌĨŝƌŵĚŝƐĂƉƉĞĂƌĂŶĐĞ ? ?ĂŚŝǇĂ^ĂŶĚ<ůĂƉƉĞƌ> ? “tŚŽƐƵƌǀŝǀĞƐ ?ĐƌŽƐƐ-ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇĐŽŵƉĂƌŝƐŽŶ ? ?
Journal of Financial Stability 3 (2007) 261-278, p270 
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ƉŽǁĞƌ ?ŵŽƐƚŶŽƚĂďůǇŝŶ>ĞĨĞďǀƌĞ ?ƐLa Production de l ?ĞƐƉĂĐĞ33 and the work 
stemming from Foucault ?s Space, Knowledge and Power.34  dŚĞǁŽƌĚ ‘ƐƉĂĐĞ ?ŝƐƵƐĞĚ
in its widest possible sense, including both space as a room or a gathering, and space 
as a distance between people or objects.  It encourages us to consider the law as part 
of an interactive system where behaviour is inflƵĞŶĐĞĚďǇƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨ
the law (whether accurate or otherwise).  
When Mnookin ĂŶĚ<ŽƌŶŚĂƵƐĞƌƐƚĂƚĞƚŚĂƚ “ƚŚĞƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞŽĨƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ƚŚĞ
entitlements created by law, transaction costs, attitudes toward risk, and strategic 
outcome will substantially affect the negotiated outcomes, ?35  the application of the 
principle clearly extends beyond divorce and is echoed, for example, when 
Davydenko and Franks describe the ƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶǁŚĞƌĞ “ďĂŶŬƐƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚůǇĂĚjust their 
lending and reorganisation practices in response to the countrǇ ?Ɛ bankruptcy code. ?36  
dŚĞŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨŝŶƐŽůǀĞŶĐǇŝƐƐĞĞŶƚŽŝŵƉĂĐƚŽŶŝƐƐƵĞƐŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ “ƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇůĂǁƐ ?
contract and commercial law, the law dealing with mortgages and other types of 
security, as well as tax and inheritance laws, employment and social security regimes, 
ĂŶĚĞǀĞŶĨĂŵŝůǇĂŶĚŵĂƚƌŝŵŽŶŝĂůůĂǁƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?37  In the English courts the 
management of insolvency can be observed repeatedly challenging our principles 
and our legal mechanisms, from pushing the boundaries of constructive trusts38, via 
debating the rights of cohabitees39, ƚŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŶŐĂƐƚŚĞ “ƚĞƐƚŝŶŐŐƌŽƵŶĚĨŽƌŶŽǀĞů
types of intangible property. ?40  Practical examples of the behavioural impact of 
changes in insolvency law include the emergence of the use of hire purchase in order 
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to avoid buyer in possession terms41 and its subsequent role as a quasi-security 
transaction, or the shift to asset based lending that occurred after Re Spectrum Plus42 
determined that security on book debts were a floating rather than a fixed charge.  
&ƌŝƐďǇ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŽŶŝŶƐŽůǀĞŶĐǇŽƵƚĐŽŵĞƐĨŽƵŶĚĂůŝŶŬďĞƚǁĞĞŶůĞŶŐƚŚƐŽĨƉƌŽĐĞĞĚŝŶŐƐ
and uncertainty surrounding the Brumark43 decision regarding charges over book 
ĚĞďƚƐ ?ĂƐĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚďǇŽŶĞƉƌĂĐƚŝƚŝŽŶĞƌŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞĞ P “ ‘tĞ ?ǀ ŐŽƚƌĞĐĞŝǀĞƌƐŚŝƉƐƚŚĂƚ
have been open from 1999 which, had it not been for Brumark, would have been 
over, and now, after Spectrum ?ǁĞ ?ǀĞŐŽƚĂĨůƵƌƌǇŽĨĂĐƚŝǀŝƚǇŐŽŝŶŐŽŶƚŽĐůŽƐĞ
ƚŚĞŵ ? ? ?44  High end commercial behaviour is demonstrably responsive to changes in 
insolvency law.   
Recognising insolvency laws do impact upon commercial practice, the theoretical 
divide between normative and material incentives is crucial when evaluating how 
insolvency laws impact upon behaviour.  This is particularly the case if trying to write 
laws to achieve a particular outcome, such as viable rescue or increasing investment.  
By applying a materialist economic analysis to developing insolvency laws you will, to 
borrow the metaphor, simply seek make the parking fine cost more than the price of 
the ticket divided by the probability of getting caught.  Failure to take into account 
both the normative and material incentives will lead to incorrect conclusions about 
the impact of the law.  Some people will choose to pay for their parking ticket even if 
there is no chance that they will be caught.  The difficult question is to what extent 
insolvency laws need to take these factors into account. 
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1.2  ORDERLY AND EFFECTIVE INSOLVENCY AND THE ASIAN 
FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 1997 
Recognising the economic importance of insolvency laws, tŚĞ “Orderly and Effective ?
model of insolvency law reform was developed from a series of recommendations by 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF)45 and the World Bank46 to the transitional 
economies after the Asian financial crisis of 1997.  The IMF report was drafted by 
Sean Hagan from the IMF legal department representing a team of IMF lawyers and 
consulting widely with academics and professionals.  It was designed to build upon 
ƚŚĞ “<ĞǇWƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐĂŶĚ&ĞĂƚƵƌĞƐŽĨĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞ/ŶƐŽůǀĞŶĐǇZĞŐŝŵĞƐ ?47 report of the G-
22 Working Group on International Financial Crisis, by identifying the key issues 
involved in the design and application of insolvency laws and the advantages and 
disadvantages of different approaches.  Hagan described the work as  “ĂŶŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ
component of IMF-supported economic programs in many countries because of the 
ŝŵƉĂĐƚƐƵĐŚƌĞĨŽƌŵĐĂŶŚĂǀĞŽŶĂĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƐĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂŶĚĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? ?48 and 
sizable IMF loans were conditional upon pursuing economic reforms that included 
changes to insolvency law, intended both to help solve the problems that caused the 
crisis and also to safeguard IMF resources by increasing chances of repayment.49  The 
fact the loan conditions were built upon IMF recommendations suggests that this 
was not ĂŶĞƵƚƌĂůĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚ ?ďƵƚƌĂƚŚĞƌŽŶĞƉƌŽƉŽƐŝŶŐĂƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞƉŽůŝĐǇ “ƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚƚŽ
ĂůůĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ? ?50 
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The Asian financial crisis was a sovereign debt crisis that started in Thailand and 
quickly spread throughout East Asia, collapsing currency values and sending interest 
rates soaring.  It has been described as a ĐƌŝƐŝƐŽĨƐƵĐĐĞƐƐ ? “caused by a boom of 
international lending followed by a sudden withdrawal of funds. At the core of the 
Asian crisis were large-scale foreign capital inflows into financial systems that 
bĞĐĂŵĞǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞƚŽƉĂŶŝĐ ? ?51  Now that developed nations are suffering their own 
financial crisis, with European states seeking IMF bailouts amidst serious questions 
about levels of sovereign debt and panic in the markets, it is pertinent to ask whether 
they should be following similar advice.   
Financial crises can usefully be described from a selection of five characteristics: 
macroeconomic policy induced, financial panic, bubble collapse, moral hazard and 
disorderly workout.  Radalet and Sachs, whose work defines these characteristics, 
argue that the Asian Crisis was a panic followed by a disorderly workout52, on the 
grounds that it was largely unanticipated and followed by a large number of 
nominally good loans going bad.  Others focus on moral hazard issues in the Asian 
ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůƐǇƐƚĞŵƐǁŚŝĐŚ “ŵĂŐŶŝĨŝĞĚƚŚĞĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŽŶĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ
process of financial markets liberalization in the 1990s, exposing its fragility vis-à-vis 
the macroeconomic and financial shocks that occurred in the period 1995- ? ? ? ? ?53, 
while Krugman argues that  “the Asian story is really about a bubble in and 
subsequent collapse of asset values in general, with the currency crises more a 
symptom than a cause of this underlying real (in both senses of the word) malady. ?54   
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The interdependency of finance is such that crises are likely to contain elements of all 
these characteristics, making it difficult to forensically diagnose particular flaws in 
any national economy or legal regime.  The recent occidental crisis has included a 
housing bubble collapse (triggering the crisis through bundled securities), the 
exposure of vulnerable financial systems, market panics (the Northern Rock bank 
run55 being the most obvious but certainly not the largest example), and moral 
hazard issues (bankers ? pay, incentives and management structures being particularly 
topical at the moment).56  There are notable differences between the credit crunch 
and the Asian financial crisis.  For example, withdrawal of foreign credit during the 
Asian crisis caused soaring interest rates57, whereas occidental nations are currently 
managing to maintain low interest rates (although these lower interest rates have 
not entirely mitigated tightening credit conditions which are a symptom of both 
crises).  It is equally important to recognise that developed and developing nations 
have different requirements regarding credit governance, as the World Bank 
describes: 
While much credit is unsecured and requires an effective enforcement system, an effective 
system for secured rights is especially important in developing countries. Secured credit plays 
an important role in industrial countries, notwithstanding the range of sources and types of 
financing available through both debt and equity markets. In some cases equity markets can 
provide cheaper and more attractive financing. But developing countries offer fewer options, 
and equity markets are typically less mature than debt markets. As a result most financing is in 
the form of debt. In markets with fewer options and higher risks, lenders routinely require 
security to reduce the risk of non-performance and insolvency.
58
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The fifth, and final, characteristic of financial crisis is disorderly workout, which brings 
corporate insolvency law clearly into the equation.  A disorderly workout is where an 
illiquid or insolvent borrower is driven into liquidation even though they are worth 
more as a going concern.  Thus we might define orderly workouts as those that 
prevent firms that are worth more as a going concern from being driven into 
liquidation, providing a key definition within the Orderly and Effective model.  Falke 
suggests that the Asian financial crisis ĞǆƉŽƐĞĚ “the inadequacy of corporate 
insolvency law regimes or their application in many of those economies.  In times of 
rapid growth the significance of functioning insolvency systems was largely ignored 
because banks and other creditors could extend credit without repayment risk and 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐĐŽƵůĚĂĨĨŽƌĚƚŽďĂŝůŽƵƚĨĂŝůŝŶŐĚĞďƚŽƌƐ ? ?59  The implication is that during 
economic downturns the likelihood of disorderly workouts increases, although it is an 
open question as to whether this is because workouts are more likely to be 
disorderly or because there are simply more failures (or, indeed, both).  Radalet and 
Sachs explain that    
disorderly workout occurs especially when markets operate without the benefit of creditor 
ĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŝŽŶǀŝĂďĂŶŬƌƵƉƚĐǇůĂǁ ?dŚĞƉƌŽďůĞŵŝƐƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐŬŶŽǁŶĂƐĂ “ĚĞďƚŽǀĞƌŚĂŶŐ ? ?/Ŷ
essence, coordination problems among creditors prevent the efficient provision of working 
capital to the financially distressed borrower and delay or prevent the eventual discharge of 
bad debts (e g, via debt-equity conversions or debt reduction).
60
  
This may be interpreted in two ways.  A first, strict, approach would be that in 
conditions of efficient provision borrowers will never choose to liquidate a firm that 
is worth more if it continues to trade.  At one extreme this leads to the argument 
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that all government intervention is inefficient61, but as Cartwright observes  “ŝƚŝƐ
ǁŝĚĞůǇƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞĚƚŚĂƚŵĂƌŬĞƚƐĂƌĞĨƌĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇŝŵƉĞƌĨĞĐƚŝŶƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?62.  Even in an 
otherwise perfect market there will be occasions when users choose to liquidate 
even though they would make more money by supporting a rescue.  Furthermore 
this decision is likely to have more to do with the peculiarities of how people make 
decisions and interpret data, than any calculated model of the utility of revenge or 
excluding rogue directors being greater than the monetary return of an effective 
rescue. 
A second approach would be that if in a perfectly efficient system creditors still 
choose to make less money by liquidating a viable firm, an Orderly and Effective 
system will support that choice.  It is submitted that in English law this is not the 
case.  The extent to which English law pursues a business rather than a corporate 
rescue approach will be considered in Chapter 2 but it is quite clear that it will 
restrain creditor liberty of choice in favour of viable rescue:   “ƚhe court has clearly 
reinforced the aim of the statute (to preserve value) and the rescue culture 
supported by government i.e. to save business as a going concern wherever possible 
and to maximise the return to all creditors, even in the face of opposition from a 
ŵĂũŽƌĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌ ? ?63  Nor does it seem to fit the definition of orderly workout that 
requires orderly insolvency laws not to liquidate firms that are worth more if 
rescued. 
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Accepting it is policy that effective rescue should be prepared to override the will of 
creditors, the question becomes what conditions encourage creditors both to 
correctly identify whether a workout will provide better returns than liquidation and, 
if a perfect market is not enough, then what can be done to encourage creditors to 
choose viable rescue?   Equally, does such a policy make initial investment more 
attractive?  
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1.3  EFFICIENT INSOLVENCY 
Efficiency modelling has had a profound impact upon the analysis of insolvency law, 
both because of its important role in 20th century economic theory and because it 
provides a means to effectively circumvent the problem of identifying the value of a 
rescue outcome.  It will be seen that these principles are clearly echoed in the 
Orderly and Effective insolvency model, but are not slavishly followed.  This tension is 
rooted in a problem that both efficiency theorists and their critics are confronted by: 
how we determine and equally how we perceive the value of a distressed enterprise. 
Woolworths was one of the high profile 
ĐĂƐƵĂůƚŝĞƐŽĨƚŚĞĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůĐƌŝƐŝƐ ?dŚĞ “ ? ? 
ĚĞĂů ?ŚĞĂĚůŝŶĞŝƐŵŝƐůĞĂĚŝŶŐ ?dhe 
Times64 went ŽŶƚŽĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƚŚĂƚ,ŝůĐŽ ?Ɛ
offer included assuming £35 million 
debt in return for ownership of the 
Woolworths retail branch.  For a lawyer 
it is an echo of £1 per annum ground 
rent paid by the widow in Thomas v 
Thomas
65, and the contract law principle that consideration must be sufficient but 
need not be adequate, which ŝƐĞŶĐĂƉƐƵůĂƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨ “ƉĞƉƉĞƌĐŽƌŶƌĞŶƚƐ ? ?66  
It would be hard to argue that the assumption debt was not adequate consideration 
in itself, leaving the extra £1 an anachronism of English contract law, but it is an 
anachronism that one frequently encounters in this type of transaction.  Does this 
ŵĞĂŶƚŚĞ “ ? ?ĚĞĂů ?ŚĞĂĚůŝŶĞŝƐƐŝŵƉůĞũŽƵƌŶĂůŝƐƚŝĐŵŝƐĐŚŝĞĨŵĂŬŝŶŐ ?ŽƌŝƐƚŚĞƌĞ
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something more to it? Is there something about selling a chain of tŽŽůǁŽƌƚŚƐ ?shops 
for the price of a bag of their `pick and mix ? that makes it stick in the zeitgeist? 
One of the primary objectives identified by the IMF in an Orderly and Effective 
insolvency regime is ƚŽ “ŵĂǆŝŵŝƐĞƚŚĞǀĂůƵĞŽĨƚŚĞĂƐƐĞƚƐŽĨƚŚĞĞƐƚĂƚĞ ? ?67  The most 
obvious way to measure value is price, and it is an often cited principle of economics 
ƚŚĂƚǀĂůƵĞĞƋƵĂƚĞƐƚŽƉƌŝĐĞ P “ƚŚĞĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐǀĂůƵĞŽĨƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐŝƐŚŽǁŵƵĐŚ
someone is willing to pay for it or, if he has it already, how much money he demands 
for parting with it. ?68  Yet part of what the Woolworths ? story illustrates is an on-
going concern with a perceived divergence between value and price.    This has been 
a long standing conundrum for inƐŽůǀĞŶĐǇůĞŐŝƐůĂƚƵƌĞƐ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ “ŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞŵĂŝŶ
reasons for the reforms to the UK insolvency law as proposed in the Cork Report 
(1982) and as partly reflected in the 1986 Act was to prevent a receiver (receiver 
manager), representing the collection of debenture-holders, selling the business for 
ƚŽŽůŽǁĂƉƌŝĐĞ ? ?69  This raises a significant sticking point:  how do you know when the 
price is too low?  Ɛ>ŽƉƵĐŬŝŽďƐĞƌǀĞƐ ? “^ĐŚŽůĂƌƐŝŶůĂǁ ?ĨŝŶĂŶĐĞ ?ĂŶĚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐŚĂǀĞ
long debated the best way to determine ĂĚŝƐƚƌĞƐƐĞĚĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ƐǀĂůƵĞ Q  
[accountants typical preferred method future cash flow valuation has been] famously 
referred to as a  ‘ŐƵĞƐƐĐŽŵƉŽƵŶĚĞĚďǇĂŶĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞ ? ? ?70   
It is widely accepted that the price of a firm and its assets drops when it becomes 
ŝŶƐŽůǀĞŶƚ ? “ĂŶŬƌƵƉƚĐǇƐĐŚŽůĂƌƐĨŽƌǇĞĂƌƐŚĂǀĞǀŝĞǁĞĚƚŚĞĐŚŽŝĐĞƐĨĂĐŝŶŐĂ
corporation as either to reorganise consensually in order to preserve going-concern 
ǀĂůƵĞŽƌŚĂǀĞŝƚƐĂƐƐĞƚƐƐŽůĚƉŝĞĐĞďǇƉŝĞĐĞĨŽƌĂĨƌĂĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŝƌǀĂůƵĞ ? ?71  Lopucki 
and Doherty have demonstrated the profound impact liquidation, as opposed to 
                                                          
67
 IMF (1999), 3 - Liquidation Proceedings, p16 
68
 Posner RA (2007), p10 
69
 Webb DC (1991), p151 
70
 Lopucki LM and Doherty JW (2007), p8   
71
 ĂŝƌĚ'ĂŶĚZĂƐŵƵƐƐĞŶZ< ? “ŚĂƉƚĞƌ ? ?ĂƚdǁŝůŝŐŚƚ ? ?Stanford Law Review 56 (2003) 673-700, p691 
  
27 
 
reorganisation, ŚĂƐŽŶƚŚĞǀĂůƵĞŽĨĂĨŝƌŵ P “ĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐƐŽůĚĨŽƌĂŶĂǀĞƌĂŐĞŽĨ ? ?A?ŽĨ
book value but reorganised for an average fresh-start value of 80% of book value and 
an average market capitalization value ? based on post-reorganisation stock 
trading ?ŽĨ ? ?A?ŽĨďŽŽŬǀĂůƵĞ ? ?72   Their work was controlled for differences in pre-
filing earnings, limiting the impact of the argument that firms that were capable of 
being reorganised were simply less overvalued than those that were liquidated, and 
in a different context Espen Eckno and Thorburn have shown that even in an auction 
environment (where one would expect a more effectively functioning market) 
piecemeal liquidation significantly reduces the achievable price of the assets of a 
firm.73  This provides strong evidence that insolvency reduces price, but what does 
that tell us about value?  Are these collapsing bubbles or distorted values?  How are 
we to assess whether a rescue is worthwhile if prices are unstable? 
For some the best tactic is to avoid the problem altogether.  This can be achieved by 
applying theories of perfect competition, in which  “ĂƉĞƌĨĞĐƚůǇĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝǀĞĞĐŽŶŽŵǇ
is allocatively efficient:  resources could not be reallocated to ŝŵƉƌŽǀĞĂŶǇŽŶĞ ?Ɛ
ǁĞůĨĂƌĞǁŝƚŚŽƵƚƌĞĚƵĐŝŶŐƚŚĞǁĞůĨĂƌĞŽĨĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ? ?74  This has encouraged an 
approach to markets where regulators try as much as possible not to interfere in the 
decisions of private parties.  The principle appears imbedded in the English law 
principle of freedom of contract as described in Printing and Numerical Registering 
Co. v Sampon
75: 
If there is one thing which more than another public policy requires it is that men of full age 
and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their 
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contracts entered into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall be enforced by 
courts of justice.
76
    
Yet what here can be read as a social point about individual liberty has grown into a 
philosophy about optimal choice.  IŶŝŶƐŽůǀĞŶĐǇůĂǁ “ƚŚĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůƉŽůŝĐǇŽĨƚŚĞůĂǁŝƐ
to treat creditors themselves as being in the best position to decide what is in their 
ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ?77, reflected in ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞ ? ?ŽĨƚŚĞtŽƌůĚĂŶŬWƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƚŚĂƚ “ƚhe 
court/tribunal or regulatory authority should be obliged to accept the decision 
reached by the creditors that a plan be approved or that the debtor be liquidated. ?78 
This is ĨƵůůǇƌĞĂůŝƐĞĚŝŶƚŚĞĂƐƐĞƌƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚ “ƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶŽĨďĂŶŬƌƵƉƚĐǇŝƐƚŽĂůůŽǁ
unpaid creditors to seize the ŝŶƐŽůǀĞŶƚĚĞďƚŽƌ ‘ƐĂƐƐĞƚƐ ?ƐĞůůƚŚĞŵĂŶĚŝŶǀĞƐƚƚŚĞ
ƉƌŽĐĞĞĚƐŝŶŽƚŚĞƌǀĞŶƵĞƐ ? ?79  This philosophy of insolvency efficiency  W that creditors 
are best placed to judge the best outcome and the law should operate to realise their 
intentions  W is embodied in the creĚŝƚŽƌƐ ?ďĂƌŐĂŝŶƚŚĞŽƌǇǁŚŝĐŚŐƌĞǁŽƵƚŽĨƚŚĞ
 ? ? ? ? ?ƐůĂǁĂŶĚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞh^ĂŶĚŚĂƐĚŽŵŝŶĂƚĞĚƚŚĞĨŝĞůĚĞǀĞƌ
since.80  The economic theory of law and the efficiency theory of the common law 
should not be confused.  Economic theory of law tries to explain many legal 
phenomena through the use of economics.  Efficiency theory of law hypothesizes a 
specific economic goal:  economic efficiency in the Kaldor-Hicks81 sense.82  Thus the 
insolvency efficiency model applies the economic theory of perfect competition to 
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argue that reducing intervention and enforcing creditor agreements is allocatively 
efficient and therefore provides the most welfare in society.  
/ƚƐĞĞŵƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂŶŝŶƚĞůůĞĐƚƵĂůůĞĂƉďĞƚǁĞĞŶ^ĐŚǁĂƌƚǌ ?ƐĚĞĐůĂƌĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚ “ƚhe 
efficiency goal holds that the object of business law, broadly speaking, is to maximise 
ƐŽĐŝĂůǁĞĂůƚŚ ?83 ĂŶĚ&ŝŶĐŚ ?ƐĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚƚŚŽƐĞĂƉƉůǇŝŶŐƚŚĞŝŶƐŽůǀĞŶĐǇĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇ
model conceive that  “ƚŚĞƉƌŽƉĞƌĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶŽĨŝŶƐŽůǀĞŶĐǇůĂǁĐĂŶďĞƐĞĞŶŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽf a 
single objective: to maximisĞƚŚĞĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞƌĞƚƵƌŶƚŽĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌƐ ? ?84 Maximising returns 
to creditors is not self-evidently the same thing as maximising social welfare.  The key 
to understanding the argument is that for the efficiency theorist maximising creditor 
returns is the best way to maximise social wealth. 
:ĂĐŬƐŽŶ ?ƚŚĞ “ŵĂŝŶĐŚĂŵƉŝŽŶ ?85 ŽĨƚŚĞĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌƐ ?ďĂƌŐĂŝŶƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?ĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ
reason why disorderly workouts override individual ?s ability to achieve the best 
outcome independently is because of a market failure.  The IMF lays out the exact 
same contention here: 
tŚĞŶĂŶŝŶƐŽůǀĞŶĐǇĚĞďƚŽƌ ?ƐĂƐƐĞƚƐĂƌĞŝŶƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƚŽŵĞĞƚŝƚƐůŝĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ?ĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů
ĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌ ?ƐďĞƐƚƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇŝƐƚŽƌƵƐŚƚŽƚĂŬĞƚŚĞŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇůĞŐĂůŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐƚŽĂƚƚĂĐŚĂŶĚƐĞŝǌĞ
assets ďĞĨŽƌĞŽƚŚĞƌĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌƐŚĂǀĞĂĐŚĂŶĐĞƚŽƚĂŬĞƐŝŵŝůĂƌĂĐƚŝŽŶ ?ƉƉůǇŝŶŐƚŚĞƉƌŝƐŽŶĞƌ ?Ɛ
dilemma paradigm, while such behaviour will appear rational from the perspective of 
ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌƐ ?ƐƵĐŚĂ ‘ŐƌĂďƌĂĐĞ ?ǁŝůůŶŽƚ ?ŝŶĨĂĐƚ ?ďĞŝŶƚŚĞĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞƐĞůĨ-interest of 
creditors; not only are the legal actions taken by creditors costly, but such a disorderly 
piecemeal dismantling the entity will lead to a loss in value for all creditors.
86
 
This leads Jackson to argue that the primary rationale of insolvency law is to force 
ĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌƐƚŽĂďŝĚĞďǇĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞƐƚŚĂƚǁŝůůŽǀĞƌĐŽŵĞƚŚĞƉƌŝƐŽŶĞƌ ?Ɛ
                                                          
83
 Schwartz A (1998), p1813 
84
 &ŝŶĐŚs ? “dŚĞDĞĂƐƵƌĞƐŽĨ/ŶƐŽůǀĞŶĐǇ>Ăǁ ? ?Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 17 (1997) 227-251, p230 
85
 Walton K and Keay A (2008), p25 
86
 IMF (1999), 2  W General Objectives and Features of Insolvency Procedures, p12 
  
30 
 
dilemma.87  dŚŝƐŝƐƚŚĞĐƌƵĐŝĂůĨŝƌƐƚĞůĞŵĞŶƚŝŶƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ^ĐŚǁĂƌƚǌ ?ƐŝŶƐŝƐƚĞŶĐĞƐ
that the only mandatory rules in insolvency law should be structural.88  This de-
minimus approach is focused on mandatory stays and collective action sufficient to 
overcome the grab race.  It is intended to achieve an outcome that mirrors what 
parties would achieve from behind a Rawlsian 'veil of ignorance'89, where creditors 
can achieve the outcome they would seek if not driven by fear of being betrayed by 
the others, or as Jackson puts it himself:  
ĂŶŬƌƵƉƚĐǇƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐĂǁĂǇƚŽŽǀĞƌƌŝĚĞƚŚĞĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌƐ ?ƉƵƌƐƵŝƚŽĨƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶƌĞŵĞĚŝĞƐĂŶĚ to 
ŵĂŬĞƚŚĞŵǁŽƌŬƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ QĂƐ such, it reflects the kind of contract that creditors would agree 
to if they were able to negotiate with each other before extending credit.
90
   
This approach leads to a very particular way of evaluating insolvency laws: 
When one is dealing with firms, the question is how to convert the ownership of the assets 
from the debtor to its creditors, not how to leave assets with the debtor.  But the process is 
costly.  Bankruptcy law, at its core, is concerned with reducing the costs of conversion.
91
 
A bankruptcy law can help to achieve this goal [maximising social wealth] by reducing the 
costs of debt capital Q ?This instrumental goal, in turn, is facilitated by maximising the 
creditors' expected return when the firm is insolvent. Therefore, an efficient bankruptcy 
system maximises the value that firms have in, and as a consequence of, the system and 
minimizes the costs of realizing that value.
92
  
The efficiency model is deliberately focused on the conversion of assets to satisfy the 
creditor, and the minimisation of costs in the process of this conversion.  It is a model 
of law that is heavily focused on the extremity of insolvency, on liquidation.  This is in 
the belief that, given a clear vision of how things will be resolved in the event of 
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liquidation, parties will have a clear incentive to make rational choices regarding 
reorganisation.  The ĨŽĐƵƐŽŶĐŽƐƚƐƚŝĞƐďĂĐŬŝŶƚŽƚŚĞĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌ ?ƐďĂƌŐĂŝŶĂƐƉĂƌƚŽĨ
being a means to ensure that parties either get what they bargained for or what they 
would have bargained for, thus Schwartz suggests that  “ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐƐŚŽƵůĚďĞĨƌĞĞƚŽ
ĐŚŽŽƐĞƉƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚďĂŶŬƌƵƉƚĐǇƐǇƐƚĞŵƐŝŶƚŚĞŝƌůĞŶĚŝŶŐĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?93, and Rasmussen 
that  “ĨŽƌƚŽŽůŽŶŐďĂŶŬƌƵƉƚĐǇƐĐŚŽůĂƌƐŚĂǀĞĨĂŝůĞĚƚŽƌĞĂůŝǌĞƚŚĂƚďĂŶŬƌƵƉƚĐǇůĂǁŝƐ
ƌĞĂůůǇƉĂƌƚŽĨĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚůĂǁ ? ?94   By keeping insolvency laws as narrow as possible 
efficiency proponents hope to create the minimum possible distortion of individuals ? 
incentives to privately order themselves to their own advantage. 
The natural extension of this reasoning is that questions of public interest, no matter 
how important they are in law or to society, are not applicable in insolvency law.95  
This is not, according to the insolvency efficiency model, a question of distributive 
priority but rather one of efficiency;  “/ƚŝƐŝŶĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƚŽƌĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐe firms to save jobs, 
and society has better means than bankruptcǇƚŽƐŽůǀĞƚƌĂŶƐŝƚŝŽŶƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ Q
bankruptcy systems should function only to reduce the costs to firms of debt 
ĨŝŶĂŶĐĞ ? ?96 It is argued that as communities are better placed to judge if a business 
should be supported, and investors are better placed to negotiate their priority on 
default, emphasis on efficiency actually minimises the costs of business collapse.97  
Insolvency efficiency does not ignore social welfare, but rather considers that the 
benefits of redistribution within the insolvency framework are outweighed by the 
costs of inefficiency.  This piece of reasoning is how insolvency efficiency theorists 
are able to equate maximising social welfare with maximising the collective return to 
creditors. 
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Taken together this leads directly to perhaps the most famous characteristic of 
insolvency efficiency:  rigid adherence to the absolute priority rule. 98  The principles 
of allocative efficiency have been applied to insist that  “ŝŶsolvency state rights should 
ďĞƉƌĞƐĞƌǀĞĚŝŶŝŶƐŽůǀĞŶĐǇƐƚĂƚĞƐ ?99, effectively restated by Goode in the notion that 
the  “ƐĞĐƵƌĞĚĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌŝƐĂĐĐŽƌĚĞĚƉƌŝŽƌŝƚǇďĞĐĂƵƐĞŚĞďĂƌŐĂŝŶĞĚĨŽƌŝƚ ? ?100  An 
efficient insolvency law ensures that secured creditors are paid first.   
The pinnacle of the use of the free market rationale in policy making was achieved 
through the application of Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) to the operation of 
financial markĞƚƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐŝŶĨĂĐƚ “ũƵƐƚĂŶĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĞǆƉĞĐƚĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŽ
ƚŚĞƉƌŝĐŝŶŐŽĨƐĞĐƵƌŝƚŝĞƐ ?101 and an extension of the first welfare theorem that  “ĂƐ
long as producers and consumers act as price makers and there is a market for every 
commodity, the equilibrium allocation of resources is Pareto efficient. ?102  EMH was 
introduction by Eugene Fama in his doctoral thesis in 1970103.  He identified three 
forms of informational efficiency in capital markets: the weak, where past prices 
cannot be used to predict future security prices; the semi-strong, where publically 
available information cannot predict future security prices; and the strong, where 
security prices cannot be predicted.104  Although the strong version can be rejected 
due to the existence of things like insider trading105, the semi-strong and weak 
models proved extremely durable.   
This then popularised the notion that prices in capital markets reflect all available 
information, or as Ayer puts it  “ŝĨƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂĨŝǀĞĚŽůůĂƌďŝůůůǇŝŶŐŽŶƚŚĞƐƚƌĞĞƚŝŶǇour 
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ŶĞŝŐŚďŽƵƌŚŽŽĚ ?ƐŽŵĞŽŶĞŚĂƐĂůƌĞĂĚǇƉŝĐŬĞĚŝƚƵƉ ? ? 106  This idea was hugely 
influential on financial practice and investment strategy.107   The most obvious 
problem with it is that the tools that were its progeny failed to manage either the 
dot-com boom in the early nineties or the current credit crunch.  EMH is the 
intellectual father of Northern Rock  W because models derived from EMH gave the 
markets confidence in securitised bundles of sub-prime debts  W and the financial 
crisis has encouraged growing support for the criticism of the theory.   
Two of the strongest criticisms are behavioural bias and cultural bias.  Behavioural 
Economists KĂŚŶĞŵĂŶĂŶĚdǀĞƌƐŬǇ ?Ɛ ‘WƌŽƐƉĞĐƚdŚĞŽƌǇ ?108 demonstrates behavioural 
bias by showing that standard utility theory behaves poorly under conditions of risk, 
and cultural bias.  Meanwhile an important proponent of the role of cultural bias, 
Schiller109, has shown the large impact on markets of social and cultural aspects, 
ŵĞĚŝĂĐŽǀĞƌĂŐĞĂŶĚ “ĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚŝĚĞĂƐŝŶƚŚĞƉŽƉƵůĂƌĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞ ? ?110  Stemming from 
these two critiques the notion of rationality in particular has come under fire:   
 “dŽŽŽĨƚĞŶĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌƉŽůŝĐǇŚĂƐĨŽĐƵsed on the allegedly average consumer, who is in fact 
ŝŵďƵĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĂďŽǀĞĂǀĞƌĂŐĞƋƵĂůŝƚŝĞƐŽĨďĞŝŶŐ ‘ƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůǇǁĞůůŝŶĨŽƌŵĞĚĂŶĚƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůǇ
ŽďƐĞƌǀĂŶƚĂŶĚĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƉĞĐƚ ? ?dŚĞůĂǁƵƐĞƐƚŚŝƐŵŽĚĞůĂŶĚĂƐƐƵŵĞƐĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌƐŽďƐĞƌǀĞ
information, rationally process it and act in predictable ways.  Vulnerable consumers are seen 
as atypical consumers, for whom special protection measures may be needed, but whose 
ŶĞĞĚƐƐŚŽƵůĚŶŽƚŐĞƚŝŶƚŚĞǁĂǇŽĨĚĞƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚůŝďĞƌĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶƚŽďĞŶĞĨŝƚƚŚĞ ‘ĂǀĞƌĂŐĞ ?
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consumer.  The truth is that we are all to some extent vulnerable, because of the limitations of 
the human mind.
111
   
/ƚŝƐƉƌŽďĂďůǇĨĂŝƌĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐǁŽƌŬ “ŚĂƐŶ ?ƚƐŚŽǁŶŝŶĂŐŐƌĞŐĂƚĞŚŽǁ
[behavioural economics] effects prices."112  It is also fair to say that markets are not 
always clear and prices do not reflect all available information, especially under 
circumstances where players ?  “ƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ?ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌŝƐďĞŝŶŐĐŽŵƉƌŽŵŝƐĞĚďǇƐƚƌŽŶŐ
social factors or exposure to risk.  Yet this critique of efficient markets profoundly 
impacts upon the Orderly and Effective insolvency model both because it questions 
the effectiveness of the market mechanism through which user objectives are 
realised.  More fundamentally, this highlights the fact that users are not always the 
best placed to judge what is in their own best interests.  This is in direct contrast to 
the principle in Printing and Numerical Registering.113 
Even if the behavioural critiques are rejected, concentrating on attempting to 
achieve perfect markets may not create more effective insolvency laws because 
Pareto-optimal results in a free market may not meet policy objectives: 
While private market choices may lead to a Pareto-efficient outcome, ethical principles are 
required if we are to choose between outcomes that distribute economic benefits differently 
between individuals.  It is also difficult to see how you might indicate your preference for, say, 
an integrated and sustainable transport system by walking into a shop and buying some 
particular product.
114
   
English law is prepared to override the wishes of major creditors in order to pursue 
the overriding rescue objective.115  This might be justified on the basis of Kaldor-Hicks 
Efficiency, an alternative model that allows moves that disadvantage one party 
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provŝĚĞĚ “ƚŚĞǁŝŶŶĞƌƐĐŽƵůĚĐŽŵƉĞŶƐĂƚĞƚŚĞůŽƐĞƌƐ ?ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŽƌŶŽƚƚŚĞǇĂĐƚƵĂůůǇ
ĚŽ ?116 and also known as potential Pareto superiority.  However, prioritising viable 
rescue above all other outcomes must inevitably lead to Pareto inefficient solutions 
because it overrides individual utility:  the conclusion is that if Pareto optimality is at 
the root of Orderly and Effective insolvency (via Insolvency Efficiency) then English 
insolvency law is not ideally Orderly and Effective.  
However, Pareto efficiency is based ŽŶĂ “ƐĞƚŽĨǀĂůƵĞũƵĚŐĞŵĞnts that are far from 
innocuous. ?117  Two that are of particular note concerning this analysis of insolvency 
law are the assumptions of non-paternalism and process independence.  Non-
paternalism is the assumption that individuals are the best judges of their own 
welfare, which translates as the ability to make the sorts of calculations that 
underpin EUT.  Process independence suggests that the means by which allocations 
are achieved is unimportant, which has been strongly refuted by procedural justice 
theory where preferences for adversarial over inquisitorial justice, regardless of 
outcome, have been established because it gave a greater opportunity to put what 
they felt was important in front of a judge.118  This problem might be overcome by 
allowing that satisfaction with the procedure is part of the utility achieved in the 
outcome, but this is not strictly part of the Pareto model.   
Of course the Orderly and Effective model of insolvency predates the financial crisis 
and the current explosion in the popularity of behavioural economics.  It is not 
difficult to see echoes of both efficient market hypothesis and pertinently the 
contractualists insolvency efficiency approach in the IMF model:  the centrality of 
enforcing priority, emphasis on efficiency, the importance of the prevention of the 
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grab race and the link being made between cost of debt capital and returns to 
creditors from insolvency proceedings.  The following quote from the guidelines 
shows how directly the IMF has applied the theories of the contractualists: 
As a general rule, if the assets of the estate are encumbered, the proceeds of their sale should 
first be distributed to secured creditors to the extent of the value of their secured claim, plus 
any compensation arising from the stay that has not already been paid during the proceedings 
 QdŚĞŝŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶŽĨŽƚŚĞƌƐƚĂƚƵƚŽƌǇƉƌŝǀŝůĞŐĞƐ ?ǁŚŝůĞƚŚĞǇŵĂǇďĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇĨŽƌ
social or political reasons, should be limited to the extent possible since they generally 
undermine the effectiveness and efficiency of insolvency proceedings.
119
  
Insolvency efficiency is an elegant solution to the problem of determining and 
comparing value in business failure, but one does not have to be particularly cynical 
to identify another reason why the efficiency model has proved both popular and 
enduring.  Its central conclusion is that the best means to promote global welfare is 
to focus on protecting secured creditors, which for the most part means protecting 
the interests of the rich and powerful.  Warren articulates her frustrations with the 
ĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚŝŶŚĞƌĞůŽƋƵĞŶƚĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞŽĨĂŝƌĚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŽŶĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚƵĂůŝƐŵ P 
Baird sees collectivism as something of an intellectual yardstick, a tool that he can use to 
determine whether a particular bankruptcy proposal is good or bad-solely by measuring 
ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŝƚƉƌŽŵŽƚĞƐŽƌŝŵƉĂŝƌƐĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀŝƐŵ Q  Collectivism is nothing but a veil to conceal his 
relentless push for single-value economic rationality, an excuse to impose a distributional 
scheme without justifying it, and, incidentally, a way to work in a damn good deal for secured 
creditors.  By focusing on an economic rationale-without defending this exclusive focus, Baird 
eliminates without discussion or proof any other values that may be served by bankruptcy.
120
  
Communitarian theorists, like Warren, challenge the basic premises of the efficiency 
economic model of insolvency:  “namely that individuals should be seen as selfish, 
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rational calculators ? 121  They argue that insolvency law must weigh the interests of a 
broad range of different constituents and the wider community  W employees, 
suppliers, government, consumers and neighbours.  By considering a wider range of 
constituent interests it takes on a more  “ƉƵďůŝĐůĂǁĨŽĐƵƐ ?122, attempting to intervene 
to balance the tensions that arise rather than leaving them to the market.   
The over-simplification of the single value economic-rationality approach does not 
hold together well under scrutiny.  When Rasmussen argues that  “ďĂŶŬƌƵƉƚĐǇůĂǁ is 
really part of contract law ?123 and thus only the initial arrangements should count, 
Goode counters that this  “ŽǀĞƌůŽŽŬƐƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƉƌŽďůĞŵƐĐŽŶĨƌŽŶƚŝŶŐ
ĐůĂŝŵĂŶƚƐŽƵƚƐŝĚĞƚŚĞĐŽŵŵŽŶƉŽŽůĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌƐĂƌŝƐĞƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇĚƵĞƚŽƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?Ɛ
insolvĞŶĐǇĂŶĚĨŽƌŶŽŽƚŚĞƌƌĞĂƐŽŶ ? ?124   An example is that for claims of employees 
wrongfully or unfairly dismissed the general law cannot prescribe priority as it makes 
no sense outside of the context of insolvency.  Warren expands: 
Contract law need not take account of the values relevant to sanctioning debtor default, 
because these values are accounted for in the debtor-creditor collection scheme. Without the 
refined and balanced system of debtor-creditor lawդ  which includes a well-developed concept 
of bankruptcyդ  contract law itself would look very different, and its enforcement would be 
considerably more constrained... The enforcement scheme in debtor-creditor law 
acknowledges values different from those central to contract law. Idiosyncratic factors 
involved in the changed circumstances of debtors in extreme financial distress become 
important.
125
  
The claim that insolvency law is properly a species of contract law seems 
indefensible.   The insolvency efficiency approach appears to be beset by this sort of 
overwhelming desire for ideological purity.  Its proponents are prepared to conduct 
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all sorts of acrobatic acts of reasoning in order to justify placing all needs secondary 
to giving secured creditors what they contracted for.  Perhaps this is betraying a 
deeper ideology.  The principle of freedom to contract, described above as sacred 
public policy in Printing and Numerical Registering126, could in itself be described as a 
communitarian interest:  a policy choice that one could explicitly choose ahead of 
greater returns.  But such a policy choice would by definition be disorderly, as on 
occasion it would result in firms that may have greater worth being liquidated in the 
name of preserving freedom of contract.   
Another likely element is that ideological inclinations are being exacerbated by 
methodological limitations.  Abstraction is an essential part of economic modelling.  
Economics is traditionally considered the study of the production, distribution and 
ĐŽŶƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶŽĨŐŽŽĚƐĂŶĚƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ ?ďƵƚ “ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐs theory requires only that scarce 
ƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐŵƵƐƚďĞĂůůŽĐĂƚĞĚĂŵŽŶŐĐŽŵƉĞƚŝŶŐƵƐĞƐ ? ?127  The word comes from the 
'ƌĞĞŬĨŽƌ ‘ŚŽƵƐĞŚŽůĚŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?ĂŶĚǁĂƐĚĞǀĞůŽped as a species of sophistry.  The 
modern discipline aspires to a more scientific approach, but relies heavily on 
abstraction rather than empiricism.  Posner defends this approach in his seminal 
work on law and economics:   
Abstraction is the essence of scientific inquiry, and economics aspires with some success to be 
scientific...  an economic theory of law will not capture the full complexity, richness, and 
confusion of the phenomena  W criminal or judicial or marital or whatever that it seeks to 
illuminate.  But its lack of realism in the sense of descriptive completeness, far from 
invalidating the theory, is a precondition of theory.  A theory that sought faithfully to 
reproduce the complexity of the empirical world in its assumptions would not be a theory  W an 
explanation  W but a description.128   
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Yet the obvious danger of abstraction is that it can be used to simply avoid issues 
that challenge your thesis.  dŚĞƌĞŝƐĂŶĂƚƵƌĂůƉƌŽƉĞŶƐŝƚǇƚŽ “ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƚŽ
ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŽŶĞ ?ƐŝŶƐƚŝŶĐƚŝǀĞŽƉŝŶŝŽŶƐ QƚŽďĞůŝĞǀĞŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƐ ?ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ?
ǀŝĞǁƉŽŝŶƚĂŶĚĚŝƐĐƌĞĚŝƚŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚĚŽĞƐŶŽƚ ? ?129  Contractualists have been 
frequently criticised for building theoretical constructs without taking the time to 
verify them by empirical evidence130, with Keay and Walton going so far as to state 
ƚŚĂƚĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚƵĂůŝƐƚƐ ?ĂŶƐǁĞƌƐĂƌĞ “ƚŽŽĐůĞĂƌ-ĐƵƚĂŶĚŐůŝď ? ?131   Warren makes the point 
very clearly: 
If the central policy justification is nothing more than a single economic construct, specific 
conclusions with system wide impact follow neaƚůǇĨƌŽŵĂŶĂďƐƚƌĂĐƚƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞ Qthe 
uncomfortable normative issues can be avoided by playing a narrow game of logic.
132
  
^ŚĞĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƐƚŽĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƚŚĞĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĂƐ “utterly self-referential ? 133, attractive 
ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉĂůůǇďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝƚ “spares the proponent from nasty hours searching out 
empirical evidence or trying to learn about what happens in real borrowing and 
lending decisions ? ?134  This is not even the bluntest critique of the school of thought.  
Samuel Bufford, who at the time of writing was a Californian Bankruptcy Judge with 
ƚĞŶǇĞĂƌƐ ?ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞĂƚƚŚĞďĞŶĐŚ ?ŽĨĨĞƌĞĚƚŚĞĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐĞǀĂůƵĂtion of a series of 
papers written by some of the most influential contractualists of the day: 
The central points of these papers are gravely mistaken Q they completely misunderstand the 
character of the bankruptcy caseload and procedures, they ignore some important purposes 
of bankruptcy reorganisation, and they misstate the success rate for reorganisations... they 
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recommend radical changes in bankruptcy law, and they are based on the thinnest knowledge 
of bankruptcy practice. Incidentally, they also all take an economics approach to law.
135
 
The problem is not that insolvency efficiency takes an economic approach to the law, 
but rather that it often ƵƐĞƐĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂďƐƚƌĂĐƚŝŽŶ ?ƐĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽƐŝŵƉůŝĨǇŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽ
push what is essentially an ideological point via  “19th century notions of laissez-faire 
economics Q that rest on inarticulate groping towards efficiency. ?136  Although 
ƉƵƌƉŽƌƚŝŶŐƚŽĂǀŽŝĚĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚŝǀĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĞŝƌ “Đonclusions are nonetheless driven 
by normative values and empirical assumptions ?137:  the insolvency law they propose 
is redistributive from the weak to the strong.   
Bufford goes to some lengths to present actual data from the insolvency courts to 
ƌĞďƵƚƚŚĞƉĂŶĞů ?ƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐ ?,ŝƐĐŚŝĞĨŽďũĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐƵŶƐƵƌƉƌŝƐŝŶŐůǇĨƌŽŵĂ
judge, is that the insolvency efficiency proponents are presenting their theories 
without supporting evidence, or where evidence is used very limited examples are 
taken to extrapolate to the whole: 
This statement [that markets seem to be the only available devices which really do solve the 
problems of financial distress because markets are efficient and bankruptcy procedures are 
not] is simply incorrect. The empirical evidence shows that most markets are far from 
efficient: we have bankruptcy law in large part because of this problem. Debtors need an 
opportunity to suspend the rights of creditors because markets are so inefficient.  Similarly, 
markets do not solve the problems of financial distress.
138
  
Nobody knows whether, on balance, the economy is better off because bankruptcy permits 
debtors to try to wait out imperfect markets: the data has not been collected.
139
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Warren argues for a multi-value approach,  “ĂĚŝƌƚǇ ?ĐŽŵƉůĞǆ ?ĞůĂƐƚŝĐ ?ŝŶƚĞƌĐŽŶŶĞĐƚĞĚ
view of bankruptcy from which I can neither predict outcomes nor even necessarily 
ĨƵůůǇĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞĂůůƚŚĞĨĂĐƚŽƌƐƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚƚŽƚŚĞƉŽůŝĐǇĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ? ?140  While this sounds 
marvellously poetic it does not appear to be particularly practically applicable.  It 
risks avoiding making decisions by leaving all options valid and nothing but confusion 
for those who must actually draft and apply insolvency laws.141  The insolvency 
ĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐ ?ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨƚŚĞůĂǁƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐĂĐůĞĂƌĞƌŵŽĚĞůƵƉŽŶ
which to base policy.  Equally, communitarians are no more immune to the 
limitations and seductions of economic abstraction than efficiency theorists, nor are 
they I suspect any more or less lazy as a group when it comes to looking for data or 
considering context.  It would be more reasonable to recognise that conducting law 
and economics research is replete with technical challenges that lawyers are not 
always best equip to manage:   “ƚŚĞŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇŽĨŝƚƐƉƌĂĐƚŝƚŝŽŶĞƌƐĂƌĞďĂƐĞĚŝŶůĂǁ
schools, and have not received any systemic training in either sociological theory or 
research methods,. ?142  This is not some inherent deficiency in lawyers:  we have all 
encountered otherwise well-educated and informed non-lawyers who find law in 
practice utterly mysterious and proceed to find everything but the right end of the 
stick.   
When it comes to insolvency law in practice, however, the progenitors of English 
insolvency law recognised that an element of communitarian policy should exist in 
English law.  A good insolvency law is defined ĂƐďĞŝŶŐŽŶĞƚŚĂƚŝƐĂďůĞƚŽ “ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞ
that the effects of insolvency are not limited to the private interests of the insolvent 
and his creditors, but that other interests of society or other groups in society are 
vitally affected by the insolvency and its outcome, and to ensure that these public 
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interests are recognised aŶĚƐĂĨĞŐƵĂƌĚĞĚ ? ?143  If the contractualists are correct this 
would strongly imply that English law is less effective than it could be, because these 
efforts to safeguard public interests will be reflected in higher costs of debt capital 
and subsequently reduced investment and lower aggregate welfare.  Is this 
perfidiousness on the part of English law, compromising the principles of efficiency 
and associated greater welfare in order to address immediate social concerns?  Are 
both English law and the Orderly and Effective ŵŽĚĞůƐŚĞĞƉŝŶǁŽůǀĞƐ ?ĐůŽƚŚŝŶŐ ?
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1.4  THE ORDERLY AND EFFECTIVE REGIME:  PREDICTABILITY 
AND PROTECTION OF VALUE 
The IMF explains that regimes should be Orderly and Effective.  As we saw above, 
orderly regimes prevent firms that are worth more as a going concern from being 
driven into liquidation, and effective regimes maximise the value realised through 
the insolvency process.  CŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƐƵĐŚƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞƐ “plays a critical 
role in fostering growth and competitiveness and may also assist in the prevention 
and resolution of financial crisis:  such procedures induce greater caution in the 
incurrence of liabilities by debtors and greater confidence in creditors when 
extending credit or rescheduling their claims. ?144  Thus two key objectives are 
identified:  predictability, and preservation of value. 
 
1.4.1 Predictability 
The IMF demands that an Orderly and Effective insolvency regime ensure the 
ĂůůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƌŝƐŬŝŶĂ “ƉƌĞĚŝĐƚĂďůĞ ?ĞƋƵŝƚĂďůĞ ?ĂŶĚƚƌĂŶƐƉĂƌĞŶƚŵĂŶŶĞƌ ?145, echoed by 
the World Bank ?s statement that  “a modern credit-based economy requires 
predictable, transparent and affordable enforcement of both unsecured and secured 
ĐƌĞĚŝƚĐůĂŝŵƐ ? ?146  Further analysis reveals that these three words -predictable, 
equitable and transparent - speak to the same underlying idea.  Predictability is the 
ƐĂůǀĞƚŽƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ “erodes the confidence of all participants and undermines 
ƚŚĞŝƌǁŝůůŝŶŐŶĞƐƐƚŽŵĂŬĞĐƌĞĚŝƚĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ ? ?147  Equitability does 
not refer to equality but is a species of predictability as it is particularly concerned 
ǁŝƚŚ “ƚŚĞƉƌŽďůĞŵŽĨĨƌĂƵĚĂŶĚĨĂǀŽƵƌŝƚŝƐŵƚŚĂƚŽĨƚĞŶĂƌŝƐĞƐŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨ
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ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůĚŝƐƚƌĞƐƐ ? ?148  Fraud and favouritism undermine predictability by defeating 
expectation, which in turn reduces confidence in investment.  dƌĂŶƐƉĂƌĞŶĐǇŝƐ “vital 
to establishing public trust in the insolvency system Q ?/ƚ ? allows the public to form 
opinions on the insolvency system through the media and other outlets. ?149  It is 
about ensuring parties have enough information for them to exercise their rights, 
both in terms of adequate guidance and ensuring that courts give sufficient 
explanation of their decisions.  
The World Bank asks the legal system to make a difficult judgement call: 
Where an enterprise is not viable, the main thrust of the law should be swift and efficient 
liquidation to maximisĞƌĞĐŽǀĞƌŝĞƐĨŽƌƚŚĞďĞŶĞĨŝƚŽĨĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌƐ QKŶƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌŚĂŶĚ ?ǁŚĞƌĞĂŶ
enterprise is viable, meaning it can be rehabilitated... [it] should be promoted through formal 
ĂŶĚŝŶĨŽƌŵĂůƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞƐ QDŽĚĞƌŶƌĞƐĐƵĞƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞƐƚǇƉŝĐĂůůǇĂĚĚƌĞƐƐĂǁŝĚĞƌĂŶŐĞŽĨ
commercial expectations in dynamic markets. Though such laws may not be susceptible to 
precise formulas, modern systems generally rely on design features to achieve the objectives 
outlined above.
150
 
Balancing the need for swift predictable judgement and evaluating this wide range of 
commĞƌĐŝĂůĞǆƉĞĐƚĂƚŝŽŶƐƌĞƐƚƐƵƉŽŶ “the degree of discretion that the law gives to 
this infrastrƵĐƚƵƌĞǁŚĞŶŝƚĂƉƉůŝĞƐƚŚĞůĂǁ ? ? 151  Too much discretion and the system 
becomes unpredictable; too little and it ceases to be commercially responsive. 
In English law the question of how to manage judicial discretion has been part of a 
long standing debate about the importance of legal certaŝŶƚǇ ?tŚĞƚŚĞƌŝŶŝĐĞǇ ?Ɛ
rule of law protecting individuals from an arbitrary state152, or as principle of inherent 
ŵŽƌĂůŝƚǇŝŶ&ƵůůĞƌ ?ƐŵŽƌĂůůĂǁ153, the concept of legal certainty has always been a key 
                                                          
148
 Ibid 
149
 World Bank (2001), p59 
150
 Ibid, p5 
151
 IMF (1999), 2 - General Objectives and Features of Insolvency Procedures, p10 
152
 Dicey AV, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 10th Ed, MacMillan (London:  1968), p187 
153
 Fuller L, The Morality of Law, Yale University Press (New Haven: 1973), p262 
  
45 
 
component of any discussion of the principles of proper law making.154  Douzinas and 
EĞĂĚĂƌŐƵĞƚŚĂƚƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇůĂǁƐ “ŵƵƐƚďĞũƵƐƚŝĨŝĞĚďǇƐƚƌŝĐƚŶĞĐĞƐƐŝƚǇĂŶĚŵƵƐƚĨŽůůŽǁ
ŐĞŶĞƌĂůƌƵůĞƐĂŶĚĂĐůĞĂƌůŽŐŝĐ Q [and] cannot indulge fanciful subjective 
considerations ?155, while Slapper and Kelly describe the practical importance of legal 
certainty for promoting predictability as follows: 
Lawyers and clients are able to predict what the outcome of a particular legal question is likely 
to be in the light of previous judicial decisions.  Also, once the legal rule has been established 
in one case, individuals can orientate their behaviour with regard to that rule, relatively secure 
in the knowledge that it will not be changed by some later court.
156
   
Two convictions are central to this notion of certainty.  First, that preserving the rule 
of law protects us from the whims of the judiciary.   Second, that predictability allows 
us to safely order our actions according to the probable legal response, as famously 
described by Oliver Wendall Holmes: 
 A man may have as bad a heart as he chooses, if his conduct is within the rules.  In other 
words, the standards of the law are external standards, and, however much it may take moral 
consideration into account, it does so only for the purpose of drawing a line between such 
bodily motions and rests as it permits, and such as it does not.  What the law really forbids, 
and the only thing it forbids, is the act on the wrong side of the line, be that act blameworthy 
or otherwise.
157
  
Principles like clarity, calculability and reliability are encoded into European Law158 
and are all the progeny of the desire for legal certainty, as is the doctrine of stare 
decisis in the common law.159  In contemporary insolvency law there is a repeated 
ĨŽĐƵƐŽŶƚŚĞĐƌĞĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂ “ĐůĞĂƌ ?ƉƌĞĚŝĐƚĂďůĞĂŶĚƚƌĂŶƐƉĂƌĞŶƚŝŶƐŽůǀĞŶĐǇƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ
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which enables both debtor and creditor to calculate the consequences in the event 
ŝŶƐŽůǀĞŶĐǇĂĐƚƵĂůůǇŽĐĐƵƌƐ ? ?160  Promoting legal certainty in this form has been a pillar 
of the advice given to developing nations by organisations like the IMF, the World 
Bank and the OECD.161  The reasoning behind this is that it is felt that, in a legally 
certain insolvency regime, potential creditors will be able to better evaluate the risks, 
ĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐŝŶŐĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚĂŶĚƐƚĂďůĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ P “DĂŶĚĂƚŽƌǇƌƵůĞƐ ?ǁŚĞŶ
precisely formulated, give legal certainty to the parties and avoid litigation; they 
facilitate the proceedings and reduce their cost.  Moreover, specific rules and criteria 
provide for the predictability that is one of the overall objectives of an insolvency 
ůĂǁ ? ?162 This reference to precisely formulated mandatory rules has strong echoes of 
the work of the contractualists, discussed in Chapter 1.3. 
Does this mean that the call for legal certainty by the IMF implies they agree that 
only structural rules should be mandatory?  There is a clear logic in operation, based 
upon our expectations of creditor behaviour.  If creditors are given a predictable legal 
system then they will privately order in the most efficient fashion possible; thus, in 
ŶŐůŝƐŚůĂǁ ?ƚŚĞ “ƐĞĐƵƌĞĚĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌŝƐĂĐĐŽƌĚĞĚƉƌŝŽƌŝƚǇďĞĐĂƵƐĞŚĞďĂƌŐĂŝŶĞĚĨŽƌŝƚ ?163, 
and his ability to enforce his claim as a creditor reduces the risk of giving credit and 
ƚŚĞƌĞďǇ “increases the availability of credit and the making of investment more 
ŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇ ? ?164  It is a virtuous circle founded on the rationality of the creditor.  The 
primacy of predictability is therefore somewhat undermined if we discover that in 
ƌĞĂůŝƚǇĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌƐĂƌĞŽĨƚĞŶŝƌƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ?dŚĞtŽƌůĚĂŶŬ ?ƐƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐƚŽƚŚĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞ
of public trust and public opinion165 suggest that predictability means something 
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more than a list of de minimus structural rules, and the IMF and World Bank 
approach to Orderly and Effective insolvency goes beyond basic contractualism.  
Nonetheless, the influence of contractualism and efficiency modelling is clear in their 
discussion of predictability. 
 
1.4.2 Protection of Value 
The second objectivĞŽĨŝŶƐŽůǀĞŶĐǇůĂǁŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚďǇƚŚĞ/D&ŝƐ “ƚŽƉƌŽƚĞĐƚĂŶĚ
maximise value for the benefit of all interested parties and the economy in 
ŐĞŶĞƌĂů ?166, an objective that is achieved not only through rescue of viable businesses 
but also by the fashion in which unviable firms are liquidated.  There is an implicit 
recognition of the role of creative destruction in the economy here, a phrase 
ƉŽƉƵůĂƌŝƐĞĚĂƐĂƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞĨŽƌĐĞďǇ^ĐŚƵŵƉĞƚĞƌŝŶƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?Ɛ ?167  As Dahiya and 
Klapper observe: 
All economies are marked by somĞĚĞŐƌĞĞŽĨ ‘ƚƵƌŶŽǀĞƌ ?ŝŶƚŚĞƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŝƚƐĨŝƌŵƐǀŝĂĞŶƚƌǇ
of new firms and exit of existing firms.  This constant churning of the private sector plays a key 
economic role by constantly reallocating resources from non-surviving firms to surviving 
firms...  Since the survivors are likely to be the better performing firms, the creative 
destruction of poorly performing firms is central to innovation and growth in an economy.
168 
 
The availability of failure is essential in a predictable system, because it is considered 
to weed out weak players,  “ƚŚĞĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĞŝƚŝŵƉŽƐĞƐŽŶĂĚĞďƚŽƌŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞƐƚŚĞ
competitiveness of the enterprise sector and facilitates the provision of credit. ?169  
dŚŝƐŝƐƌĞĨůĞĐƚĞĚŝŶŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞŵŽƐƚŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚĨĂĐƚƐŽĨŝŶƐŽůǀĞŶĐǇ P “Ɖoor performance 
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is the primary reason for firm disappearance. ?170  This is to say the most common 
reason for a firm going bust is because it was not very good at what it did.  Removing 
bad firms from the market makes space for better firms to prosper, a notion which is 
a cornerstone of capitalism as Hobsbawm explains in his description of the 
development of the land commodity:  
Since the size of the earth was limited, and its various pieces differed in fertility and 
accessibility, those who owned its more fertile parts must inevitably enjoy a special advantage 
ĂŶĚůĞǀǇĂƌĞŶƚŽŶƚŚĞƌĞƐƚ Q ?ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ?ĞŶƚĂŝůƐĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌƉŽŚŝďŝƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƐĂůĞŽƌĚŝƐƉĞƌƐĂů
which rested on noble estates had to be broken and the landowner therefore subjected to the 
salutary penalty of bankruptcy for economic incompetence, which would allow economically 
more competent purchasers to take over.
171
   
dŚŝƐŝƐĂĐŚŝĞǀĞĚďǇĞŶƐƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŝŶƐŽůǀĞŶĐǇƌĞŐŝŵĞƐ “curtail the deterioration of the 
value of their assets by providing them with a means of ĞŶĨŽƌĐŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌĐůĂŝŵƐ ? ?172  
Protection of first claim secured credit, that is to say paying secured creditors first, is 
then correlated to the cost of credit in the broader economy: 
The introduction of any measures that erode the value of security interests requires careful 
consideration.  Such an erosion will ultimately undermine the availability of affordable credit:  
as the protection provided by security interest declines, the price of credit will invariably need 
to increase to offset the greater risk.
173
  
A prosperous economy requires that poor businesses fail, and the Orderly and 
Effective model points to the primacy of secured credit as a means to maintain this.  
The empirical evidence for this will be discussed in much greater detail in Chapter 4.  
The principle itself quickly runs into both economic and political difficulties.  A 
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relevant concern is that, particularly during financial crisis, widespread insolvency can 
ĐĂƵƐĞƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚŚĂƌŵ P “ĐƌĞĚŝƚĐŽůůĂƉƐĞƐƐƵĐŚĂƐƚŚŽƐĞŝŶƐŝĂĂƌĞŶŽƚƐŝŵƉůǇƚŚĞĞnd 
of socially destructive bubbles but also (or even mainly) result in the destruction of 
ƐŽĐŝĂůůǇƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝǀĞŽƵƚƉƵƚ ? ?174  Changing credit requirements, or the failure of 
customers or suppliers, can render businesses temporarily insolvent.  This may lead 
to their liquidation regardless of their long term viability.  A liberal model assumes 
rational creditors simply will not do this, but contemporary regimes seem unwilling 
to give them the chance.  This may be exacerbated by the difficulty in determining 
who is meant by secured creditors.  
ŶŐůŝƐŚůĂǁ ?ƐĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨĂƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝƐĂƌŐƵĂďůǇĂƌƚŝĨŝĐŝĂůŝŶƚŚĂƚŝƚĞǆĐůƵĚĞƐĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚƐ
such as hire purchase transactions, chattel leases, retention of title clauses and outright 
assignments of debts when these clearly function as security (and, indeed, are often referred 
ƚŽĂƐ ‘ƋƵĂƐŝ-ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ? ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇĂŵŽŶŐƐƚůĞŐĂůĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐ )ďƵƚĚŽŶŽƚĐŽŶĨĞƌƵƉŽŶ
the counterparty any property interest in assets of the company.
175
 
The definition of who is a secured creditor is not as transparent as might initial 
appear, as it excludes many types of people who are clearly holding some form of 
secured credit.  This makes it dangerous to assume that secured creditor priority is 
simply about shoring up returns for banks at the expense of small businesses and 
employees.  But even accepting that secured creditors include more than just the rich 
and powerful, the liberal economic model is a hard sell when people are losing their 
jobs.  During the Asian financial crisis transitional economies ?ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐ were 
criticised for de-liberalising their systems ƚŽ “ƵƚŝůŝǌĞƚŚĞŝŶƐŽůǀĞŶĐǇƐǇƐƚĞŵƚŽĐŽƌƌĞĐƚ
ŽǀĞƌǁŚĞůŵŝŶŐƐŽĐŝĂůŶĞĞĚƐŽĨƚŚĞƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?176, which may seem ironic now that 
European economies are engaged in bail-outs for failing banks and the automotive 
industries.  Will the East now accuse the West ŽĨ “vicarious measures that will 
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involve extensive use of public funds and give beneficiaries a substantial advantage 
over their less-favoured compeƚŝƚŽƌƐ ?177, following that well-established historical 
pattern that  “ŝŶƚŝŵĞƐŽĨĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĚŽǁŶƚƵƌŶƐŝŶƐŽůǀĞŶĐǇƉŽůŝĐǇĐŽŶĐĞŶƚƌĂƚĞĚŽŶƚŚĞ
promotion of enterprise reorganisation going along with the protection from mass-
unemployment, whilst in times of boom liquidation-favoured policies prevailed ?178?  
dŚĞŶĂƌƌŽǁĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŝŶƐŽůǀĞŶĐǇĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇŵŽĚĞůĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚŝƚǁĂƐŝŶƐŝĂ ?Ɛ
best interests to strip social intervention from their insolvency systems and allow 
secured creditors the power to liquidate their interests as quickly as possible.  By 
extension, compromises in English law regarding efficiency may be criticised as 
similarly crude political measures that reduce effectiveness and ultimately reduce 
social welfare.  Such a critique would be misguided.  An element of inclusivity and 
redistribution improves economics stability and the likelihood of effective rescue.  
English insolvency law is a living illustration of how pure efficiency is neither in 
secured ĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌƐ ? best interests nor is it actually what they seek from an insolvency 
regime, as shall subsequently be demonstrated.   
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 CHAPTER 2:  ENGLISH INSOLVENCY LAW AND THE 
INTRODUCTION OF A RESCUE CULTURE 
 
2.1 THE LAISSEZ FAIRE TRADITION OF ENGLISH LAW 
If English insolvency law is Orderly and Effective, what is it intended to effect?  
Effective law based on the recommendations of the OECD and the World Bank post 
the Asian financial crisis, as explored in Chapter 1, was geared towards improving 
foreign investment returns and consequently levels of foreign investment.  English 
law was influential in the design of these recommendations.  Are the objectives of 
English insolvency law therefore compatible with improving investment (whether 
foreign or otherwise)?  Is it effectively optimised for preventing the liquidation of 
firms that would realise more as a going concern, and maximising the realisation for 
insolvency procedures? 
A common characterisation of English law is that it is laissez-faire in that it  “ŽƉĞƌĂƚĞƐ
with a regard to those practices that develŽƉǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŵŵĞƌĐŝĂůǁŽƌůĚ ?1, a notion 
ƚŚĂƚŵĂǇĚĂƚĞďĂĐŬƚŽŝƚƐƌŽŽƚƐŝŶƚŚĞ>ĂǁDĞƌĐŚĂŶƚƚŚĂƚ “ŐƌĞǁƵƉĂŶĚĂƌŽƵŶĚƚŚĞ
ĐƵƐƚŽŵƐĂŶĚƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐĂĚŽƉƚĞĚďǇƚƌĂĚĞƌƐĂĐƌŽƐƐĐŽŶƚŝŶĞŶƚĂůƵƌŽƉĞ ?ĚƵring the 
middle ages.2 It is most iconically encapsulated in the principle of freedom of 
ĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĂůůŽǁƐƚŚĂƚ “ŵĞŶŽĨĨƵůůĂŐĞĂŶĚĐŽŵƉĞƚĞŶƚƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƐŚĂůůŚĂǀĞ
the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their contracts entered into freely and 
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ǀŽůƵŶƚĂƌŝůǇƐŚĂůůďĞŚĞůĚƐĂĐƌĞĚĂŶĚƐŚĂůůďĞĞŶĨŽƌĐĞĚďǇĐŽƵƌƚƐŽĨũƵƐƚŝĐĞ ? ?3  Franks 
ĂŶĚ^ƵƐƐŵĂŶĂƌŐƵĞŶŐůŝƐŚŝŶƐŽůǀĞŶĐǇůĂǁ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚŵĂŬĞƐŝƚ 
little more than the strict enforcement of the default clauses in the debt contract, as 
negotiated ex ante ďǇƚŚĞůĞŶĚĞƌĂŶĚƚŚĞďŽƌƌŽǁĞƌ Q ? ?ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ƐŚŽƵůĚĞǆƉĞĐƚƚŚĞĐŽƵƌƚƚŽ
ƐƚƌŝĐƚůǇĞŶĨŽƌĐĞƚŚĞĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƚŽƚƌǇĂŶĚ “ƐƵƉĞƌǀŝƐĞ ?ĂƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞ
ĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ƐĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚŝĞƐ ?4   
If correct, this approach would find favour with American contractualist insolvency 
scholars like Schwartz, who argued that  “ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐƐŚŽƵůĚďĞĨƌĞĞƚŽĐŚŽŽƐĞƉƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚ
ďĂŶŬƌƵƉƚĐǇƐǇƐƚĞŵƐŝŶƚŚĞŝƌůĞŶĚŝŶŐĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?5, and Rasmussen who observed 
ƚŚĂƚ “ĨŽƌƚŽŽůŽŶŐďĂŶŬƌƵƉƚĐǇƐĐŚŽůĂƌƐŚĂǀĞĨĂŝůĞĚƚŽƌĞĂůŝǌĞƚŚĂƚďĂŶŬƌƵƉƚĐy law is 
ƌĞĂůůǇƉĂƌƚŽĨĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚůĂǁ ? ?6 The centrepiece of the contractualist theory, as 
introduced in Chapter 1, is that insolvency laws focus on enforcing the contractual 
arrangements of firms by ensuring that only structural rules are mandatory.7  
StrucƚƵƌĂůƌƵůĞƐĂƌĞƚŚŽƐĞƚŚĂƚ “ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚƚŚĞŝŶƚĞŐƌŝƚǇŽĨĂďĂŶŬƌƵƉƚĐǇƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?ĂƐ
ŽƉƉŽƐĞĚƚŽƚŚŽƐĞ ?ǁŚŽƐĞŐŽĂůŝƐƚŽĂƵŐŵĞŶƚƚŚĞďĂŶŬƌƵƉƚĞƐƚĂƚĞ ?8, thus a mandatory 
stay is a structural rule and acceptable because it enhances parties ability to contract 
with certainty, whereas rules that require continued performance of a contract or 
impose prices are not because they are considered not to enhance ex-ante efficiency.  
For the contractualist the purpose of insolvency laws is to allow market mechanisms 
to ensure the most efficient allocation of resources and thereby maximise social 
utility, and the means of achieving this is to provide the minimum interference in 
privately ordered solutions.   
                                                          
3
 Printing and Numerical Registering Co. v Sampson (1875) LR 19 Eq 462 at 465 
4
 &ƌĂŶŬƐ:ZĂŶĚ^ƵƐƐŵĂŶK ? “&ŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůŝƐƚƌĞƐƐĂŶĚĂŶŬZĞƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌŝŶŐŽĨ^ŵĂůůƚŽDĞĚŝƵŵ^ŝǌĞh<ŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐ ? ?
Review of Finance 9(1) (2005) 65 W96, p66 
5
 ^ĐŚǁĂƌƚǌ ? “ŽŶƚƌĂĐƚdŚĞŽƌǇƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽƵƐŝŶĞƐƐĂŶŬƌƵƉƚĐǇ ? ?The Yale Law Journal, 107 (1998) 1807-1851, 
p1810 
6
 Rasmussen RK, "Debtor's Choice: A DĞŶƵƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞĂŶŬƌƵƉƚĐǇ ?Texas Law Review 71 (1992) 51-121, 
p121 
7
 Schwartz A (1998), p1809 
8
 Ibid, p1839 
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Prior to the Enterprise Act 2002 the ĨůŽĂƚŝŶŐĐŚĂƌŐĞŚŽůĚĞƌ ?Ɛ freedom to contract for 
the right to appoint an administrative receiver, in order to take control of a 
distressed companǇ ?Ɛ affairs, led to UK law being  “regarded as a partial 
approximation to this "contract bankruptcy" model ?9.  The implicit suggestion is that 
modern English insolvency law, and in particular replacement of administrative 
receivership with a new streamlined administration system, represents a retreat 
from contractualism because it limits the freedom of secured creditors to contract 
for control of the distressed firm via a receiver.  A retreat from contractualism would 
would be in keeping with the changing academic mood.  As seen in Chapter 1, the 
ĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚďĂŶŬƌƵƉƚĐǇŵŽĚĞůŚĂƐŝƚƐĐƌŝƚŝĐƐ ?>ŽƉƵĐŬŝƐƚĂƚĞƐďůƵŶƚůǇƚŚĂƚ^ĐŚǁĂƌƚǌ ?Ɛ
ŵŽĚĞů “ĞŵƉůŽys materially inconsistent assumptions and the proof reaches its goal 
only through miscalculations from those ĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶƐ ?10, his critique focusing on 
problems of unequal access to information and conflicting incentives because of the 
ƐŝŵƉůĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚ “ĐƌĞĚitors lend at different times or under different 
ĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ? ?11  Westbrook ĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚ “ ?ƚŚĞ ?abolition of the British system in 
 ? ? ? ?ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞƐĞŵƉŝƌŝĐĂůůǇƚŚĞƐĞƌŝŽƵƐǁĞĂŬŶĞƐƐĞƐŽĨƐĞĐƵƌĞĚĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚƵĂůŝƐŵ ?12 
because of the failure of the contract model to take into account the importance of 
control:   
Control is the central concept in any persuasive model of the field.  A lack of understanding of 
the role of control explains the failure to recognize and analyze the crucial distinction between 
an ordinary secured party and a dominant secured party and to see that the latter offers a 
possible alternative to the bankruptcy trustee.
13
 
                                                          
9
 ƌŵŽƵƌ: ?,ƐƵ ?tĂůƚĞƌƐ ? “ŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ/ŶƐŽůǀĞŶĐǇŝŶƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ<ŝŶŐĚŽŵ PdŚĞ/ŵƉĂĐƚŽĨƚŚĞŶƚĞƌƉƌŝƐĞĐƚ ? ? ? ? ?
European Company and Financial Law Review (2008) 148-171, p153 
10
 Lopucki LM, "Contract Bankruptcy: A Reply to Alan Schwartz" Yale Law Journal 109 (1999) 317-342, p319 
11
 Ibid , p340 
12
 Westbrook J, "The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy", Texas Law Review, 82 (2004) 795-862, p796 
13
 Ibid , p861 
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Contractualism gives concentrated lenders the scope to pursue their own interests 
ahead of those of other stakeholders.  It thus does nothing to redress the power 
imbalance between groups such as, on the one hand, financial institutions, and on 
the other, unsecured involuntary creditors.  Nor does it address the belief that 
 “procedures controlled by secured creditors may tend to result in outcomes biased 
against the continuation of the insolvent company's business and towards piecemeal 
liquidation. ?14  Armour, Hsu and Walters continue that:  
The prevailing international trend appears to be on the side of the critics - that is, a strong 
preference for collective formal rescue proceedings in which control rights are vested 
(principally) in unsecured creditors.  This is reflected in global and regional initiatives in the 
context of transnational insolvency such as the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border 
Insolvency and the EC Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings.
15
  
This may seem incongruous given the results in the first chapter.  The World Bank 
emphasised the important role of secured credit16 and the IMF stated that  
the introduction of any measures that erode the value of security interests requires careful 
consideration.  Such erosion will ultimately undermine the availability of affordable credit:  as 
the protection provided by security interest declines, the price of credit will invariably need to 
increase to offset the greater risk.
17
  
The primacy of contracted security is an important part of the contractualist model of 
efficiency and equally of the recommendations of the World Bank and the IMF.  If the 
Enterprise Act represents such an erosion of the value of secured credit does this 
mean that the law is now less Orderly and Effective than when it was inspiring the 
models used by the World Bank and the IMF18?   
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 Armour J, Hsu A, Walters A (2008), p154 
15
 Ibid 
16
 World Bank (2001), p4 
17
 IMF (1999), 3  W Liquidation Procedures, p23 
18
 ƌŝĞƌůǇWĂŶĚsůŝĞŐŚĞ' ? “ŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞtŽƌŬŽƵƚƐ ?ƚŚĞ>ŽŶĚŽŶƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĂŶĚĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůƐƚĂďŝůŝƚǇ ? ?Financial Stability 
Review (November 1999) 167-183, p170 
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This chapter, and the next, consider these questions by exploring the purpose of 
English insolvency law and whether this was changed by the Enterprise Act 2002. It 
looks at the objectives of English Law as described in the Cork Report19 and why 
these led to revisions to the 1986 law in 2002, the distinction between corporate and 
business rescue, and what difference the replacement of administrative receivership 
with administration has made.  Chapter 3 will comprise of a closer examination of the 
hierarchy of objectives presented in paragraph 3 of Schedule B1 of the Insolvency Act 
 ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŽƌ ?ƐĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨƚŚĞ ?creditor 
friendliness ? of the law, as well as a discussion of two important trends in modern 
English law:  the Administration and CVA as rescue devices, and the Pre-Pack 
administration.  It will be demonstrated across these two chapters that the increased 
inclusivity appears to have improved rather than eroded the position of secured 
creditors, and that this remains firmly in keeping with the traditional commercial 
sensitivity of English law.  
  
                                                          
19
 Insolvency Law and Practice: Report of the Review Committee (Cmnd 8558, HMSO 1982) ? “dŚĞŽƌŬZĞƉŽƌƚ ? 
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2.2 FROM THE CORK REPORT TO THE ENTERPRISE ACT:  THE 
INTRODUCTION OF A RESCUE CULTURE? 
Insolvency Law in England is governed by the Insolvency Act 1986 and Insolvency 
Rules 1986.  These have been amended several times since they were passed in to 
law, particular by the Enterprise Act 2002.  One of the most important characteristics 
of the English regime is that the directors of an insolvent company have a duty to the 
creditors of that company.20  Hopefully with this in mind, the directors of an insolvent 
firm have a range of options within this legal framework to deal with debts they 
cannot satisfy. 
The first is to do nothing.  This may seem trite but is actually rather important, not 
least because it is not an uncommon option for directors of insolvent companies to 
take.  An insolvent company can continue as long as it wishes, provided none of its 
creditors seek to enforce their debt.  The danger in doing nothing, of course, is 
exactly this.  Creditors can petition the court to have the company wound up or to 
appoint an administrator, or a properly qualified floating charge holder can move to 
appoint a receiver.  The holder of a floating charge will be properly qualified if they 
meet the requirement of the grandfathering provision21 that the security was taken 
before 15 September 2003, and the floating charge is over all or substantially all of 
the assets of the company.22 Administrative receivership was prospectively abolished 
by the Enterprise Act 2002 in favour of a new streamlined administration procedure, 
hence the requirement that floating charge holders meet the requirements of the 
grandfathering provision, but where still possible it represents one of the most 
dramatic examples of how under English insolvency law a debtor who chooses to 
delay dealing with their debts can quickly lose control of their own business.  The 
                                                          
20
 West Mercia Safetywear Ltd Liquidator of v Dodd [1988] BCLC 250 
21
 s72A Insolvency Act 1986 
22
 s29(2) Insolvency Act 1986 
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express powers of a receiver will have been set out in the original debenture, 
alongside powers set out under s1 IA 1986 under which the management are 
replaced and the receiver can take possession and sell assets in order to satisfy the 
debt.  Importantly, ƚŚĞƌĞĐĞŝǀĞƌ ?Ɛduty is to the floating charge holder and not to the 
other creditors, and this duty is limited only by a requirement of reasonable conduct 
towards the company. 
Alongside the danger that creditors will take matters into their own hands, another 
important risk to the passive debtor is the aforementioned shift, when the company 
becomes insolvent, from a primary duty to the company to a primary duty to the 
creditors.  This opens them up to the possibility of action for wrongful trading23, and 
a requirement to contribute personally to the assets of the company, or fraudulent 
trading24, which imposes both criminal and civil liability on directors for acting against 
the interests of their creditors, not to mention the risk of disqualification under 
Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986.  Thus while it is entirely possible for an 
insolvent company to continue trading without making use of formal or informal 
insolvency proceedings, there are significant risks both to the company and to the 
directors. 
The second option, therefore, is to attempt to make some sort of deal with the 
creditors.  At its most informal this can simply mean picking up the phone and 
arranging to make a payment a few days late, and informal re-negotiation of debt is 
an extremely common part of day to day business.  In addition to this, English law 
offers two informal procedures for insolvent debtors to renegotiate their debts.  The 
first is a Scheme of Arrangement under part 26 of the Companies act 2006.  This 
effects a reorganisation of a company that, once it has the courts sanction, will bind 
                                                          
23
 s214 Insolvency Act 1986 
24
 s213 Insolvency Act 1986 
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both dissenting and unknown creditors, but it is expensive and requires the 
involvement of the court. 
The other informal procedure is a Company Voluntary Arrangement under ss1-7 
Insolvency Act 1986, which is a written proposal by the directors in which they 
nominate an insolvency practitioner to supervise the plan, state how the business 
will be run during the CVA, give a summary of current financial information and the 
financial projections, and make a comparison with recoveries for creditors under 
other insolvency outcomes (in particular winding up).  If the proposal is passed by 
vote then it binds all creditors who were given notice or who would have been 
entitled to vote, although secured and preferential creditors ? rights to their priority 
cannot be affected without their consent.  No further court involvement is required.  
Management remains in place, making reports to the supervisor nominated in the 
original plan.  The Insolvency Act 2000 introduced a moratorium from companies in 
paragraph 2(1) of Schedule 1A, which includes small companies but excludes banking 
and insurance businesses, and this alongside lower costs has made the CVA a 
preferable option to the more expensive Scheme of Arrangement.  
The third option for directors of an insolvent company is to put the firm into 
administration themselves.  The directors may make an application to the court to 
appoint an administrator, which the court will do if they consider it reasonably likely 
that the administration will achieve its purpose.  The Enterprise Act 2002 also 
introduced a new out-of-court procedure for appointing an administrator25.  Either 
way, the administrator takes over the management of the company and is appointed 
to fulfil the three stage tests under Schedule B 3(1).  These stages are aimed at 
maximising returns to all creditors, and the first of them is to attempt to rescue the 
                                                          
25
 Schedule B1 paras 14-21 Insolvency Act 1986 allow a qualified floating charge holder to do so, paras 22-34 allow 
the company/directors to do so. 
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company as a going concern.  He has wide ranging powers to carry on the business of 
the company, take possession and dispose of property of the company, raise money 
on security, ĂŶĚĞǆĞĐƵƚĞĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚƐĂŶĚĚĞĞĚƐŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ƐŶĂŵĞ ?dŚĞ
appointment of administration creates an immediate moratorium on enforcement 
action, and within eight weeks of appointment the administrator circulates their 
proposals for achieving the purpose of the administration to Companies House, the 
creditors and the shareholders.  A creditors ? meeting is then usually held within ten 
weeks of appointment to consider the proposals and recommend changes, although 
the court may make interim orders where creditors do not agree, and the 
administrator may also make use of the CVA procedure if they consider it 
appropriate.  Their appointment is automatically terminated after 12 months, 
although it can be extended once by 6 months with creditor agreement.  The 
ultimate outcome for the company, and often more appropriately the underlying 
business, is a question for the good judgement of the administrator.   
The fourth and final option for the directŽƌƐŽĨĂŶŝŶƐŽůǀĞŶĐǇĐŽŵƉĂŶǇŝƐĂƌĞĚŝƚŽƌƐ ?
Voluntary Liquidation (CVL).  The company convenes an extraordinary general 
meeting at which it passes resolutions to approve the CVL (84(1)(c) and appoint a 
liquidator.  This must be advertised in the Gazette within 14 days.  A creditors 
meeting is then convened within 14 days of the advertisement, where the directors 
set out the companies affairs and the creditors can vote for the appointment of their 
own liquidator, or elect a committee from which the liquidator must seek approval 
when attempting to exercise certain of his powers.  The liquidator is an agent of the 
company and must cŽůůĞĐƚĂŶĚƌĞĂůŝƐĞƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?Ɛ assets.  He may seek to 
challenge voidable transactions or sue directors for wrongful or fraudulent trading, or 
disclaim onerous property, but needs permission of the committee (if there is one) or 
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the court if they wish to commence legal proceedings or carry on running the 
business.  Assets are then distributed in the following order of priority: 
x >ŝƋƵŝĚĂƚŽƌ ?s costs with relation to fixed charge assets; 
x Fixed charge creditors; 
x Liquidators costs with regards to floating charge assets; 
x Preferential Debts, typically concerning employees or certain occupational 
pension funds; 
x The prescribed part of the floating charge26, which is 50% of first £10,000 then 
20% thereafter up to a maximum fund of £600,000, to be distributed amongst 
unsecured creditors; 
x Floating charge creditors; 
x dŚĞůŝƋƵŝĚĂƚŽƌ ?ƐĐŽsts with regards to  “ĨƌĞĞ ?ĂƐƐĞƚƐĂŶĚƚŚĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůĞǆƉĞŶƐes of 
winding up;27  
x Unsecured creditors  W ordinary trade creditors and crown debts; 
x Interest on unsecured and preferential debts; 
x Payments to shareholders according to their class of shares. 
Thus English law might be characterised by the way in which it offers alternatives for 
the directors of an insolvency firm: doing nothing, doing a deal, informal procedures, 
administration, or voluntary liquidation.  These options in turn are characterised by 
the way in which they change who controls and manages the firm, and the outcome 
being sought.   
So how did the Enterprise Act operate to change this landscape?  And where how 
comfortably does it sit with the Orderly and Effective model or as the paragon of 
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 s176A Insolvency Act 1986 
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 s115 and s156 Insolvency Act 1986 
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insolvency efficiency?  The Enterprise Act did not introduce the notion of rescue to 
English law.  TŚĞŶŐůŝƐŚ ‘ƌĞƐĐƵĞĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ?ǁĂƐďŽƌŶƚǁĞŶƚǇǇĞĂƌƐďĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞŶƚĞƌƉƌŝƐĞ
ĐƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ “dŚĞŽƌŬZĞƉŽƌƚ ?28, a government commissioned review 
into the reform of insolvency law that led to the introduction of the Insolvency Act 
1986 and  
 Qundoubtedly remains the most influential review of the principles and aims of UK insolvency 
law to ever be produced. Its clarity, completeness, and profundity is consistently remarkable 
and it therefore comes as no surprise that it continues to serve as a point of reference for 
insolvency scholars and insolvency professionals alike.
29
   
dŚĞ/ŶƐŽůǀĞŶĐǇĐƚ ? ? ? ? “ĐĂŶďĞseen as the first wave of rescue-oriented insolvency 
law reform in the United Kingdom. ?30  As Lord Browne-Wilkinson observes in Powdrill 
v Watson  “ƚŚĞrescue culture which seeks to preserve viable businesses was, and is, 
fundamental to much of the Act of  ? ? ? ? ?31   It ǁĂƐĂůƐŽĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ “a basic objective 
of the law to support the maintenance of commercial ŵŽƌĂůŝƚǇ ? ?32  This notion of 
commercial morality is an integral part of the assessment of commercial viability.  An 
example of how English insolvency law attempts to achieve this is in the 
contemporaneous Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986.  Section 6 demands 
that upon application the court will make a disqualification order or between 2-15 
years where it finds that the conduct of the director of an insolvent Ĩŝƌŵ “ŵĂŬĞƐŚŝŵ
ƵŶĨŝƚƚŽďĞĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚŝŶƚŚĞŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨĂĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ? ?33  The result is that there is 
 “in every insolvency proceeding, an initial overview of the conduct of directors. ?34  
                                                          
28
 Insolvency Law and Practice: Report of the Review Committee (Cmnd 8558, HMSO 1982) ? “dŚĞŽƌŬZĞƉŽƌƚ ? 
29
 Frisby S (2011), p358 
30
 Armour J, Hsu A, Walters A (2008),  p150 
31
 Powdrill v Watson [1995] 2 AC 394, 442A-444A, cited by  
Armour J, Hsu A, Walters A (2008), p149 
32
  “dŚĞŽƌŬZĞƉŽƌƚ ? ?Para 191 
33
 Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, s6(1)(b) and s6(4) 
34
 Frisby S (2011), p382 
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This is very different from simple strict contractualist enforcement oĨĚĞďƚŽƌƐ ?
contracts. 
The Enterprise Act was not, therefore, written to introduce a rescue culture into a 
contractualist English law but rather to improve the one that had already been 
introduced in 1986.  AƐ&ƌŝƐďǇƉƵƚƐŝƚ “ƚhe Enterprise Act pioneers no new dogma, 
therefore, but rather seeks to apply an existing ideology ŵŽƌĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇ ? ?35 It sought 
ƚŽĂĚĚƌĞƐƐƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƚŚĂƚ “ƌĞƐĐƵĞƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞƐŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐĞĚŝŶƚŚĞ/ŶƐŽůǀĞŶĐǇĐƚ
 ? ? ? ?ǁĞƌĞ QƵŶĚĞƌƵƚŝůŝƐĞĚĂŶĚĂƌŐƵĂďůǇĨĂŝůĞĚƚŽĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐĞĂĐƵůƚƵƌĞŽĨcorporate 
ƌĞƐĐƵĞ ? ?36   dŚĞ “ĨŽƌĞŵŽƐƚŽďƐƚĂĐůĞ ?37 to achieving the rescue culture was considered 
ƚŽďĞƚŚĞƐǇƐƚĞŵŽĨĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝǀĞƌĞĐĞŝǀĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐ “ƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚƚŽŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶ
overused by lenders and to have created economic recessionary pressure. ?38 This is 
ƌĞŵŝŶŝƐĐĞŶƚŽĨƵĨĨŽƌĚ ?ƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚŝŶƐŽůǀĞŶĐǇůĂǁƐĞǆŝƐƚƐĂƐĂƐĂĨĞƚǇŶĞƚƚŽ
prevent secured creditors from causing an economic downward spiral.39    
The Enterprise Act sought to redress an imbalance between the use of 
administration, CVAs (Company Voluntary Arrangements) and administrative 
receiverships.  The key quality that distinguished administrative receivership from 
the other available remedies was that iƚŝƐ “ďǇŝƚƐŶĂƚƵƌĞĂƉƌŽƉƌŝĞƚŽƌŝĂůĞŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚ
remedy, possessed by one creditor, as opposed to a collective remedy available to all 
creditors. ?40  Its principle ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐŝƐƚŚĞƌĞĐĞŝǀĞƌ ?ƐƉƌŝŵĂƌǇŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĚƵƚǇ
is to the appointer41:   “limited obligations do not prevent a receiver ruthlessly 
promoting the interests of his appointer, and, in doing so, he owes no duty to 
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consider the position ŽĨƵŶƐĞĐƵƌĞĚĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌƐŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ? ?42  This conferred a 
ŐƌĞĂƚĚĞĂůŽĨƉŽǁĞƌƚŽƚŚĞŚŽůĚĞƌŽĨĂĨůŽĂƚŝŶŐĐŚĂƌŐĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ “underscored the 
common perception of the United Kingdom as a "bank friendly" jurisdiction. ?43  Not 
only could secured creditors appoint receivers to act on their behalf, but they also 
ŚĞůĚĂƉŽǁĞƌŽĨǀĞƚŽŽǀĞƌƚŚĞĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŵĞŶƚŽĨĂŶĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŽƌ ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐ “Ɖart of 
the explanation for relatively low usage [of administration and] Qcame under 
increasing scrutiny in policy circles. ?44  In essence the power of appointers was 
undermining the collectivity in insolvency proceedings. 
Concerns about focused control allowing abuse of process by stronger parties are 
ƌĞŵŝŶŝƐĐĞŶƚŽĨtĞƐƚďƌŽŽŬ ?Ɛcritique of contractualism.45  Mokal goes so far as to 
ĂƌŐƵĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĨůŽĂƚŝŶŐĐŚĂƌŐĞŝƐĂ “ƌĞƐŝĚƵĂůŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚĚŝƐƉůĂĐĞŵĞŶƚĚĞǀŝĐĞ ?46 
ǁŚŽƐĞǀĂůƵĞŝƐŝŶƚŚĂƚŝƚĂůůŽǁƐƚŚĞŚŽůĚĞƌƚŽ “ƚĂŬĞĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽĨƚŚĞĚĞďƚŽƌďǇ
ĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŝŶŐĂƌĞĐĞŝǀĞƌ ?47 in the event that they believe the business has become 
economically distressed.48  This led to two key complaints that administrative 
receivership was contrary to the rescue objectives described in the Cork Report:  first 
that it inhibited corporate rescue, and second that it disenfranchised unsecured 
creditors.49 
The first concern, that administrative receivership inhibited corporate rescue, was 
based upon the evaluation that the powers it granted to receivers  “ĐƌĞĂƚĞĚ
incentives for opportunistic behaviour and the premature liquidation of insolvent 
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ĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐ ? ?50  The root of this argument rested on the notion that the ĂƉƉŽŝŶƚĞƌƐ ? 
interests might not always be best served by the rescue of the firm:   
If the inteƌĞƐƚƐŽĨƚŚĞĂƉƉŽŝŶƚĞƌĂƌĞďĞƐƚƐĞƌǀĞĚďǇĂ ‘Ĩŝre-ƐĂůĞ ?ŽĨƚŚĞŝŶƐŽůǀĞnt estate then the 
receiver is duty-bound to pursue this strategy, notwithstanding that better realisations or a 
less terminal outcome for the company could be accomplished via a different approach.
51
  
The existence of incentives not to rescue where rescue might be available leads to 
certain natural conclusions: 
[the] receivership system had led to excessive liquidations and inflated bankruptcy costs: 
senior claimants lack incentives to maximise recoveries and minimise costs in cases where the 
Ĩŝƌŵ ?ƐĂƐƐĞƚƐare worth more than the face value of the senior debt. Secured creditor control, 
it was thought, therefore tended to reduce recoveries for junior claimants.
52
  
The receivership system was considered responsible for introducing perverse 
incentives that drove up costs and liquidated businesses that would have produced 
better returns if they had continued trading.  These conclusions are not 
ƵŶƉƌŽďůĞŵĂƚŝĐ ?tŚĂƚĂƌĞ “ĞǆĐĞƐƐŝǀĞůŝƋƵŝĚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂŶĚŚŽǁĐĂŶǇŽƵƚĞůůǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƚŚĞ
number is excessive?  How do you determine if costs are inflated?  These questions 
were approached through empirical work after the introduction of the Enterprise Act 
(which will be considered in the second half of this chapter), but at the time of the 
revisions such analysis was unavailable.  Instead, the notion that perverse incentives 
were causing excessive liquidations (essentially that economically viable firms were 
being liquidated when a better option was available) gained strength during the 1991 
recession53 due to the impression that the availability of a quick exit route for 
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appointers was aggravating the poor economic climate. 54  The incentive was 
considered to be a particularly large problem where secured creditors were  “over-
secured ? ?ƐƵĐŚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ƐĂƐƐĞƚƐŝŶůŝƋƵŝĚĂƚŝŽŶǁĞƌĞ worth as least as much 
ĂƐƚŚĞƐĞĐƵƌĞĚĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌƐ ?ĚĞďƚ P  “tŚĂƚŝŶĐĞŶƚŝǀĞ ?ƚŚe critics asked, did a receiver have 
to pursue a going concern strategy if the break-up value of the assets would be 
enough to repay the debt owing to the appointing creditor and cover the receiver's 
ĐŽƐƚƐ ? ?55  
The second concern, disenfranchisement of other creditors, is not just about 
unsecured creditors receiving lower returns.  Collectivity and inclusion are seen as 
important parts of an improved insolvency regime: 
The Governmenƚ ?ƐǀŝĞǁŝƐƚŚĂƚ, on the grounds of both equity and efficiency, the time has 
come to make changes which will tip the balance firmly in favour of collective insolvency 
proceedings - proceedings in which all creditors participate, under which a duty is owed to all 
creditors and in which all creditors may look to an office holder for an account of his dealings 
ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?s assets.56 
This leads Frisby to suggest that even if administration were not any more likely to 
increase survival rates than administrative receivership then  “ĂďŽůŝƚŝŽŶŽĨ
ƌĞĐĞŝǀĞƌƐŚŝƉŝƐŶĞǀĞƌƚŚĞůĞƐƐũƵƐƚŝĨŝĞĚ ?57 on the basis that receivership disenfranchised 
creditors.  Collective responses are seen as a salve to the potential perverse 
consequences of handing control to one interested party, and more broadly to 
improve both fairness and efficiency.  This is a bold claim.  As shall be seen in section 
2.3 of this chapter, receivership was both cheaper and faster than pre-Enterprise Act 
administration, and the efficiency argument is more typically the province of the 
contractualists. 
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Nonetheless, it was considered that the changes in the Enterprise Act 2002  “herald a 
new era of corporate insolvency law for the United Kingdom QŝŶƚĞŶĚĞĚƚŽĂƚƚĂŝŶƚŚĞ
goals of a superior corporate rescue environment, a better return for creditors and a 
generally fairer system ŽĨŝŶƐŽůǀĞŶĐǇĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶ ? ?58   The re-emphasis on rescue 
ƐŚŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞƚĂŬĞŶƚŽŝŵƉůǇƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŶƚĞƌƉƌŝƐĞĐƚƐŽƵŐŚƚƚŽŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐĞĂ ‘ŚĂƉƚĞƌ
 ? ? ?ĐƵůƚƵƌĞƐŝŵŝůĂƌƚŽƚŚĞŵƵĐŚĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚ law of the United States.  US law essentially 
offers two main routes for dealing with distressed firms, Chapter 7 with a focus on 
liquidation or Chapter 11 court supervised reorganisation.59  Although American 
literature emphasises choice and market-led efficiency in insolvency as the route to 
redistributive justice60, applying American commentary to English law is problematic 
because it is obsessed with Chapter 11 reform61 ?ǁŚĞƌĞ ? “as is well known, the 
ĚĞďƚŽƌ ?ƐŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƵƐƵĂůůǇƌĞŵĂŝŶŝŶĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽĨƚŚĞfirm during the 
proceedings ? ?62  With the possible exception of France, no other major western legal 
system does more than Chapter 11 to take choice out of the hands of the 
stakeholders and put it into the hands of the courts, in favour of the debtors.63    
ŵŽƵƌ ?,ƐƵĂŶĚtĂůƚĞƌƐ ?ŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĂƐƚĞĂĚǇŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞŝŶ “more stringent 
contracts regarding the provision of finance to firms in Chapter 11 proceedings ?64, 
combined with the weakening of control rights through the abolition of 
administrative receivership, is bringing the two jurisdictions closer together, should 
not cause the reader to forget just how far apart they began.  Chapter 11 is focused 
on the debtor, whereas English law is and always has been focused on the creditor. 
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dŚĞĨŽƵƌ “ŵĂŝŶƉůĂŶŬƐ ?65 of the Enterprise Act were: 
x Abolition of administrative receivership; 
x Reformation of Administration, towards  “ƐƚƌĞĂŵůŝŶĞĚ ?66 approach granting 
greater powers to the administrator; 
x Abolition of Crown ?s Preferential Status (s251); 
x Creation of a ring fenced fund from proceedings of assets of a floating charge 
to be distributed amongst unsecured creditors (s252). 
The cumulative intention behind the Enterprise Act reforms was therefore clear. The 
imposition of wider accountability on the insolvency practitioner was designed to increase the 
realizable value of the company's assets by addressing the problem of perverse incentives; the 
streamlining of administration was designed to make the procedure more flexible and easily 
accessible, and to reduce costs. The expectation of policymakers was that this twin approach 
would promote corporate rescue and, by increasing gross realizations and reducing the costs 
of formal rescue, produce better net outcomes for creditors across the board.
67
  
The focus is on getting the creditors as a whole better incentivised to pursue viable 
rescue, a tweak towards collectivity and the elimination of perceived perverse 
incentives.  The pressing question is, did it work? 
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2.3 IS ADMINISTRATION BETTER THAN RECEIVERSHIP FOR 
IMPROVING RESCUE? 
There have been significant recent efforts to quantify and empirically explore the 
impact of the change in the English regime and the introduction on insolvency 
outcomes.  &ƌŝƐďǇ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? “ZĞƉŽƌƚŽŶ/ŶƐŽůǀĞŶĐǇKƵƚĐŽŵĞƐ ?68 uses a combination of a 
database on administration outcomes and interviews with practitioners to show how 
practice has changed in response to the law.  Armour, Hsu and Walters 2008 paper69 
uses a similar data set to explore the theoretical question of the virtue of secured 
creditor control in the context of shifting behaviour in the shadow of the Enterprise 
Act.  In both of these papers statistics are used primarily descriptively but in 
combination with the qualitative evidence to provide a convincing picture of the 
changing approaches in insolvency practice.  More sophisticated statistical analysis of 
the same data was performed in 2006 by Armour, Hsu and Walters to  consider the 
costs and benefits of secured creditor control, and Katz and Mumford70  used record 
of appointments from London and Edinburgh Gazettes in autumn 2004 in order to 
explore changes in the use of administration and look for evidence of abusive 
behaviour.  As these papers look at data from the same period they can be usefully 
triangulated.  One of the central contributions of this thesis is to attempt to combine 
the results from these papers to explore the effectiveness of English insolvency law 
at achieving returns for creditors.   
The two immediately evident trends following the introduction of the Act were a 
small move in choice of procedure from liquidation to administration and a large 
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move from receivership to administration.71 Perhaps counter-intuitively the decrease 
in the use of liquidation is not held to imply an improvement in rescue rates; 
 “administrations do not result in any significantly greater incidence of continued 
trading or going-concern sales than did receiverships, indicating that the new 
ƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞŝƐŶŽƚƉƌĞƐĞƌǀŝŶŐĂŶǇŵŽƌĞĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚ ? ?72  Frisby pragmatically observes 
that this should not be much of a ƐƵƌƉƌŝƐĞ ?ĂƐ “ƚŚĞŽďǀŝŽƵƐĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌƚŚŝƐŝƐƚŚĂƚ
the same practitioners act as both receivers and administrators, and will tend to 
ĞŵƉůŽǇƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐ ? ?73  
The second trend is equally unsurprising given that the Act sought to abolish 
receivership in favour of administration, but within this data is the interesting 
ĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌǇƚŚĂƚ “lenders with grandfathered security, who are still entitled to appoint 
ƌĞĐĞŝǀĞƌƐ ?ĂƌĞ ?ŵŽƌĞŽĨƚĞŶƚŚĂŶŶŽƚ ?ĐŚŽŽƐŝŶŐƚŽĂƉƉŽŝŶƚĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŽƌƐŝŶƐƚĞĂĚ ? ?74 As 
Keay and Walton observe,  “ƐŽŵĞǁŚĂƚŝƌŽŶŝĐĂůůǇ ?ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞĐŚĂŶŐĞƐŵĂĚĞďǇƚŚĞ
Enterprise Act 2002, administration is quickly taking over from administrative 
ƌĞĐĞŝǀĞƌƐŚŝƉĂƐƚŚĞƉƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚŝŶƐŽůǀĞŶĐǇƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞĨŽƌĚĞďĞŶƚƵƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐ ? ?75  Even 
where secured creditors have the power to instigate administrative receivership and 
claim the perceived advantage there seems to be a preference for the ostensibly 
weaker position in administration.   
Why would those with the possibility of having more control through receivership 
choose administration instead?  Administration has proved to be significantly faster 
ƚŚĂŶĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝǀĞƌĞĐĞŝǀĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?ƚĂŬŝŶŐ “on average a little over half the time. ?76 
They are also more expensive, having been found ƚŽďĞĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚ “with higher 
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direct costs than receiverships ?77 in spite of the efforts to streamline access.  Frisby 
predicted that this would be the case in 2004: 
The procedure remains very much either court- or creditor-driven, and in this regard will 
almost certainly generate more expense and delay than administrative receivership. The fact 
that the path into administration has been smoothed will not, it is submitted, drastically 
reduce either. Proposals to creditors will still have to be formulated, meetings still called, 
information still provided, voting still completed and notices filed with the court. Inclusivity, 
whilst an arguably laudable aim, is a double-edged sword and one that may, on balance, strike 
at those it was intended to guard.  This is not to mention the increased burden on the court 
system.
78
 
The increase in costs lead Armour, Hsu and Walters to conclude that  “ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽ
compelling statistical evidence that creditors as a whole do better out of 
administration than they did ŽƵƚŽĨƌĞĐĞŝǀĞƌƐŚŝƉ ? ?79  The bar chart below compares 
their findings on net payments/face value of the claim in administrative receivership 
and administration during the sample period: 
80
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These results do appear to show an improvement in returns for all classes of 
creditors.  The shifts in returns to preferential and unsecured creditors may, 
however, be better explained by the reprioritisation of HMRC81 than the streamlining 
of administration.  Because the changes are expressed as percentages it is difficult to 
tell how the 11% increase in returns to preferential creditors compares to the 0.4% 
increase to unsecured creditors.  It is suggested that  “ƚŚĞŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚƌĞĐŽǀĞƌŝĞƐŝŶ
administration cases may have been eaten up by increased costs, which inference is 
supported by the general lack of any statistically significant increase in net recoveries 
to creditors under the new administration procedurĞ ? ?82  
Vanishingly small increases in net returns may not seem much of a victory, as the 
increase in gross returns is cancelled out by the predicted increase in direct costs.  
Costs are, however, likely to be higher during a transitional period and it is 
reasonable to predict that costs will decrease as changes bed in.  Even if the 
increases in returns are excluded as statistically insignificant achieving the same 
returns in a significantly shorter time period represents an improvement in the 
procedure, an assertion supported the fact that those security holders who have the 
choice post Enterprise Act often appear to be choosing administration ahead of 
receivership. 
Frisby considers another way of measuring the improvement of returns that might 
help explain a preference for administration:  
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83 
This bar chart shows the proportion of procedures within the Frisby database where 
the secured creditors achieved 100% returns.  It will be recalled that all three 
datasets were from the same time period as those measured by Armour, Hsu and 
Walters, and Mumford and Katz.  Administration appears to have always provided a 
greater level of 100% returns and this improved substantially after the Enterprise Act.  
The difference pre-Enterprise Act may be due to a preference for administration in 
cases where higher returns were expected, but this does not tally with the 
expectation that receivership was attractive to the over-secured.  Perhaps the 
decision by some secured creditors to push for asset sales through receivership was 
based upon an erroneous perception of the typical returns received (bearing in mind 
that empirical analysis of returns data was either limited or non-existent), and that 
one impact of the Enterprise Act is that it has led to more enlightened self-interest 
amongst secured creditors?   
The increase in post-Enterprise Act 100% returns might more simply be ascribed to 
over-secured creditors that would have realised their assets through receivership 
                                                          
83
 From data presented at Frisby S (2006), p44, where the proportions of secured creditors paid in full are from the 
718 out of 950 cases that recorded both debts owed and payments made. 
22.60% 
29.90% 
36.80% 
Administrative Receivership Pre-EA Administration Post-EA Administration
Proportion of 100% secured creditor 
returns 
  
73 
 
moving to administration, and thus inevitably increasing the average.  This does not 
fit the picture described by the means averages for secured creditor returns 
described above, given that pre-Enterprise Act administration was more effective 
than receivership, but merits further scrutiny as preventing perverse incentives for 
the over-secured was a key objective of the change in the law (and means can often 
be misleading).  It is difficult to draw firm conclusions about the operation of the 
procedures from recoveries to secured creditors during this sample period, where 
the majority of floating charge holders are likely to have taken the security prior to 
15 September 2003 and therefore had a choice as to whether or not to block the 
appointment of an administrator.  Whilst the criticism that receivers working for 
over-secured clients may not take sufficient care to maximise realisation of the assets 
stands, it does not follow that given the choice over-secured floating charge holders 
will have a greater preference than other floating charge holders for receivership 
over administration.  Being over-secured perhaps results in less desire for control, 
which would make the greater speed of administration attractive given they can be 
confident of recovering the debt.   It will be necessary to keep track of changes in the 
data as grandfathered security slowly phases out.   
A cynic may not be surprised to observe that banks were not universally thrilled to 
see the abolition of administrative receivership, as Frisby discovered during her 
empirical work on insolvency outcomes;  “ŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞĞƐǁĞƌĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇĂĚĂŵĂŶƚƚŚĂƚ
the perception of receivership as a biased and destructive procedure were 
ŵŝƐĐŽŶĐĞŝǀĞĚ ? ?84 However, 
an intuitive response to the legal framework of receivership may be unreliable and may 
overlook some of the institution ?ƐďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐ ?'ƌĂŶƚĞĚ ?ĂƌĞĐĞŝǀĞƌmust prioritisĞŚŝƐĂƉƉŽŝŶƚĞƌƐ ?
interests, but this of itself does not inevitably prejudice all other stakeholders, nor is it 
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necessarily inhibitive of corporate rescue. It is only when the appointer is over-secured that a 
receiver could properly pursue a break-up sale strategy.  Where the appointer is under-
secured, in order to maximise value and so comply with his duty to that appointer the receiver 
must look to other means of realising the security, and, as noted above, one method is to 
attempt to sell the business as a going concern.
85
   
Amour, Hsu and Walters find that the chief explanatory factor for the increase in 
returns in administration is the behaviour of the over-secured:   
Realizations in administration in the over-secured sub-sample were on average around 60 % 
higher than in receivership. Conversely, using the same specification in the under-secured sub-
sample, we did not find any statistically significant difference in levels of asset realization 
achieved in the two procedures. The implication is that the observed increase in realizations is 
largely confined to cases in which the secured creditor was over-secured: in other words, in 
precisely those cases where the impact of wider legal accountability might be expected to be 
at its most pronounced.
86
 
This seems to support the idea of the increase in returns overall and the increase in 
post-Enterprise Act administrations.  However, &ƌŝƐďǇ ?ƐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐĂůƐŽƐŚŽǁƐƚŚĂƚŽŶůǇ
around 1 in 5 receiverships resulted in full repayment.  This is supported by previous 
data that indicates that  “appointments by under-ƐĞĐƵƌĞĚĐŚĂƌŐĞĞƐĂƌĞƚŚĞŶŽƌŵ Q 
and that one of the WŚŝƚĞWĂƉĞƌ ?Ɛŵain justifications for abolition is therefore 
ĨĂůůĂĐŝŽƵƐ ? ?87  Seen from the other side of the Enterprise Act the argument that 
administrative receivership was driving a recessionary spiral due to needless 
liquidations seems to be incorrect.  Equally important, now that a proportion of any 
floating charge is diverted to the unsecured creditors88 the conditions under which 
one can achieve 100% returns have changed.  In effect it is now practically impossible 
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to be over-secured via a floating charge;89 it would require a situation where the 
floating charge holder is so over-secured as to have a cushion of £600,000 and there 
to be no better alternative than formal insolvency proceedings.  Yet this shift, which 
nominally reduced the power of secured creditors and certainly forced them to share 
ƐŽŵĞƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞƉŽƚǁŚĞŶ ‘ĨƵůůǇ ?ƐĞĐƵƌĞĚ ?ĂƉƉĞĂƌƐƚŽhave also improved their 
returns.   
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2.4 CORPORATE RESCUE OR BUSINESS RESCUE? 
It has been shown that the Insolvency Act 1986 sought to introduce a rescue culture, 
which the Enterprise Act was designed to improve, but that although returns to 
creditors have arguably improved there is little evidence of increased corporate 
survival.  It is submitted that in spite of this the Enterprise Act did improve the 
Orderly and Effective quality of English law.  This was in part due to a development in 
the nature of the rescue culture:  an appreciation of the importance of the distinction 
between corporate and business rescue and an increased willingness to sacrifice the 
former in favour of the latter. 
The White Paper that preceded the Enterprise Act defined corporate rescue as 
ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ “ƚŚĂƚĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐin financial difficulty should not go to the wall 
unnecessarily ?90, which is a direct echo of the description of orderly insolvency law 
introduced in Chapter 1.  A narrow interpretation of corporate rescue would suggest 
that this means saving the corporate entity itself, but successful rescue encompasses 
a wider range of outcomes: 
A distinction exists between rescuing the company and rescuing the business of the company.  
The former, which might ďĞĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐ ‘ƉƵƌĞƌĞƐĐƵĞ ? ?ǁŽƵůĚŝŶǀŽůǀĞƚŚĞĐŽƌƉ ĂƚĞĞŶƚŝƚǇ
emerging from the rehabilitation endeavour intact, so as to continue substantially the same 
operations, with the same workforce and in the ownership of the same people.  The latter is 
perhaps most accurately expressed as a form of corporate recycling.  dŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?Ɛbusiness, 
or a viable part of that business, is sold as a going concern to a third party. This means that the 
productive part of the enterprise is removed from its original owners. There may be associated 
job losses, which will almost certainly include directorships. The business itself, however, can 
be said to survive, albeit under new ownership.
91
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Thus Armour, Hsu and Walters expand the meaning of corporate rescue to include all 
circumstances by which the business of an insolvent company avoids closure and is 
able to continue trading as a going concern ?92, whether through formal or informal 
procedures, as a continuation of the company as an entity or the survival of the 
undertaking under new ownership or management.    Business rescue is considered 
to have many advantagĞƐ ? “ŝƚǁŝůůĂůŵŽƐƚĂůǁĂǇƐŵĂǆŝŵŝƐĞǀĂůƵĞ ?ŝŶƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞƚŚĂƚĂ
premium is usually available on selling a collection of assets housed in a business 
over that that can be realised from a sale of the same assets on a break-ƵƉďĂƐŝƐ ?93, 
and is more in keeping with the laissez-faire ideal described by Santella, where 
English law  “recognises the need to preserve the viable economic activities of a 
ĐŽŵƉĂŶǇŝŶĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚǇďƵƚŶŽƚƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇŝƚƐĞůĨ ? ?94  This sort of pragmatism reflects 
the principle that unnecessary failure should be avoided, but equally that  “Đorporate 
rescue mechanisms are not intended to maintain inefficient firms that are not 
economically viable ? ?95    The effectiveness of a rescue culture thus depends on its 
ability to identify and support viability.  
 ?ŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ƐŵĂǇďĞĐŽŵĞĚŝƐƚƌĞƐƐĞĚ ?ƐŝŵƉůǇďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞǇĐƌĞĞƉƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞƐĞĐƵƌĞĚůĞŶĚĞƌ ?Ɛ
radar, or because they seek advice too late in the cycle of decline, or seek it reasonably early 
but then ignore it. Finally, of course, some companies will inevitably become economically 
distressed as markets change and their products or services become obsolete. Attempting 
rescue of these enterprises would be futile, but where the company in question still houses a 
business that may be viable the current enquiry is as to whether an insolvency procedure in 
general, and administration in particular, is an appropriate vehicle through which to effect a 
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rehabilitation. In other words, if informal rescue mechanisms have either failed or never been 
attempted, for whatever reason, can an insolvency procedure serve as a stop gap?
96
  
If a corporation is economically distressed but contains a potentially viable and more 
valuable business, then attempting to rescue the company would be contrary to the 
philosophy of the Act.  This is just as much the case as for the pursuit of a hopeless 
rescue that merely increases costs and reduces the sum ultimately realised through 
liquidation.   Frisby observes from her interviews with bankers and practitioners a 
feeling that the Enterprise Act  “ǁĂƐŵŝƐĐŽŶĐĞŝǀĞĚŝŶƚŚĂƚŝƚĨŽĐƵƐĞĚŽŶĂƉƌŝŵĂƌǇĚƵƚǇ
to rescue the company instead of the business. Further, there was a general view 
that legislation itself will not of itself lead to higher levels of rehabilitation, and that 
that can only be achieved ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĂŵŽĚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ? ?97  In practice 
this cultural shift seems to be both occurring and effective.  Chapter 1 cited Cohen 
and Crooks ? observation that in RE DKLL  “the court has clearly reinforced the aim of 
the statute (to preserve value) and the rescue culture supported by government i.e. 
to save business as a going concern wherever possible and to maximise the return to 
all creditors. ?98 They prefer saving business over saving the company. 
A need for a cultural shift was identified and such a shift has been achieved.  If it is 
accepted that rescuing ultimately unviable business is counterproductive, and in the 
absence of an objective measure of the proportion of business that is viable at any 
one time, determininŐƚŚĂƚůĞǀĞůƐŽĨďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐƌĞƐĐƵĞŚĂǀĞ ‘ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚ ?Žƌ ‘ĚĞĐƌĞĂƐĞĚ ?
is meaningless.  An increase in rescue could easily under such circumstances mean an 
increase in maintenance of unviable business.  Instead the Enterprise Act has made 
changes that removed the bathwater without jettisoning the baby; the over-security 
issue appears to have been resolved without being over-egged, returns have 
                                                          
96
 Frisby S (2006), p62 
97
 Ibid, p64 
98
 Cohen M and Crooks S (2007), p221 
  
79 
 
marginally improved and are realised faster, and the judgement regarding viability is 
remaining in the hands of the creditors.  By the reasoning of the Orderly and 
Effective insolvency law model this improvement in returns should lead to improved 
investment, in spite of the movement away from the efficiency underpinnings of the 
theory.  The next chapter considers in greater detail how this judgement is operating 
in the new regime.
 CHAPTER 3:  CREDITOR FRIENDLINESS AND CHOICE OF 
PROCEDURE 
 
3.1 CREDITOR FRIENDLINESS 
Insolvency regimes are sometimes described on a scale between creditor and debtor 
friendliness.  Creditor friendly regimes employ measures such as requiring creditor 
consent, replacement of management through the appointment of an 
administrator/liquidator, absence of automatic stays or asset freezes, and paying 
secured creditors first.1  The importance of secured creditor priority links creditor 
friendliness with contractualism, and the view that distributive efficiency comes from 
enforcing market solutions by honouring contracted-for security.  Debtor friendly 
regimes, meanwhile, may seek to keep management in place, and offer stays or 
moratoria to promote recovery. Davydenko and Franks compare two notional 
extremes of this scale, France and England: 
In the creditor-unfriendly code of France, the state imposes court-administered procedures in 
bankruptcy with the explicit objective of preserving the firm as a going concern and 
maintaining employment. To achieve these goals, French bankruptcy courts are given control 
of the bankruptcy process and are not mandated to sell firm assets to the highest bidder.  The 
role of creditors is reduced to an advisory function, and their approval is not required by the 
court in determining a reorganisation plan.  By contrast, in the United Kingdom, although the 
state provides court-administered bankruptcy procedures, secured creditors can veto them 
and enforce the default provisions as specified in the debt contract.
2
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One of the most important efforts to determine the impact of insolvency laws on 
finance was La Porta et al ?Ɛ “ƉŝŽŶĞĞƌŝŶŐĂŶĚŚŝŐŚůǇŝŶĨůƵĞŶƚŝĂů ?3 ƉĂƉĞƌ “>ĂǁĂŶĚ
&ŝŶĂŶĐĞ ? ?4  This ambitious effort to provide a complete objective model of the 
qualities of individual insolvency laws was based on two key theses, as described 
here by Armour et al: 
x  “ƚŚĞŐƌĞĂƚĞƌƚŚĞƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶĂĨĨŽƌĚĞĚƚŽŵŝŶŽƌŝƚǇƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐĂŶĚĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌƐ
by a country's legal system, the more external financing firms in that 
jurisdiction will be able to obtain (the "quality of law" claim). If good legal 
institutions can reduce the risk of investor expropriation ex post, then 
investors will be more willing to advance funds ĞǆĂŶƚĞ ? ?5 
x  “dŚĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇŽĨůĞŐĂůŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐǀĂƌŝĞƐƐǇƐƚĞŵĂƚŝĐĂůůǇǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ ?ŽƌŝŐŝŶ ?ŽĨĂ
couŶƚƌǇ ?ƐůĞŐĂůƐǇƐƚĞŵ Q ?ŝƚĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞƐ ? the financing of corporate growth, 
and through that and other channels, the nature of the financial system and 
ƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇ ?ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐ ?ŽǀĞƌĂůůĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŐƌŽǁƚŚ ? ?6  
One of the key results of the legal origins approach was to provide support from the 
notion that common law was  “ďĞƚƚĞƌĂďůĞƚŽƌĞƐƉŽŶĚƚŽƚŚĞĐŚĂŶŐŝŶŐŶĞĞĚƐŽĨĂ
market econŽŵǇƚŚĂŶĂƌĞĐŝǀŝůŝĂŶƐǇƐƚĞŵƐ ? ?7  The validity of the legal origins model 
has been strongly questioned by Armour et al, whose time series analysis suggests 
that  “ĂŶǇŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞĞĐonomic effects of civil law origin would seem to be confined to 
ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐƐǇƐƚĞŵƐ ?ĂŶĚĞǀĞŶƚŚĞŶƚŚĞĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞŝƐŶŽƚǀĞƌǇĐůĞĂƌ ? ?8  Of equal interest 
within the context of this thesis is their accusation that the legal origins theory is an 
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ideological construct of Hayekian origins with little supporting evidence.9 As seen in 
Chapter 1, this is not the first time that insolvency theory has been accused of 
applying an excessively broad brush.10  Finally, the time series analysis approach is 
particularly valuable as it demonstrates areas of convergence in legal practice.11   
>ĂWŽƌƚĂĞƚĂů ?ƐǁŽƌŬŝƐĞŶŽƌŵŽƵƐůǇŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚĨŽƌĂŶƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞ “Orderly 
and Effective ? model, both because of the clear similarities between the quality of 
law/legal origins thesis and the principles of Orderly and Effective insolvency outlined 
in Chapter  ? ?ĂŶĚďĞĐĂƵƐĞ “the World Bank uses it in order to assess and promote a 
ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌƚǇƉĞŽĨůĞŐĂůĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ? ?12  The very notion of creditor friendliness can 
be derived from La PoƌƚĂĞƚĂů ?ƐĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨĂ ratings system of creditor rights 
which scored France at the lowest end of the spectrum, with a score of 0, and the 
United Kingdom as the highest at 4.13  The four marks are awarded, one a piece, for 
the following creditor friendly qualities:  no automatic stay on enforcement rights, 
secured creditors paid first, restrictions on going into reorganisation, and 
management does not stay in reorganisation.  This makes the analysis read a little 
ůŝŬĞĂƐĐĂůĞŽĨ ‘ŚŽǁĐůŽƐĞĚŽƚŚĞĨŽƌĞŝŐŶĞƌƐŵĂŶĂŐĞƚŽŐĞƚƚŽďĞŝŶŐŶŐůŝƐŚůĂǁ ? ?
Indeed, there is a close resemblance between the recommendations of the IMF and 
World Bank, and what English law has been doing for years: 
DĂŶǇŽĨƚŚĞ/D& ?ƐƌĞĐŽŵŵĞŶĚĂƚŝŽŶƐŚĂǀĞůŽŶŐďĞĞŶƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞh< ?ƐŝŶƐŽůǀency regime, such 
as adherence to the ranking of claims, the treatment of director fraud, and co-operation with 
ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶŝŶƐŽůǀĞŶĐǇƉƌŽĐĞĞĚŝŶŐƐ ?ůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƌĞǀŝĞǁƉƌĞĚĂƚĞƐƚŚĞ/D& ?ƐƌĞƉŽƌƚ ?
                                                          
9
 Ibid, p593 
10
 See the critiques of Insolvency Efficiency in Chapter 1.3 
11
 Armour J, Deakin S, Priya L and Siems M (2009), p579   
12
 Ibid, p583 
13
 La Porta R, Lopez-de-Silanes F, Shleifer A and Vishny RW (1998)  table of creditor rights scaling p1136-1137, table 
of rule of law scaling p1142-1143 
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the fact that some of the proposals are in line with IMF recommendations reflects current 
thinking on insolvency regimes.
14
   
This suggests that, at least prior to the Enterprise Act 2002, the Orderly and Effective 
model was strongly influenced by the English model of creditor friendliness.  The 
relative creditor friendliness of English law in 1998 compared to other regimes can be 
illustrated below: 
 
The chart above shows a selection of countries from La Porta et aů ?ƐƐĐĂůŝŶŐƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?
combining the score for creditor friendliness with a mark for efficiency of judicial 
system15.  The IMF argue that: 
The degree to which an insolvency law is perceived as pro-creditor or pro-debtor is, in the final 
analysis, less important than the extent to which these rules are effectively implemented by a 
strong institutional infrastructure... effective implementation requires judges and 
                                                          
14
 ƌŝĞƌůǇWĂŶĚsůŝĞŐŚĞ' ? “ŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞtŽƌŬŽƵƚƐ ?ƚŚĞ>ŽŶĚŽŶƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĂŶĚĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůƐƚĂďŝůŝƚǇ ? ?Financial Stability 
Review (1999) 167-183,   p170 
15
 Efficiency of judicial system evaluated by La Porta et al under their rule of law scalings, La Porta R, Lopez-de-Silanes 
F, Shleifer A and Vishny RW (1998), p1142-1143 
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administrators that are efficient, ethical, and adequately trained in commercial and financial 
matters and in the specific legal issues raised by insolvency proceedings.  A pro-debtor law 
that is applied effectively and consistently will engender greater confidence in financial 
markets than an unpredictable pro-creditor law.
16
  
Davydenko and Franks have found there to be a correlation between creditor 
ĨƌŝĞŶĚůŝŶĞƐƐĂŶĚŵĞĚŝĂŶƌĞĐŽǀĞƌǇƌĂƚĞƐ ?ďĂƐĞĚƵƉŽŶƚŚĞďĂŶŬ ?ƐƚŽƚĂůĨŝŶĂůůŽƐƐƚŽƚŽƚĂů
debt exposure at default, using a database of information from participating 
institutions.  The highest score is achieved by the UK at 92% and the lowest by the 
perennial bogeyman of insolvency efficiency, France, at 52%17  The US remains, 
ĚĞĨŝĂŶƚůǇ ?ƐƚĂƚŝƐƚŝĐĂůůǇĐŽŶƚƌĂƌǇ ?/ƚƐĐŽƌĞƐĂ “ ? ?ĂƐĂĚĞďƚŽƌĨƌŝĞŶĚůǇƌĞŐŝŵĞďƵƚǁŝƚŚ
substantially more de-listings and fewer acquisitions than its debtor friendly label 
suggests18, and an unexpectedly high recovery rate of 70%.19  It is important to note 
that the creditor ratings are from 1998 and the Davydenko and Franks return 
scorings from 2008, although it is not unreasonable to suggest that developments in 
the laws of the respective countries have not been so radical in the interim that 
significant changes have occurred.  Sporadic data collection is a debilitating issue in 
ƚŚĞĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨŝŶƐŽůǀĞŶĐǇůĂǁ ?ƐƌŵŽƵƌĞƚĂůŽďƐĞƌǀĞ P “little has been done to 
investigate the dynamic effects of particular legal systems in relation to the 
production of substantive legal rules: that is, how particular attributes of legal origins 
or systems shape and influence the evolution of the law, and in turn, the real 
econŽŵǇ ?20, although clearly a great deal of speculation has taken place in the 
absence of clear evidence.  Armour et al observe that the creditor rights index is 
ǁĞĂŬĞŶĞĚďǇƚŚĞǁĂǇŝŶǁŚŝĐŚ “different constituent elements may cut in different 
ĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ Q ?some parts of the index may  ‘cancel out ? others, thereby undermining 
                                                          
16
 IMF (1999), 1 - Introduction, p6 
17
 Davydenko SA and Franks JR (2008), p581 
18
 Dahiya S and Klapper L (2007), p276-277 
19
 Davydenko SA and Franks JR (2008), p581 
20
 Armour J, Deakin S, Priya L and Siems M (2009), p592 
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ƚŚĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐĨƵůŶĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞŽǀĞƌĂůůƐĐŽƌĞ ? ?21 Yet the rather forced approach of 
ŐƌŽƵƉŝŶŐƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌƚŚĞƐĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐƐĂŶĚůĂďĞůůŝŶŐƚŚĞŵ ‘ĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌ
ĨƌŝĞŶĚůǇ ?ŚĞůƉs build the ideological narrative based upon an idealised notion of the 
common law:  promoting absolute priority leads to higher recovery rates for secured 
creditors, which if correct would fit the overarching objective of Orderly and Effective 
insolvency laws to improve investment returns.  
If this creditor friendliness model were correct then the Enterprise Act must have 
been something of a disappointment.  Part of the problem is the way the model is 
framed.  Insolvency laws are described as a dichotomy between creditor and debtor 
friendliness, but this seems rather clumsy where a law is shifting priority between 
creditors.  It does not seem immediately reasonable to describe the Enterprise Act, 
whose principal function is to shift some control from secured to unsecured 
creditors, as having become less creditor friendly.  Directors are still removed under 
the streamlined administration system.  Yet the shift in control represents a threat to 
one of the fundamental pillars of insolvency efficiency:  that secured creditors get the 
security they contracted for.  It represents a  “shift away from a  ‘concentrated 
creditor ?model of governance towards a  ‘dispersed creditor ? model of governance 
which vests greater control rights in unsecured creditors colůĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇ ? ?22  The law 
becomes more creditor unfriendly without become more debtor friendly  W in 
essence, according to the efficiency model, the law simply becomes less effective. 
It would be reasonable to hypothesise on this basis that the changes made in act 
would have reduced secured creditor returns.  Instead the analysis in Chapter 2.3 
suggests that the change either made a small positive difference or no significant 
difference to net secured creditor returns.  Based upon analysis of CVA outcomes in 
                                                          
21
Ibid, p605 
22
 Armour J, Hsu A, Walters A (2008), p148 
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Chapter 3.4 this writer suspects that administration returns will ultimately prove to 
be a net improvement over receivership, and it would be interesting to repeat the 
costs research in a few years.  Whether secured creditor returns increased or not, it 
is clear that they did not decrease.  The reason for focusing on the impact of returns 
to secured creditors is because they are central to the insolvency efficiency analysis 
of insolvency laws.  The justification for efficiency, in the sense that only structural 
rules are mandatory, is that improving secured creditor returns improves general 
welfare.  If efficiency is not the optimal means to achieve maximum secured creditor 
returns, then the whole theory is called into question. 
Applying the model of the impact of creditor friendliness applied above, three logical 
non-exclusive hypotheses can be derived for why it may be the case that changes in 
the Enterprise Act that actively sought to reduce secured creditor control did not 
result in reduced secured creditor returns:  
1. The reduction in secured creditor control was offset by infrastructural 
improvements to the efficiency of the judicial system, which it has been 
suggested is of greater importance than the relative creditor/debtor 
friendliness of the system in the first place. 
2. Secured creditor control does not improve secured creditor returns in a 
linearly positive fashion, perhaps suggesting that there is an optimal level 
after which increases in secured creditor control reduce secured creditor 
control returns. 
3. The Enterprise Act made no significant practical difference to secured 
creditor control.   
These hypotheses will be explored in further detail throughout the rest of this thesis, 
starting with a consideration of the operation of creditor control prior to the 
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commencement of formal insolvency proceedings and how this intersects with the 
purpose of administration.  A fourth factor is important to note.  The abolition of 
Crown preference had an instant effect but the prescribed part was prospective 
only.23  Secured creditors holding floating charges that predated the act will have 
benefitted from the Crown ?s part being returned to the general pot.  This will not be 
explored further as the only way to be sure would be to repeat the insolvency 
outcomes investigations, which is beyond the resources of this writer.  The focus 
instead is on how the new law has changed the environment within which insolvency 
is negotiated. 
 
  
                                                          
23
 Insolvency Act 1986 s176A(9) 
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3.2 CHOICE OF PROCEDURE Ȃ WHO DECIDES? 
Insolvency is the technical state of being unable to pay debts,24 but this has no 
practical consequence until someone attempts to enforce the debt.  As described in 
the opening of Chapter 2.2, directors of insolvent firms have a range of options for 
how to deal with an unpayable debt, up to and including do nothing at all.  There are 
a number of reasons why a firm may avoid paying a debt, for example simple human 
error, genuine disputes, or points of principle: 
Debtors may not be able to meet their obligations for a host of different reasons. Their 
stupidity, greed, misfortune, bad judgment, or inadequate foresight may leave them unable to 
pay. They may not be able to pay over the short term or the long term. They may be victims of 
their own mistakes or of unforeseeable circumstances.
25
  
Very often those facing financial difficulty are not best placed to assess their own situation.  
The stresses and strains that inevitably accompany financial problems may cause undue panic, 
ŽƌĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞůǇĂ ‘ŚĞĂĚŝŶƚŚĞƐĂŶĚ ?ŵĞŶƚĂůŝƚǇ Q^ƵƌƉƌŝƐŝŶŐůǇ ?ǁŚĞŶa debtor faces a financial 
ĐƌŝƐŝƐ ?ƚŚĞƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƚŚĞĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌƐŵĂǇƚĂŬĞŝƐŽĨƚĞŶŽǀĞƌůŽŽŬĞĚ Q/ƚŝƐƌĞŵĂƌŬĂďůĞŚŽǁ
accommodating a fully informed creditor can turn out to be.  Unfortunately, what is more 
common is that the debtor has avoiding tackling its creditors, keeping them in the dark and 
providing increasingly unlikely excuses.
26
 
Informal negotiation regarding outstanding debt is a normal part of everyday 
business;  ?much will depend upon the response to this factual situation of its various 
stakeholders, and, in general, some form of intervention is more likely where default 
ŚĂƐďĞĐŽŵĞƌŽƵƚŝŶĞŽƌĂĐƵƚĞ ?27  Thus some event or factor beyond simple technical 
insolvency is typically required, and being technically insolvent need not lead to 
formal insolvency proceedings.  For formal insolvency proceedings to commence 
                                                          
24
 Insolvency Act 1986, s123. 
25
 tĂƌƌĞŶ ? “ĂŶŬƌƵƉƚĐǇWŽůŝĐǇ ? ?University of Chicago Law Review 54 (1987) 755-814, p779 
26
 Dennis V (2007), p12, p15 
27
 Frisby S (2011), p351 
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somebody, whether creditor, debtor or state, must take steps to commence them.  
An insolvent firm can continue as long as creditors do not seek to enforce their 
claims.  Any liquidation or formal rescue has passed through phases of negotiation, 
possibly iteratively, with differing levels of formality and court intervention, each 
terminated when at some point one of the parties decides that the current level of 
negotiation has failed.   
The amended Insolvency Act 1986 offers five different formal insolvency procedures: 
x Compulsory liquidation, by court order at the petition of a creditor where the 
company is unable to pay its debts (s122(1)) or where it is just and equitable 
that company should be wound up (s122(1)(g); 
x CƌĞĚŝƚŽƌƐ ?Voluntary Liquidation led by company directors; 
x Administration.  Schedule B offers three means to appoint an administrator:  
o Para 12 - administrative application to the court by one or more 
creditors of the company; 
o Para 14 - out of court appointment by floating charge holders; 
o Para 22  W appointment by the company or its directors; 
x Administrative receivership, where the receiver is appointed by a floating 
charge holder with grandfathered security that predates 2003; 
x Company Voluntary Arrangement , initiated by the company under s1-7b 
where  “ǀĞƌǇďĂƐŝĐĂůůǇ ?ĂƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůŝƐĨŽƌŵƵůĂƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ƐĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐ
and put to ƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ƐƵŶƐĞĐƵƌĞĚĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌs, who may vote to approve it, 
ĂŵĞŶĚŝƚ ?ŽƌƌĞũĞĐƚŝƚŽƵƚƌŝŐŚƚ ? ?28  
The range of options presented is in keeping with what Armour, Hsu and Walters 
ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĂƐĂƚĞŶĚĞŶĐǇŝŶĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚŝŶƐŽůǀĞŶĐǇƐǇƐƚĞŵƐƚŽ “ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĂŵĞŶƵŽĨ
                                                          
28
 Frisby S (2011), p352-353 
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collective procedures offering (at minimum) a choice between a terminal liquidation 
procedure for the orderly winding up of the insolvent company's affairs and a rescue 
or reorganisĂƚŝŽŶƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞ ? ?29 dŚŝƐĐĂŶďĞĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚĞĚĨƌŽŵZĂƐŵƵƐƐĞŶ ?Ɛ
proposed menu-approach to insolvency in that it limits ex-ante control in favour of 
ex-parte intervention.  There is clearly still scope for parties to order themselves 
favourably prior to formal proceedings, not least because of this period of 
negotiation that exists between technical insolvency and formal insolvency 
proceedings.   Armour, Hsu and Walters state that  “ŽŶĐĞĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐĂƌĞĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůůǇ
distressed, insolvency law casts its shadow. ?30  This perhaps underestimates the 
extent of the shadow, as the workings of insolvency law can be seen in the very 
earliest negotiations between creditor and debtor.   Adler, discussing corporate 
insolvency theory in the context of debtor friendly US law but in this case clearly 
applicable in our own jurisdiction, argues that this process goes all the way back to 
ƚŚĞŝŶŝƚŝĂůŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌĐƌĞĚŝƚǁŚĞƌĞ “ďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌƐchoose an initial capital 
structure, they may adopt a debt component that renders unlikely the simultaneous 
ŽĐĐƵƌƌĞŶĐĞŽĨŝŶƐŽůǀĞŶĐǇĂŶĚǀŝĂďŝůŝƚǇ ? ?31 The suggestion is that investors should be 
able to plan such that the only circumstances in which technical insolvency occurs are 
the economic unviability of the business.  Although this rather exaggerates the 
prescience or indeed the powers of investors, banks in particular are in the position 
to extend or withdraw credit, and negotiate to attach security, as suits their 
ĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚŽĨĂďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ ?ƐǀŝĂďŝůŝƚǇĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶďĂƌŐĂŝŶŝŶŐƉŽǁĞƌ ?This allows for a 
distinction between formal and informal rescue  
[formal rescue procedures] refer to insolvency procedures, enshrined in or recognized by 
statute, that facilitate rĞƐĐƵĞŽƵƚĐŽŵĞƐ Q ? By way of contrast, a financially distressed company 
                                                          
29
 Armour J, Hsu A, Walters A (2008), p153 
30
 Ibid 
31
 Adler B ? “dŚĞŽƌǇŽĨŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ/ŶƐŽůǀĞŶĐǇ ? ?New York University Law Review 72 (1997) 343-382, p344 
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is rescued informally where, following a restructuring occurring without invoking a formal 
rescue procedure, it is able to continue its business. Typically this will involve "turning around" 
the company's business to restore it to profitable trading, and/or a consensual "workout" 
involving a restructuring of the company's capital structure with the agreement of its 
creditors.
32
  
Consideration of informal proceedings naturally takes place prior to formal 
proceedings.  Parties to informal negotiation retain a first mover advantage as they 
are not subject to the collectivism of formal insolvency arrangements, and options 
available during informal negotiation are virtually limitless to the extent that they are 
defined by the needs and desires of the parties.33   
Unsecured creditors may prefer to maintain informal negotiations because an 
important consideration regarding formal workouts is the need to involve secured 
creditors.  Secured creditors are typically essential to any reorganisation34 because of 
the effective powers of veto they hold over formal arrangements due to their 
continuing powers of action.  There are, however, significant advantages to the 
involvement of insolvency professionals or the clearing banks (who are often secured 
creditors) as it opens up a wide variety of what could be called semi-formal workout 
options.  These options are not formal procedures identified in the Insolvency Act but 
involve professionals and procedures specifically related to the management of 
insolvency.   Major clearing banks have developed  “sophisticated support systems for 
ƚŚĞŝƌĐƵƐƚŽŵĞƌƐ ?35, and firms can access so called  “company doctors ? who look into 
the operation of the firm to provide advice on strategy, management and funding, 
and turnaround professionals who conduct  “ŝŶƚĞŶƐŝǀĞĐĂƌĞ ?36 while principal 
creditors informally agree to withhold enforcement action.  This may be particularly 
                                                          
32
 Armour J, Hsu A, Walters A (2008), p156-157 
33
 Dennis V (2007), p89 
34
 Ibid , p88 
35
 Frisby S (2006), p22 
36
 Dennis V (2007), p90   
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useful where there are a number of secured creditors because of the costs and 
complexity of collective solutions.  Unsecured creditors who can achieve no traction 
with the debtor may benefit from the greater powers of their secured brethren.  It 
has been argued that the modern banking industry is much keener on these semi-
formal approaches to resolving insolvency: 
[banks] activities in providing advice and guidance outside insolvency demonstrate their 
commitment to the rescue ideology in general. It is the notion that the rescue ideal should 
become the primary driver inside insolvency that was generally contested, on the grounds that 
the very onset of an insolvency procedure makes efforts in that regard sterile.
37
  
The bank ?ƐƌŽůĞŝŶŝŶĨŽƌŵĂůŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĞƐŽĐĂůůĞĚ ‘>ŽŶĚŽŶƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ?ǁŝůůďĞ
explored in more detail in Chapter 5. 
Only where informal negotiation is exhausted, unavailable or undesirable will formal 
insolvency proceedings be commenced.  Entering into formal insolvency proceedings 
ĚƌĂŵĂƚŝĐĂůůǇĐŚĂŶŐĞƐƚŚĞŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐďĞĐĂƵƐĞ “the collective rights of 
ĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌƐĐŽŵĞƚŽƚŚĞĨŽƌĞ ? ?38  The informal negotiation period gives players an 
opportunity to strategically position themselves, but once formal proceedings begin 
statutory priority takes effect and freedom to negotiate becomes more limited.  This 
can lead to the impression that entering into administration or other formal 
insolvency proceedings becomes almost self-fulfilling, causing the loss of the 
confidence of customers, employees and suppliers: 
There is almost, therefore, a point of no return which, once passed, signals that the best 
outcome that can realistically be achieved is a maximisation of value through a sale of the 
ĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ƐďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ ?dŚĞƌĞŝƐĂƌŐƵĂďůǇŶŽŚĂƌŵĐĂƵƐĞĚŝŶƌĞƋƵŝƌŝŶŐƉƌĂĐƚŝƚŝŽŶĞƌƐƚŽĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌ
the possibility of pursuing the survival of the company in administration, but it is suggested 
that at the same time it is perfectly acceptable to acknowledge that this will be a realistic 
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 Frisby S (2006), p64 
38
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ƉƌŽƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŝŶŽŶůǇƚŚĞŵŽƐƚĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂůĐĂƐĞƐ QKŶĞŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞĞƌĞŵĂƌŬĞĚƚŚĂƚĞǀĞŶƚŽĚĂǇ
directors (of small, owner/managed companies in particular) take the view that the 
involvement of an insolvency practitioner, even in an advisory capacity, will inevitably lead to 
the demise of the enterprise.
39
  
Secured creditors may seek to recover their debt by appropriating the collateral, but 
 “ƚŚŝƐǁŝůůǀĞƌǇŽĨƚĞŶďĞĞĨĨĞĐƚĞĚƚŚrough the instigation of a formal insolvency 
ƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞ ?40 ?ǁŚŝůĞƵŶƐĞĐƵƌĞĚĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌƐ “ŵĂǇƐĞĞŬƚŽĞǆĞĐƵƚĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ
unencumbered assets of the company or, alternatively, to initiate a formal insolvency 
ƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞ ? ?41  &ƌŝƐďǇ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚ “ŝƚŝƐŽŶůǇƚŚe compulsory liquidation 
procedure that can sensibly be described as primarily initiated by unsecured 
ĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌƐ ?42, as unsecured creditor-led appointments are hindered by degree of 
investigation and investment typically required.  The administrator has a duty to 
present a plan for the administration in order to justify the purpose of the 
ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŵĞĂŶƐƚŚĂƚ “ŝŶƚŚĞǀĂƐƚŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇŽĨĐĂƐĞƐĂƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇǁŝůůŚĂǀĞ
been decided upon before the administrator is appointed and the particular 
objective in paragraph 3 to be pursued will be equally pre-ĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞĚ ? ?43   Whoever 
is driving a strategy leading into administration it is not unsecured creditors. 
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3.3 ADMINISTRATION AND BUSINESS RESCUE 
Business rescue (45%) is chosen massively ahead of corporate rescue (1%).44  This 
does not appear to represent a radical change in insolvency practice.  Prior to the 
Enterprise Act the dominant insolvency procedure for viable returns was 
receivership, which could not result in corporate rescue.  Does this mean that by 
continuing to adopt a business rescue approach post Enterprise Act administrators 
are undermining the over-arching purpose of administration?  The objectives of 
administration were defined in the Insolvency Act 1986 Schedule B para 3(1), 
introduced in part 10 of the Enterprise Act and representing an apparent  “seismic 
shift in emphasis. ?45  It lists the purposes of administration as: 
(a) Rescuing the company as a going concern; or 
(b) ĐŚŝĞǀŝŶŐĂďĞƚƚĞƌƌĞƐƵůƚĨŽƌƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ƐĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌƐĂƐĂǁŚŽůĞƚŚĂŶǁŽƵůĚ
be likely if the company were wound up (without first being in 
administration); 
(c) Realising property in order to make a distribution to one or more secured or 
preferential creditors. 
Dennis argues that paragraph 3 ŝƐ “ŽŶĞƉƵƌƉŽƐĞǁŝƚŚĂŚŝĞƌĂƌĐŚǇŽĨŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ ?46, the 
purpose being to rescue the company.  Similarly Phillips and Goldring state  “ƚhis 
provision makes it expressly clear that administration is first and foremost about 
rescuing the corporate entŝƚǇ ? ?47  If this were correct then administrators would 
clearly be failing in their duty, but the statutory duty is rather more subtly drafted 
than that and the overarching purpose is not corporate rescue.  Mokal and Armour 
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argue that administrator must work through this list sequentially, eliminating each 
option in turn if he considers that it is not reasonably practicable to achieve it, or that 
the pursuit of the objective next in the list would bring better returns to creditors as 
a whole. ?48  The final purpose, realising property to satisfy secured or preferential 
creditors, is thus only being targeted where the first two are not reasonably 
practicable and this strategy  would not unnecessarily harm the interests of the 
ĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?Ɛ creditors as a whole.  This is accurate, but may still leave the inaccurate 
impression that corporate rescue sits at the top of the hierarchy. 
The reason why this is not the case becomes a great deal clearer once the benefits of 
viable rescue to all parties are understood.  If a business rescue would achieve better 
returns than a corporate rescue then the administrator has a clear duty to pursue 
this course of action, and a liquidation will only achieve better returns for creditors as 
a whole where a rescue option is unavailable:49   “dŚĞŽstensible top-table place of 
corporate rescue in the statutory scheme is, therefore, arguably illusory QƉĂƌĂŐƌĂƉŚ
 ?ĚŽĞƐŶŽƚĂĚǀŽĐĂƚĞĂ ‘ƌĞƐĐƵĞĂƐŽĨƌŝŐŚƚ ?philosophy but rather retains a wholly 
justifiable flexibility, to be exercised on the basis of commercial ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?50 In 
their interviews Armour, Hsu and Walters found mixed opinions regarding the impact 
of these changes amongst insolvency professionals, some feeling that their role had 
always been to maximise realizations, and that regardless tŚĞǇĨĞůƚ “Đonstrained by 
professional regulation and reputational coŶĐĞƌŶƐƚŽ ‘do the job properly. ? ?51  
Whether acting as receivers or administrators, insolvency professionals were 
ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉĂůůǇĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚǁŝƚŚ “ĐŽŵŵĞƌĐŝĂů ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶůĞŐĂůĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?52, ranging 
ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞǀŝĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ƐďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐƚŽƚŚĞĞǆƚĞŶƚŽĨĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨƌŽŵ
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lenders, suppliers and customers. The appointment of a professional, one with 
experience, discretion, and flexibility, may increase the confidence of parties: 
The power to appoint an insolvency practitioner as administrator of the company can be seen 
ĂƐĂŵŽǀĞƚŽƌĞĂƐƐƵƌĞŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞŝƚƐĞůĨŝƐŶŽƚŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇ ‘ƚŚĞďĞŐŝŶŶŝŶŐ
ŽĨƚŚĞĞŶĚ ? QŝƚŵĂǇĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐĞŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƚŽƐĞĞŬĂƐƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞĂƚĂƉŽŝŶƚŶĞĂrer the 
beginning of the cycle of decline rather than towards the very end. The restoration of a degree 
of autonomy that the appointment power may be seen to offer, and the fact that directors 
may be able to appoint a practitioner who has advised them, and so has a degree of 
knowledge about the company and the options open to it, is clearly intended to provoke a 
 ‘ǀŝƌƚƵŽƵƐĐŝƌĐůĞ ?ŽĨĞĂƌůǇĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂƚŝŽŶůĞĂĚŝŶŐƚŽŵŽƌĞƌĐƵƉĞƌĂƚŝǀĞŽƵƚĐŽŵĞƐ ?53  
This being the case the abolition of receivership may have been as much about 
restoring confidence in insolvency professionals as it was about improving the legal 
mechanism, notwithstanding the importance of correcting the perverse incentive for 
the relatively small number of over-secured claimants.   
The Enterprise Act54 ƐŽƵŐŚƚƚŽ “ƉƵƚĐŽŵƉĂŶǇƌĞƐĐƵĞĂƚƚŚĞŚĞĂƌƚŽĨŝŶƐŽůǀĞŶĐǇ
procedures because we want to save companies which have a decent chance of 
ƐƵƌǀŝǀĂůƐŽƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇĂƌĞŶŽƚĚƌŝǀĞŶƚŽƚŚĞǁĂůůƵŶŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇ ? ?55   The nominated 
administrator is responsible for making an evaluation of the commercial factors and 
ƉƵƌƐƵŝŶŐĂƌĞƐĐƵĞŽƵƚĐŽŵĞǁŚĞƌĞ “ƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůǇƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂďůĞ ? ?56  They must apply their 
discretion to determine if the firm has a decent chance of survival:   “ƚŚĞƉŽŝŶƚǁŝƚŚ
out of court administrations is that they do ƌĞůǇŽŶǇŽƵƌũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚĐĂůů ? ?57 How does 
the exercise of this judgement call fit within criteria for Orderly and Effective 
insolvency?  
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dŚĞƌĞĂƌĞĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨǁĂǇƐŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŽƌ ?ƐĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞŽĨŚŝƐĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶ
might come before a court.  Two important fashions are paragraph 74 and paragraph 
75 applications under schedule B of the Insolvency Act 1986:   “WĂƌĂŐƌĂƉŚ ? ?ƐĞĞŵƐ
to target an administrator who is either careless or who deliberately and 
ƵŶŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇƐĂĐƌŝĨŝĐĞƐƚŚĞǁĞůĨĂƌĞŽĨŽŶĞ ‘ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŐƌŽƵƉ ? ?ǁŚĞƌĞĂƐƉĂƌĂŐƌĂƉŚ ? ?
ƐĞĞŵƐŵŽƌĞĚŝƌĞĐƚĞĚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘ĚŝƐŚŽŶĞƐƚ ?ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŽƌ ? ?58  Exercise of the 
administrator ?s discretion regarding the best commercial outcome leaves plenty of 
opportunity for controversy, be it the accusation that  “ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶŝƐďeing used 
as a quasi-liquidation with no attempt to save the company or its business or trade 
ƚŚĞďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ ?59, or unsecured creditors finding the phoenix pre-ƉĂĐŬ “ƉƌŽďĂďůǇƚŚĞ
ŵŽƐƚŝŶĨƵƌŝĂƚŝŶŐŽƵƚĐŽŵĞŝŶĂŶǇŝŶƐŽůǀĞŶĐǇƉƌŽĐĞĞĚŝŶŐ ? ?60  More broadly there is the 
common anxiety that viable firms are being allowed to fail, such as Keay and 
tĂůƚŽŶ ?Ɛconcern that rescues attempts were occurring  “ŝŶůĞƐƐƚŚĂŶ ? ?A?ŽĨ
ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? 61  As Katz and Mumford astutely observe  “ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂŶƵƌŐĞŶƚŶĞĞĚ
ƚŽĐůĂƌŝĨǇ QƚŚĞĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶĂŶĚŵĞĂƐƵƌĞŵĞŶƚŽĨ “ďĞƚƚĞƌƌĞƐƵůƚ ?ŝŶĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐǁŚĞƌĞ
this may be marginal or inconsequential. ?62  Lacking any way to know for certain how 
many firms in administration would survive if rescue were pursued, it is difficult to 
know whether 10% is a good or a bad return.  Faced with say an application that an 
administrator has sacrificed the welfare of a floating charge holder by attempting an 
ultimately failed rescue, or sacrificed the welfare of employees by liquidating a viable 
firm, how is the judge to determine if the administrator ?ƐĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶŚĂƐďĞĞŶ
properly applied?   
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A baseline approach would be simply to look for dishonesty.  The judge would only 
rule discretion had been incorrectly applied upon discovering evidence of 
malfeasance.  s75 is clearly aimed at this sort of behaviour.  Frisby identifies the 
administrator as having a duty to act honourably as they are an officer of the court 
under Schedule B paragraph 5, suggesting that unlike a receiver they cannot partake 
in certain value maximising activities such as actively repudiating some unprofitable 
contracts entered into before their appointment.63  Yet the ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŽƌ ?Ɛduties 
regarding the application of his discretion clearly go beyond simply behaving 
honourably, otherwise there would be no need for s74. 
Mokal and Armour argued in a 2004 paper that in the exercises of his discretion the 
administrator was subject to a fiduciary duty to the creditors, applying the rule in 
Hastings Bass
64 to the administrator as a fiduciary: 
(i) Did the fiduciary take into account an irrelevant consideration or did not take 
into account one that was relevant? And if so,  
(ii) would his decision have been different had all the relevant considerations 
been taken into account, and the irrelevant ones ignored?65  
This seems to bring us closer to an econometric approach to the law, where the 
judge might consider the same sorts of factors as described above (past earnings, 
stock and bond prices, etc.) and then make a comparison where  
not to take into account reasonably discoverable factors relevant to determining whether the 
continuation of the company as a going concern (by preserving for its benefit the specific skills 
and knowledge of the local market of its pre-distress shareholder-managers, say) would result 
ŝŶďĞƚƚĞƌĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚƌĞƚƵƌŶƐĨŽƌŝƚƐĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌƐƚŚĂŶŝĨƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ƐďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐǁĞƌĞƚŽďĞƐŽůĚŽĨĨ
to another company (with little knowledge of and enjoying no goodwill in the market), would 
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ďĞƚŽŝŐŶŽƌĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚƚŽƐĞƌǀŝŶŐƚŚĞĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌƐ ?ŝnterests, and would thus 
constitute a breach of duty.
66
  
This is a really interesting way of thinking about the courts discretion.  Perhaps 
regrettably, DŽŬĂůĂŶĚƌŵŽƵƌ ?ƐƚŚĞƐŝƐĚŽĞƐŶŽƚƐƵƌǀŝǀĞŵŽƌĞƌĞĐĞŶƚĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ
insolvency law, for example the ruling in Unidaire PLC67 that the administrator 
 “ƌĞƚĂŝŶƐĂǁŝĚĞĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶďĂƐĞĚŽŶŚŝƐƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞŽƉŝŶŝŽŶǁŚŝĐŚǁŝůůŽŶůǇďĞĐĂƉĂďůĞ
ŽĨĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞŝŶŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞƐŽĨďĂĚĨĂŝƚŚŽƌŝƌƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ? ?68  It is also difficult to conceive 
of how the administrator could have a fiduciary duty to all creditors when inter-
creditor conflict is a common part of the insolvency process.  Rather, it seems that a 
s74 intervention is extremely unlikely to occur on the grounds that the court consider 
the administrator to have incorreĐƚůǇĂƐƐĞƐƐĞĚƚŚĞǀŝĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨĂĨŝƌŵ “ƵŶůĞƐƐƚŚĞ
ĐŽƵƌƚƐĐĂŶƐĞĞƚŚĞŝƌǁĂǇĐůĞĂƌƚŽĂĚŽƉƚŝŶŐƐŽŵĞĨŽƌŵŽĨ ‘ŝƌƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ?ƚĞƐƚŝŶƚŚŝƐ
regard it is at least arguable that an administrator, having once formed the view that 
a particular objective should be pursued, cannot be called to account under 
ƉĂƌĂŐƌĂƉŚ ? ? ? ?69 
The question being approached in this chapter, however, is not whether Mokal and 
Armours interpretation of the aĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŽƌ ?ƐĚƵƚŝĞƐŝƐƐƚŝůůĂƉƉůŝĐĂďůĞ but whether 
such an approach to his duty would promote Orderly and Effective insolvency.  The 
/D&ŚĂǀĞĚĞĐůĂƌĞĚƚŚĂƚ “ŵĂŶĚĂƚŽƌǇƌƵůĞƐ ?ǁŚĞŶƉƌĞĐŝƐĞůǇĨŽƌŵƵůĂƚĞĚ ?ŐŝǀĞůĞŐĂů
ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇ ?70 but the World Bank warn that modern rescue procedures responding to 
the commercial expectations of dynamic markets  “may not be susceptible to precise 
ĨŽƌŵƵůĂƐ ?ďƵƚ ?ŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇƌĞůǇŽŶĚĞƐŝŐŶĨĞĂƚƵƌĞƐƚŽĂĐŚŝĞǀĞƚŚĞŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ ? ?71 
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This is a different type of certainty, recognised as counterbalance to discretion: 
The greater the discretion that the law confers upon the court and the designated officials, the 
greater need there is for an adequate institutional infrastructure.  Countries that give their 
judges such a key role in the decision-making process often find it necessary to establish a 
specialized court system, such as a commercial court or a bankruptcy court.  The members of 
the court may be professional judges, preferably with special training and experience, or may 
be elected by the business community.
72
  
The uncertainty created by effective commercial engagement in the negotiation 
phases, and the power of the judge to recognise the expertise of the insolvency 
specialist, is offset by increasing institutional certainty.  Specialist courts, specialist 
judges and highly trained insolvency professionals with a duty to act as officers of the 
court allow players to know that although they cannot be sure of the outcome they 
can be sure that it will be decided by an institution with a good understanding of the 
situation.  Court oversight to limit bad faith and irrationality improves confidence in 
the commercial system.   
There are good reasons to be concerned that judges avoid dabbling in the 
uncertainty of diagnosing the reasons for commercial failure, as demonstrated in the 
shocking recent decision at the High Court by Smith J to order that HBOS pay out to 
creditors of Farepak as its refusal to extend the failing firm ?ƐŽǀĞƌĚƌĂĨƚ “might have 
ŬĞƉƚ&ĂƌĞƉĂŬŐŽŝŶŐ Q ?ĂŶĚ ?ǁŚĂƚŚĂƉƉĞŶĞĚƚŚĞƌĞ ?ǁŚŝůƐƚĂƉƉƌĞŶƚůǇůĞŐĂůůǇ
acceptable, might not be regarded in the public's eyes as being acceptable."73    The 
Farepak case is discussed in more detail in Chapter 7, but fear of judicial overreach 
and inability to make good commercial decisions has been a frequent concern of 
theorists and particularly insolvency efficiency theorists.  Jackson complained that 
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ũƵĚŐĞƐůĂĐŬĞĚďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐĂŶĚǁĞƌĞŽǀĞƌůǇŽƉƚŝŵŝƐƚŝĐĂďŽƵƚĨŝƌŵ ?ƐĐŚĂŶĐĞƐŽĨ
success, the result being ƚŚĂƚ “ďĂŶŬƌƵƉƚĐǇǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶƐďǇũƵĚŐĞƐĂƌĞƐǇƐƚĞŵĂƚŝĐĂůůǇƚŽŽ
ŚŝŐŚ ? ?74  The common theoretical belief that judges did not make good commercial 
decisions has, however, been subject to strong challenge.  In 2007 Morrison, who 
had himself previously been a critic of the judiciarǇ ?Ɛ faculty for commercial decision 
making, performed an empirical study of the docket of a US bankruptcy court over 
the course of a calendar year comparing the continuation decisions made by judges 
against the optimal decision making model. 75    He discovered that judges actually 
made very good decisions about whether cases should be continued or not, that their 
behaviour was very close to the optimal decision-making model, and they played a 
major role in filtering failing firms from viable ones with no systemic bias in favour of 
saving non-viable firms.76  In 2008 Djankov et al considered the role of judicial control 
and its relation to creditor returns in a cross country study of debt enforcement in 88 
countries, using survey responses from insolvency professionals regarding a model 
medium sized firm.77  They found that richer countries were considerably more 
effective than poorer countries.  The difference was linked to the use of specialist 
courts that were able to deal with cases faster but crucially also increase the 
likelihood that the firm continued as a going concern.78  When developing countries 
attempted to mimic the use of specialist courts differences in administrative and 
judicial competence were found to result in more expensive procedures without the 
associated increased returns:   
In the rich countries, although these procedures are timeconsuming and expensive, they 
typically succeed in preserving the firm as a going concern. In the developing countries, in 
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contrast, these procedures nearly always fail in their basic economic goal of saving the firm; in 
fact, 80 percent of insolvent businesses end up being sold piecemeal.
79
 
What this demonstrates is that the one size fits all approach of insolvency efficiency 
is not an appropriate way of viewing creditor returns.  If a countries legal system is 
underdeveloped, undersupported, or perhaps vulnerable to corruption then absolute 
priority may be the way to go.  However, if your system can properly support 
specialist courts then better returns can be achieved by allowing the application of 
judicial discretion and incorporating a rescue component.    
                                                          
79
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3.4 CVA VERSUS PRE-PACK:  IS THERE ONLY ONE GENUINE RESCUE 
PROCEDURE? 
This chapter opened with a consideration of the notion of creditor friendliness, and 
explored the idea of English law being based around a range of choices and 
alternative procedures.  Who makes these choices, and how, has a significant impact 
upon outcome.  The discretion of both insolvency professionals and the judiciary 
therefore play an important role in the process.  I now turn to two examples of 
modern, business-rescue orientated practice in English commercial law (and how 
they can create problems of confidence in the system):  the housing of CVAs within 
administration, and the pre-packaged business sale.  The purpose is to highlight the 
way in which outcomes can be influenced by how choices are made during the 
process. 
These represent very different types of rescue solution.  Both are effective in their 
own way, just as both have individual shortcomings.  It will be shown that the 
Administration + CVA, and particularly the trading CVA, can produce excellent returns 
for creditors, but requires significant complicity from all parties with the result that it 
is underused relative to other insolvency procedures.  The Pre-Pack, meanwhile, 
provides what may be surprisingly positive returns given the extent of the negative 
coverage it receives, but that negativity undermines public confidence in the 
insolvency process and possibly the survivability of pre-packaged rescues.   
The purpose of exploring the virtues of the administration housed CVA is not to argue 
that pre-packs should be removed or limited.  One of the strengths of the more 
English law is that both options are available, and it is clear that there are 
circumstances in which one is preferable to the other.  Rather, the aim is to highlight 
that the inclusivity of the administration + CVA procedure, from the input of 
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specialist ?s discretion to the role of creditor votes, has a positive impact on returns.  
There are lessons to be learned here that might further improve the pre-pack 
procedure and insolvency practice generally. 
 
3.4.1 Is the Administration+CVA the only genuine rescue procedure? 
Administration is not in itself considered to be a particularly effective rescue 
mechanism, but there is greater enthusiasm for its use to house a Company 
Voluntary Arrangement  ?s ) “ǁŚŝĐŚŵŝŐŚƚũƵƐƚůĞĂĚƚŽĂĨƵůůďůŽǁŶƌĞƐĐƵĞ ? ?80  Some 
ƉƌĂĐƚŝƚŝŽŶĞƌƐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƚŚŝƐ “the only genuine insolvency ƌĞƐĐƵĞŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵ ?81 in the 
post Enterprise Act regime.  In the Administration + CVA combination the 
administrator proposes the CVA to the creditors once he has control of the assets.  
This may be principally because it allows them to avoid the Schedule B1 paragraph 65 
Insolvency Act requirement to make an application to the court in order to distribute 
to secured or preferential creditors.  The combination has, however, the additional 
benefit of giving the administrator access to the unique flexibility and elements of 
creditor collaboration inherent in the CVA. 
Governed by s1-s7b of the Insolvency Act 1986 a Company Voluntary Arrangement is 
 “a statutory form of binding agreement ďĞƚǁĞĞŶĂĐŽŵƉĂŶǇĂŶĚŝƚƐĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌƐ ? ?82   It is 
designed to facilitate swift and straightforward arrangements between the company 
and its creditors.  When used independently of administration it is most likely 
entered into with a view to the continued survival and operation of the company83, 
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and possibly maintaining customer relationships.84 Being largely contractual in 
nature85 its main advantage is flexibility86 ?ŽƌĂƐ<ĞĂǇĂŶĚtĂůƚŽŶƉƵƚŝƚ ? “ŽŶĞŝƐ
immediately struck with how little detailed guidance is given as to what a CVA should 
ůŽŽŬůŝŬĞŽƌĚŽ ? ?87 It is therefore most useful where 
ƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ƐƵŶĚĞƌůǇŝŶŐďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐŵĂǇďĞƐŽƵŶĚ ?ďƵƚŝƚĐĂŶŶŽƚĂĨĨŽƌĚƚŽƉĂǇĂůůŝƚƐĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌƐ
ĂůůƚŚĂƚŝƚŽǁĞƐƚŚĞŵ Q/ƚŵĂǇƉƌŽǀĞƚŽďĞŵŽƌĞďĞŶĞĨŝĐŝĂůƚŽƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ƐĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌƐƚŽĐŽŵĞ
to some arrangement whereby the creditors are paid less than they are owed, but the amount 
paid is more than the creditors could expect on winding up.
88
 
Directors who wish to set up a CVA must appoint an insolvency practitioner as 
nominee who is asked to endorse their proposal, whereas a CVA housed within an 
administration already has an insolvency practitioner in place (the administrator) 
who is familiar with the case.  The nominee reports to the court if a cƌĞĚŝƚŽƌƐ ?
meeting vote on the proposal passes the threshold of 75% value and 50% of 
members.  This process is highly technical, meaning that the Administration/CVA has 
an inbuilt advantage when it comes to effectively achieving a CVA as in practice it is 
 “virtually impossible for the directors of the company to prepare a [CVA] proposal 
ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚĂƐƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞ ? ?89    They typically come in two types: trading CVAs, which involve 
an arrangement to pay a certain amount each month, and asset CVAs, where assets 
are sold and used to pay off creditors.  Like schemes of arrangement they are 
attractive because they are binding over all creditors whether they accept or not, and 
creditors may even be bound if they did not receive notice.90   
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The CVA had been described as the bƌŝĚĞƐŵĂŝĚŽĨƌĞƐĐƵĞƚĞĐŚŶŝƋƵĞƐďĞĐĂƵƐĞŽĨ “ƚŚĞ
perceived cost, the lack of speed in implementation, the attitude of creditors and the 
need to obtain the consent of such a high proportion of creditors to the 
ĂƌƌĂŶŐĞŵĞŶƚ Q ?ĂŶĚ ?ĂĐŽŵŵŽŶĐŽŶĐĞƌŶŽĨĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌƐ that the proposed nominee [in 
Ăs ?ĂĐƚƐĂƐĂ ‘ŵŽƵƚŚƉŝĞĐĞ ?ŽĨƚŚĞĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐ ? ?91  The rights of the secured creditors 
hang ůŝŬĞĂ “^ǁŽƌĚŽĨĂŵŽĐůĞƐ ?92 over the negotiation as they cannot be altered by 
a CVA without their consent.93  It can also be difficult to get holders of floating 
ĐŚĂƌŐĞƐŽŶďŽĂƌĚďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝĨ “ƚŚĞsĨĂŝůƐƉƌĞŵĂƚƵƌĞůǇ ?ƚŚĞĚĞďĞŶƚƵƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌŵĂǇ
find that most, if not all, of the floating charge assets have been swallowed up under 
the CVA in favour of the unsecured creditors.  This potentially disastrous result needs 
ƚŽďĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚďĞĨŽƌĞĂĚĞďĞŶƚƵƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌŐŝǀĞƐŝƚƐĐŽŶƐĞŶƚƚŽĂs ? ?94  A 
combination of administration and CVA mediates all of these problems:  the 
administrator has the skill and expertise to efficiently implement the CVA, secured 
creditors and floating charge holders are already party to the administration and so 
are easier to bring on board with the CVA, and the administrators duty to achieve the 
best possible return for all creditors ameliorates the impression that they are the 
directors ? mouthpiece.   
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3.4.2 CVAs are Liquidation in Disguise? 
95 
 ? ?A?ŽĨsƐĐŽŵŵĞŶĐĞĚŝŶ ? ? ? ?ĞŶĚĞĚǁŝƚŚƐŽŵĞĨŽƌŵŽĨŝŶƐŽůǀĞŶƚŽƵƚĐŽŵĞ ? “in 
the sense that the CVA was terminated prematurely by the supervisor, almost 
invariably on the ground that the company had failed to make the agreed 
ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?96  At the other end of the scale, 14% emerge as active firms and the 
further 13% of on-going CVAs are likely to lead to a rescue outcome as by this point 
they have been trading profitably for 5 years.97  The obvious difficulty is determining 
whether 27% rescue is a good return compared to the 52% dissolution.   
Lacking a frame of reference may lead to the seductively easy conclusion that 
because there is more dissolution than rescue the procedure is ineffective as a rescue 
technique.  The ostensibly high level of failure has led the accusation that via the CVA 
 “ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶŝƐďĞŝŶŐƵƐĞĚĂƐĂƋƵĂƐŝ-liquidation with no attempt to save the 
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ĐŽŵƉĂŶǇŽƌŝƚƐďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐŽƌƚƌĂĚĞƚŚĞďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ ?98, or more moderately,  “ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐƐŽŵĞ
evidence that the administration procedure is being used where a company 
ǀŽůƵŶƚĂƌǇůŝƋƵŝĚĂƚŝŽŶŵŝŐŚƚ ?ŽƐƚĞŶƐŝďůǇĂƚůĞĂƐƚ ?ďĞĞƋƵĂůůǇĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞ ? ?99  Certainly 
there is strong evidence of a proportionate switch from the use of CVLs to 
administration.100 
Frisby suggests four reasons why administration might be being used as a substitute 
for a CVL:  
1. As a response to the ruling in Re Leyland DAF101 that made costs and 
expenses of liquidation no longer payable in priority to claims of the floating 
charge holder, by contrast these expenses are protected by statute in 
administration.102   If this is the principal reason then she observes that we 
should expect liquidation in disguise to disappear after the statutory reversal 
of Re Leyland DAF.103  
 
2. If the insolvency professional recommends administration they secure their 
own appointment, whereas recommending liquidation may result in the 
appointment of another practitioner.104 
 
3. dŚĞ ‘ŶĞǁĞŶƚƌĂŶƚphenomenon ? ?dŚŝƐŝƐĐŽŶŶĞĐƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚƌĞĂƐŽŶŝŶ
that smaller newer firms dealing with liquidations do not  believe they will 
get appointed as liquidators but want the business as an administrator, 
ĐŽŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĞĚďǇ “ƚĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĚĂƚĂƚŽƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƚŚĞ
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ŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞĞƐ ?ĂƐƐĞƌƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘ĚŝƐŐƵŝƐĞĚůŝƋƵŝĚĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŝƐĐĂƌƌŝĞĚŽƵƚŵŽƌĞ
ŽĨƚĞŶďǇƐŵĂůůĞƌĨŝƌŵƐ ? ?105  
&ƌŝƐďǇ ?ƐŶĞǁĞŶƚƌĂŶƚƚŚĞŽƌǇŵĂǇďĞƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚŝŶĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇďǇ<ĂƚǌĂŶĚDƵŵĨŽƌĚ ?Ɛ
ĨŝŶĚŝŶŐƐƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐ ‘ĂďƵƐĞ ?ŽĨĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞ ?dŚĞǇĨŽƵŶĚƚŚĂƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŝƌ
sample of administrations 29% by number but 3% by value were either unjustified or 
only justified by the existence of secured and preferential creditors (and therefore 
arguably not within the meanings of the objectives).106  Procedural justification need 
not correlate cleanly with abuse,107 although equally it is not de facto the case that 
the increase in asset sales within administration means there were an increasing 
ŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨ “ĚŝƐŐƵŝƐĞĚůŝƋƵŝĚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?108  However, what evidence there is of the 
existence liquidation-in-disguise is associated with an area of the market made up of 
large numbers of small-value administrations (hence 29% by number and 3% by 
value),109 exactly the type you would expect to be handled by smaller firms.  This is 
also evidence of an important fact about the insolvency market:  there is diverse 
behaviour between different groups, for example between large scale accountancy 
firms and small IP practices, and this should encourage caution when considering 
aggregate statistics. 
 
3.4.2 Administration Housed CVAs are Orderly and Effective. 
The fourth reason presented by Frisby for the shift from CVLs to asset based sales 
within administration is, if cynicism can momentarily be suspended, convincing in its 
simplicity.  Insolvency practitioners may be choosing administration over liquidation 
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not for selfish ends or as a back door to quick liquidations, but because it achieves 
better all round results: 
Administration has considerable advantages over liquidation in terms of the speed at which it 
can be entered, and the enhanced powers of an administrator in dealing with assets and 
managing the business of the company. Liquidation has some deleterious effects in terms of 
terminating contracts of employment and, in some cases, other contracts subject to ipso facto 
clauses which may not arise in an administration.
110
  
Frisby expands upon this theme in a later paper: 
The most probable explanation for this is that the company finds itself in a position where it 
cannot be the subject of a solvent winding up, its debts exceeding its assets, but that a 
relatively short period of continued trading would result in the completion of executory 
contracts which in turn would swell the assets of the company, thus allowing for an enhanced 
insolvency dividend for its creditors. In other words, the eventual dissolution of the company 
is contemplated from the outset, but the use of a CVA is designed to facilitate an orderly and 
more productive wind down of its operations without the risk of creditor pressure or non-co-
operation threatening the maximisation of value a trading strategy is calculated to 
enhance.
111  
Reworking of the presentation of the data in the recent Preliminary Report to the 
Insolvency Service into Outcomes in Company Voluntary Arrangements by Frisby and 
Walters demonstrates the dramatic advantages to unsecured creditors of CVAs over 
liquidation.112  This paper considers a sample of 177 CVAs, out of which the average 
return to unsecured creditors was 16%.  They observe that  “ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐ
ĚŝƐĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŝŶŐůǇ ?113 52% of creditors receive a return of 0%, but ĨŝŶĚŝƚ “ƚŽƐŽŵĞ
extent heartening to note that dividends of over 30% were returned in 14% of the 
                                                          
110
 Frisby S (2006), p80 
111
 Frisby S (2011), p374 
112
 Walters A and Frisby S (2011) 
113
 Ibid, p24 
  
111 
 
ĐĂƐĞƐŝŶƚŚĞƐĂŵƉůĞ ? ?114  By drawing on different pieces of evidence in their paper it is 
possible to avoid the problem of judging CVAs in a vacuum and make some clear 
observations about the relative efficacy of CVAs compared to liquidations: 
 
This chart is devised from two tables presented in the CVA outcomes report115, and 
makes the advantages of CVA returns over CVL returns abundantly clear.  Participants 
in a CVA are on average far more likely to get far greater returns. This in itself is not 
particularly surprising, as it is well known that returns to creditors in liquidations are 
lower than in other procedures.  It would be illuminating to be able to properly 
compare returns from differing insolvency procedures in the same way, although 
there are difficulties in comparing like-with-like and it will require more time and 
data than currently available to produce the sorts of studies required.  What this data 
does show us is that when a director or administrator meets the requirement of 
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better returns through CVAs.  The data is from a sample of 177 companies out of the 547 CVAs recorded as 
commence in 2006 by Companies House, and is therefore 32.4% of the entire population of 2006 CVAs. 
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including in their CVA proposal a financial assessment including comparison of the 
likely CVA outcome compared to a liquidation outcome, the CVA is likely to be a 
much more attractive alternative.   If an active, trading CVA can be achieved the 
results are even better: 
 
 
 
CVA 
Compulsory 
Liquidation 
>1% 47.87% 19% 
>9% 32.98% 9% 
>19% 22.34% 0% 
>29% 14.89% 0 
>39% 9.57% 0 
>49% 6.38% 0 
>74% 5.32% 0 
100% 3.19% 0 
 
CVA 
Average 
CVA with 
Active 
Continuation 
>1% 47.87% 100% 
>9% 32.98% 80% 
>19% 22.34% 61.3% 
>29% 14.89% 46.4% 
>39% 9.57% 35.2% 
>49% 6.38% 24% 
>74% 5.32% 20% 
100% 3.19% 8% 
 
 
CVAs are significantly better for unsecured creditors than compulsory liquidation.  
The most dramatic result, if one is concerned for the fate of unsecured creditors, is 
that 100% of creditors achieve some degree of return from an active CVA, as 
opposed to 48% from CVAs overall and only 18% in compulsory liquidation.  CVAs are 
so much better than liquidation, even including the fact that half of CVAs end in 
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insolvent outcomes, that even the most risk-averse creditor should usually be voting 
in favour of the CVA and trying to keep the firm trading through its difficulties even if 
this will almost inevitably end in liquidation. 
The data for returns to unsecured creditors from an active CVA are from chart 25 in 
the Walters and Frisby report116, although the data has had to be manipulated to 
make it comparable.  First, the returns between categories are smoothed as Walters 
and Frisby did not categorise the returns from active CVAs in the same fashion as the 
returns from CVAs overall or liquidations.  Second, their categories are not spaced 
evenly.  The strongest impact this has on the presentation of the data is diminishing 
the tail towards the right of the curve.  Redistributing the subsets is avoided in order 
to keep at least one set of data the same as reported in the original work, but as 
compulsory liquidations do not achieve returns beyond 20% this makes little 
difference to the comparison.  Third, the average CVA returns includes within it the 
data on returns from active CVAs.  This means that returns from CVAs as a whole are 
lifted by the performance of active CVAs.  The returns from active CVAs as compared 
to non-active CVAs is actually relatively better than appears in the second diagram. 
This leads to the most important problem with the comparison regarding choice 
between entering administration with a view to achieving a trading CVA and the 
possibility of an asset sale, or straight liquidation.  A proportion of CVA outcomes 
presented will be for cases where liquidation was never appropriate as the 
underlying business was sound.  If in the future CVLs are abolished and current 
liquidations are treated as administrations this would have a downward pressure on 
average results from CVAs.  Although the results strongly suggest that it is better to 
                                                          
116
 Walters A and Frisby S (2011),  p37 
 
  
114 
 
go for an Administration + CVA even where it is likely to result in dissolution, this is 
not a direct comparison of liquidation against quasi-liquidation. 
Further research and/or access to the original data set could correct many of these 
issues, for example performing a comparison between average returns from 
potential quasi-liquidations identified as having inadequately defined purposes in 
<ĂƚǌĂŶĚDƵŵĨŽƌĚ ?ƐƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚǁŝƚŚĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂŶĞŽƵƐƌĞƚƵƌŶƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚs> ?117  Even 
working with the data as presented in the report allows us to see very clearly the 
advantage to unsecured creditors of running a CVA, as Walters and Frisby plainly 
ƐƚĂƚĞ P “dŚĞĂǀĞƌĂŐĞƌĞƚƵƌŶĨƌŽŵĂĐƚŝǀĞsƐŝƐ ? ?A? ?ĂƐĐŽŵƉĂƌĞĚƚŽ ? ?A?ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ
entire sample and it is submitted that this would far outstrip average returns from 
ŽƚŚĞƌŝŶƐŽůǀĞŶĐǇƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞƐ ? ?118  Averages are not the best way to evaluate 
performance in subsets, but it would be a fairly dramatic (although feasible) 
turnaround to discover CVAs were not better for all classes of creditors, even 
creditors of quasi-liquidations.  Nonetheless, further research to provide verification 
is reqƵŝƌĞĚ ?dŚĞƐĞƌĞƐƵůƚƐŵĂŬĞŝƚĞǀĞŶŚĂƌĚĞƌƚŽĂƌŐƵĞǁŝƚŚ&ƌŝƐďǇ ?ƐĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶ ?
stemming from the original insolvency outcomes report, that quasi-liquidation 
through administration is still justifiable under paragraph 3b of the objectives where 
it gets better returns for creditors.119  Katz and Mumford suggest: 
Some of the difficulties with the criteria for administration could be resolved by making 
ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶŵŽƌĞǁŝĚĞůǇĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞ QĞǀĞŶŝŶŵĂƌŐŝŶĂůĐĂƐĞƐ ?ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶŝƐůŝŬĞůǇƚŽ
produce a result at least equal to that achievable in a CVL. Such a change could bring about a 
substantial further increase in the proportion of administration to liquidation cases but we do 
not see that as a problem. It could in practice bring about (or extend) a two tier market: on the 
one hand for the typically larger cases where there is a prospect of saving the company or 
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some of its business or otherwise managing a more complex realisation strategy; and on the 
other hand for the typically smaller cases of a liquidation nature.
120  
Returns from liquidation are so poor that for any objective risk neutral unsecured 
creditor the gamble on achieving an active CVA through administration is most likely 
the best choice, even if the odds of success are long.  Indeed, it has been argued that 
CVLs are becoming redundant121 and removing the procedure altogether in favour of 
Ă “ƐŝŶŐůĞŐĂƚĞǁĂǇ ? 122 approach to management of insolvency through administration 
makes a great deal of sense, given the better returns involved and the reduced costs.  
This would seem a sensible direction for English law to take. 
Naturally, creditors are human and therefore unlikely to be either objective or risk 
neutral.  An interesting additional quality of the Administration + CVA combination is 
that, as well as improving returns, CVAs also enhance inclusivity because they require 
a realistic proposal that achieves creditor support. 123  A CVA is legitimised by because 
ƚŚĞ “ĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ƐĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌƐǁŝůůŚĂǀĞĂĐƚŝǀĞly approved the proposal put to them by the 
company. ?124  More importantly an active CVA depends on maintaining relationships 
with creditors, whether they are the bank or the taxman, suppliers or customers.  
Getting the cooperation of the unsecured creditors increases the chances of the 
rescue.  It is not outlandish to suggest that most rescues depend on the goodwill of 
stakeholders.  Rather than being a side effect, the inclusive element of the CVA may 
be an essential part of its success.  This makes it crucial that creditors are persuaded 
of the benefits of CVAs: 
To the extent that CVAs regularly fail then creditors, particularly repeat players such as 
ƐĞĐƵƌĞĚĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌƐĂŶĚƚŚĞƌŽǁŶ ?ďĞŐŝŶƚŽĚŽƵďƚƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞ ?ƐŝŶƚĞŐƌŝƚǇĂŶĚƉƌŽƐƉĞĐƚƐĨŽƌ
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success as a whole. Following on from this, it may be that even realistic proposals will not clear 
the hurdle of acquiring creditor support.
125
  
&ƌŝƐďǇĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƐƚŽŽďƐĞƌǀĞĂ “ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶŵŝƐƚƌƵƐƚŽĨƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞŝŶŐĞŶĞƌĂů Q ?ƐƵĐŚ ?
that the most fruitful route to rescue inside insolvency may be subject to an obstacle 
that thwarts eveŶƌĞĂůŝƐƚŝĐƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůƐ ? ?126  This is an interesting dichotomy.  What 
evidence exists strongly suggests the using CVAs within administration is a highly 
effective means of maximising creditor returns, and it is submitted that the element 
of inclusivity and creditor co-operation is part of this because of the prominent 
advantages of active and trading CVAs.  However, if participant confidence in the 
procedure is undermined this can kill it off before it even begins.  This chapter will 
now turn to a much clearer example of a divide within insolvency law between the 
ƋƵĂůŝƚǇŽĨĂƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ?ƐƌĞƐƵůƚƐĂŶĚƉƵďůŝĐĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶĐĞŝŶƚŚĂƚƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ PƉƌĞ-packs.   
 
3.3.5 Prepacks 
An example of English flexibility that most certainly and by design does not enhance 
unsecured creditor involvement is the pre-pack: 
Pre-packing basically involves a period of pre-insolvency negotiation with a prospective 
purchaser of the business of an insolvent company. The assets required by that purchaser will 
be agreed and a price for the business settled, invariably by reference to an independent 
valuation. Administration is then entered into and the business, comprising the agreed assets 
and goodwill, contracts and the like, and employees are transferred to the purchaser.
127
  
Pre-packs are negotiated and agreed prior to formal insolvency, enabling them to be 
executed very quickly in the event of insolvency.  Pre-packs may involve a business 
ƐĂůĞƚŽĂƚŚŝƌĚƉĂƌƚǇŽƌĂ ‘ƉŚŽĞŶŝǆ ?ƐĂůĞǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐƚĂŬĞŽǀĞƌƚŚĞ
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new firm.  They have several advantages, usefully outlined by Katz and Mumford128 
and Frisby129 as including increased realisation from sale of assets, high speed of 
transaction, reduction of uncertainty, preservation of employment, and maintenance 
ŽĨĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚƐĂŶĚŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ŐŽŽĚǁŝůů ?ĂƐƐĞƚƐŚŽƵůĚit exist.  It is a  “ƋƵĂƐŝ-
ĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞƌĞƐĐƵĞĚĞǀŝĐĞ ?130 ?Ă “peculiarly matter-of-fact sŽůƵƚŝŽŶ Qone that has 
become especially useful as contemporary commercial conditions [and that] solves 
the very common problem of a lack of funds to support a period of trading while the 
business is marketed and sold during the course of ƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞ ? ?131  An important 
disadvantage is that, while preventing exposure to the market may improve 
confidence and increase sale speed, it also undermines accurate pricing and excludes 
potentially superior outcomes. 132  This is not, however, the reason why doubts about 
pre-ƉĂĐŬĂŐŝŶŐŚĂǀĞďĞĐŽŵĞ “the one most substantial threat to the perception of 
the integrity of insolvency practice ?:133 
it may be used perfectly honourably and in the best interests of all concerned, or it may be 
exploited by the unscrupulous ŝŶǁŚĂƚŚĂƐďĞĞŶĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐĂ ‘ĚĞďƚ-ĚƵŵƉŝŶŐ ?ƐƚǇůĞ Q in its 
most egregious form it clearly has the potential to raise serious doubts as to the integrity of 
insolvency practitioners and, indeed, the effectiveness of UK insolvency law in terms of its 
ability to deal with what would be widelǇƌĞĐŽŐŶŝǌĞĚĂƐ ‘ŵĂůƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ? ?134 
When a pre-pack deal is agreed  “ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŶĞǀĞƌĂŶǇŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶŽĨƉƵƚƚŝŶŐĂƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůƚŽ
the cƌĞĚŝƚŽƌƐ ?ŵĞĞƚŝŶŐŽƌŽĨĞǀĞŶĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌŝŶŐĂƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƌĞƐĐƵĞƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĂƚƌĂĚŝŶŐ
ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?135  Some commentators argue that pre-ƉĂĐŬƐǁĞƌĞ “ĐůĞĂƌůǇŶŽƚ
ĞŶǀŝƐĂŐĞĚďǇƉĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚǁŚĞŶƚŚĞŶƚĞƌƉƌŝƐĞĐƚǁĂƐďĞŝŶŐƉĂƐƐĞĚ ?136 ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ “ŝĨĂŶ
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administrator has a duty to consider rescuing the company and prior to becoming an 
administrator is bound to a pre-ƉĂĐŬĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚƚŽƐĞůůƚŚĞďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐƚŽƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?Ɛ
management team, it is arguable that the administrator has fettered his or her 
ĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶ ?137 contrary to the rule in Re Scotch Granite Co138.  Yet pre-packs have 
been recognised for some time as part of normal insolvency practice.   “Phoenixing ? 
via pre-packs, where the sale is affected to previous owners or directors, is often 
seen as particularly egregious.  Although concern about phoenixing was a significant 
driver behind the movement to create a unified bankruptcy code  “the Cork 
Committee itself noted that it was important to distinguish ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ‘ŝŶŶŽĐĞŶƚ ?ĂŶĚ
 ‘ŽďũĞĐƚŝŽŶĂďůĞ ?ƉŚŽĞŶŝǆĞƐ ?139  Provisions have been introduced into the law to 
attempt to do this, such as s216 IA1986 which prevents the use of the name of a 
previously liquidated company, and mechanisms in the Company Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986 intended to  “ ‘ƉŽůŝĐĞ ?ƐĞƌŝĂůĨĂŝůƵƌĞƐ ? ?140  These measures do 
not appear to have corrected long standing concerns about pre-packs, but they were 
never likely to.  This is because the problem is less the potential for abuse (which as 
we have seen exists in administration as well) than the fact that the other creditors 
have little to no power to exercise choice.  Unsecured creditors ability to intervene in 
a pre-pack appears largely toothless.  Paragraph 74 or 75 applications from Schedule 
B1 of the Insolvency Act 1986 that the administrator either is or has acted so unfairly 
as to harm the interests of the applicant, or has misplaced or restrained money, are 
ůŝŬĞůǇƚŽĨŽƵŶĚĞƌŽŶƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂůĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚŝĞƐ P “the likelihood of a creditor being able to 
produce persuasive evidence that some other strategy would have realized 
ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚůǇŵŽƌĞŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨǀĂůƵĞŝƐƌĞŵŽƚĞŝŶƚŚĞĞǆƚƌĞŵĞ ? ?141  Paragraph 88 
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applications on the grounds of inadequate account of decision making will in turn be 
avoided by compliance with SIP 16 provisions142.  The result is that  
 for unsecured creditors at least, the phoenix pre-pack is probably the most infuriating 
outcome in any insolvency proceeding. Interestingly, ŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌ ?Ɛ
most recent roll-out of the research into pre-packs tends to suggest that unsecured creditor 
objections tend to be based more on principle than on financial considerations: in essence, 
such creditors intrinsically object to connected parties regaining control of a business after its 
ĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ ‘ŽǁŶĞƌ ?ĞŶƚĞƌƐŝŶƐŽůǀĞŶĐǇĂŶĚƚŚĞůĞǀĞůŽƌ lack of dividend is barely relevant to this 
objection, which is based more on ideology.
143
   
dŚŝƐƉŽǁĞƌĨƵůƚĞƐƚŝŵŽŶǇĐŽŵĞƐĨƌŽŵŽŶĞŽĨ&ƌŝƐďǇ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁƐ P 
/ƚ ?ƐŶŽƚŚŝŶŐƐŚŽƌƚŽĨƐĐĂŶĚĂůŽƵƐ ?dŚĞŐƵǇƌĂŶƵƉŶĞĂƌůǇ ? ? ? ?ŽĨĚĞďƚǁŝƚŚ us, we let it go at 
first and then we started ringing up, sending e-mails, trying to get some money out of him but 
nothing happened, and then the next ƚŚŝŶŐǁĞŬŶŽǁƚŚĞƌĞ ?ƐĂůĞƚƚĞƌĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŽƌ
ƐĂǇŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?Ɛ bust but that the same guy has bought the business. We were told 
we ĐŽƵůĚŐŽƚŽĂŵĞĞƚŝŶŐ ?ďƵƚƚŽďĞŚŽŶĞƐƚ/ƐŝŵƉůǇĚŝĚŶ ?ƚƐĞĞƚŚĞƉŽŝŶƚ ?ĞǀĞƌǇƚŚŝŶŐ seemed to 
be done and dusted by that time. I read through what the administrator said, that there was 
no-one else who wanted to buy the business so he decided to sell iƚƚŽƚŚŝƐŐƵǇ ?ďƵƚ/ũƵƐƚĚŽŶ ?ƚ
agree with that, the ĨĂĐƚŝƐƚŚĂƚŚĞ ?ƐĚƌŽƉƉĞĚĂůŽƚŽĨĚĞďƚĂŶĚŚĞ ?ƐŵĂŶĂŐĞĚƚŽŬĞĞƉŚŝƐ
company ďĞĐĂƵƐĞŚĞ ?ƐĚƌŽƉƉĞĚĂůůƚŚĂƚĚĞďƚ ?/ŬŶŽǁƐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌƐĂƌŽƵŶĚ here, 
ĂŶĚǁĞĂůůƚĂŬĞƚŚĞƐĂŵĞǀŝĞǁ ?ƚŚĞƌĞ ?ƐƐŽŵething wrong with a system that allows that to 
ŚĂƉƉĞŶ ?ŽƌƚŚĞƌĞ ?ƐƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐǁƌŽŶŐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŽƌ ǁŚŽƚŚŝŶŬƐƚŚĂƚŝƚ ?ƐŽŬĂǇƚŽĚŽŝƚ Q
Interestingly, this interviewee went on to acknowledge that a dividend of in the region of 7% 
was expected to be paid later in the year. This, he stated, made no difference to his view of 
ƚŚĞŝŵƉƌŽƉƌŝĞƚǇŽĨƚŚĞƚƌĂŶƐĂĐƚŝŽŶ P ‘/ĨǇŽƵĂƐŬĞĚŵĞǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ/ ?ĚƌĂƚŚĞƌƐĞĞŚŝŵŽƵƚ of business 
ŽƌŐĞƚ ? ? ? ?/ǁŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚŚĞƐŝƚĂƚĞ ?ŚĞƐŚŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚďĞĂůůŽǁĞĚƚŽĐĂƌƌǇ on in business.144   
Naturally the response of this one creditor may not be representative of the whole, 
but combined with the other evidence provided above there is clearly a problem with 
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pre-packs.  The creditor is infuriated with an effective and commercial beneficial 
solution that is in keeping with the principle objectives of the law, because the 
feeling that it is unfair or immoral leads them to prefer to receive no money and see 
the business fail.  Further empirical work by Polo has supported &ƌŝƐďǇ ?s findings 
regarding the financial benefits of the pre-pack, that they are an effective procedure 
that appears to preserve businesses that would otherwise be liquidated piecemeal 
and equally that there is  “ŶŽĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞŽĨĞǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚŽĨŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ? ?145  
Concerns about pre-packs seem to be ill founded. 
As such, that some creditors would prefer to reject an option that would most likely 
be more commercially beneficial for all parties does not seem problematic, especially 
given that there is very little chance of them being able to prevent the pre-packaged 
sale and English law has already been demonstrated to be prepared to seek best 
returns ahead of satisfying the wishes of the creditors.146  But there are two reasons 
to care about steamrollering creditor disquiet.  The first is the damage it does to 
public confidence in the system.  The second specific point with pre-packs is that 
while Phoenix pre-packs are more likely to succeed in the long term they are more 
likely to fail than other going-concern sales in the short to medium term.147  If 
stakeholders feel that the sale is illegitimate they are less likely to co-operate with 
the new entity, damaging its chance of continued survival.  Simply pointing out the 
probable improved returns are insufficient where the creditors have no say in the 
ŽƵƚĐŽŵĞ P “For the most part, it would appear that no amount of explanation of the 
commercial justifications of pre-pack phoenixing will convince those disenfranchised 
from the process  Q[the argument that] something should be done to address this 
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air of mistrust becomes quite compelling. ?148  The trick will be to find a way to 
mediate creditor unhappiness without losing the efficiency benefits of pre-packing, 
which I will return to in the final chapter of this thesis.   
The contention that the administration housed CVA is the only genuine rescue 
procedure is clearly false.  Pre-packs can be highly effective.  They could be more 
effective, given some tweaks to improve unsecured creditor inclusivity and thus 
improve the survivability of companies post pre-packaged sale.  It is essential to 
emphasise that when I say tweak I mean exactly that:  the strength of the pre-pack is 
in many ways that it rides rough-shod over the unsecured creditors, but the anger 
that is generated by this approach and the potential subsequent withdrawal of 
support might be mediated by small measures to improve communication and 
interaction.  I will return to this question in later chapters with an exploration of 
creditor decision making.  For the time being the comparison between these two 
extremes of English rescue, the Administration housed CVA and the Pre-pack, is 
intended to emphasise that the strength of English effectiveness formed by a menu 
approach driven by informed discretion, and that where available and practicable the 
best procedures are inclusive procedures.
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docs/insolvency%20profession/consultations/prepack/responses/sales%20of%20 
administrations%20pre%20packs%20hoc%20300311.pdf> accessed 12 September 2011. 
 
CHAPTER 4:  INSOLVENCY REGIMES, INVESTMENT AND THE 
COST OF CREDIT 
 
4.1 THE COMMON SENSE LINK BETWEEN BUSINESS FAILURE AND 
THE COST OF CREDIT. 
In 2008 then Confederation of British Industry (CBI) Director General, Richard 
>ĂŵďĞƌƚ ?ŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚƚŚĂƚĂƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚŽĨƚŚĞĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůĐƌŝƐŝƐ “ƚŚĞďŝŐŐĞƐƚƚŚƌĞĂƚŚĂŶŐŝŶŐ
over businesses is cash-flow.  If they cannot get their hands on the cash and credit 
they need to go about their day-to-day business, there is a real risk that we could see 
healthy firms go under."1  This 
notion of healthy firms going 
under is interesting:  why is 
 “ŐŽŝŶŐƵŶĚĞƌ ?ŶŽƚĞŶŽƵŐŚŝŶ
itself to demonstrate that the 
firm was unhealthy?   It 
suggests that there are 
circumstances where the 
health of a firm can be distinct 
from its ability to get credit or 
indeed that healthy firms can 
become insolvent and fail.   
                                                          
1
 The Times, "Banks need extra £110bn of public money to start lending again", 24 Nov 2008, p15 
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Insolvency lawyers often explore a similar distinction by distinguishing between 
economically and financially distressed firms.2  Economically distressed firms are 
inviable due to intrinsic difficulties, such as producing a product for which there is no 
longer a demand.  Financially distressed firms may be intrinsically viable but have 
difficulty acquiring credit, for example becoming cash-flow insolvent because they 
are over leveraged.  In an efficient market all economically viable firms would be able 
to find finance.  TŚĞŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨ “ŚĞĂůƚŚǇĨŝƌŵƐŐŽŝŶŐƵŶĚĞƌ ?ŝƐƚŚĂƚ
there is some sort of market failure occurring such that the ordinary pricing 
ŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵƐŽĨĐƌĞĚŝƚĂƌĞŶŽƚĐŽƌƌĞĐƚůǇĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚŝŶŐďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞƐĞ ‘ŚĞĂůƚŚǇ ?ĂŶĚ
 ‘ƵŶŚĞĂůƚŚǇ ?ďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐĞƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚƵƐƚŚĂƚŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶŝƐƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚƚŽƉƌŽƚĞĐƚ
economically viable businesses by maintaining cheap credit.   
As a result ensuring the availability of cheap credit has remained a significant 
objective in monetary policy.  The MPC (Monetary Policy Committee) has kept base 
rates low in spite of inflation above the Bank of England target3 as a response at least 
in part to the on-going call for cheaper credit to meet the financial crisis.  It is 
credible that inflation would remain above target even with interest rate increases, 
due to cost push caused by higher energy and commodity prices, the increase in VAT 
and the depreciation of sterling4, and the MPC might legitimately maintain low 
interest rates for the benefits to struggling households or to maintain inter-bank 
liquidity during the financial crisis, but the idea that improving the flow of credit 
reduces business failure is clearly an influential consideration. 
                                                          
2
 See Mokal R (2001a), p195 
3
 At the time of writing, their most recent mŝŶƵƚĞƐŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚƚŚĂƚ “ĐŽƐƚŽĨďĂŶŬĐƌĞĚŝƚƚŽƐŵĂůůĞƌďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐĞƐƌĞmained 
elevated and the supply of credit to them was still restricted" Minutes of the Monetary Policy Committee meeting 
held on 3 and 4 August 2011, found at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/minutes/mpc/pdf/ 
2011/mpc1108.pdf (accessed 7 September 2011), p4-5 para 16, thus supporting the argument for maintaining record 
low interest rates.  
4
 Minutes of the Monetary Policy Committee meeting held on 3 and 4 August 2011, found at 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/minutes/mpc/pdf/ 2011/mpc1108.pdf (accessed 7 September 2011), 
p8 para 31 
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A company can survive as long as it can acquire credit, which can mean anything 
from bank loans to an informal arrangement with a supplier.  The starting point to 
understanding this relationship seems to be to treat credit as performing according 
to a simple cost function.5  Cheaper credit is therefore held to correspond with a 
greater supply of credit.  Interest rates are the price a borrower pays for the use of 
ĂŶŽƚŚĞƌƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐŵŽŶĞǇ ?dŚĞďĂƐĞŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƌĂƚĞƚǇpically refers to the overnight 
deposit rate from the central bank.  The rate includes inflationary expectation, in 
order to compensate the owner for the expected devaluation of his property over 
time, and a risk premium, which accounts for the assessed danger that the loan will 
not be repaid.   
Increased risk premiums due to uncertainty were an important factor in the Asian 
financial crisis;  “ĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐďĂŶŬůĞŶĚŝŶŐƐƚŽƉƉĞĚĂďƌƵƉƚůǇŝŶƚŚĞƚŚƌĞĞĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐǁŝƚŚ
IMF programs (Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand). There were widespread anecdotes 
about firms unable to obtain working capital, even in support of confirmed export 
ŽƌĚĞƌƐĨƌŽŵĂďƌŽĂĚ ? ?6  This is reflected in the approach taken in the development of 
the Orderly and Effective insolvency model, clearly applying the cost function 
approach: 
The Principles and Guidelines highlight the relationship between the cost and flow of credit 
(including secured credit) and the laws and institutions that recognize and enforce credit 
ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?ƐĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂŶĚ ? ) QThe ability of financial institutions to adopt effective credit 
practices to resolve or liquidate non-performing loans depends on having reliable and 
predictable legal mechanisms that provide a means for more accurately pricing recovery and 
ĞŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚĐŽƐƚƐ Quncertainty about the enforceability of contractual rights increases the 
                                                          
5
 See Malinvaud E, Lectures on Micreconomic Theory, tr. Silvey A, North-Holland Publishing (London:  1972), p64-68, 
for a description of the cost-function. 
6
 Radalet S and Sachs J (2000), p116 
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cost of credit to compensate for the increased risk of non-performance or, in severe cases, 
leads to credit tightening.
7
 
So the Orderly and Effective model reflects this common theory of insolvency that 
higher cost of credit = lower availability of credit = higher levels of business failure.  
The direction of causality is not one-way.  These factors are interrelated as increased 
business failure can in turn increase the risk of lending and put pressure on credit 
availability and cost.  This leads to a focus on reducing the cost of credit (either 
through, for example, base interest rate cuts or seeking to remove market failures to 
increase Pareto optimality), although it must leave the Bank of England feeling like it 
is trying to steer a speedboat with an oar.  
The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate that there is no straightforward 
relationship between cost of credit and business failure.  This does not mean that the 
MPC is wrong to lower interest rates, or that lowering interest rates cannot 
sometimes improve business survival.  Nor does it mean that there is no relationship, 
or that there are not times when reducing the cost of credit will reduce business 
failure.  Rather, the point is that applying a simple cost model to credit in order to 
justify greater marketization of insolvency law is dangerously unempirical.  There are 
clear occasions where enforcing absolute priority and encouraging pure insolvency 
efficiency will reduce creditor returns.  
 
  
                                                          
7
 World Bank (2001), p3-4 
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4.2 AN EXAMPLE OF APPLIED INSOLVENCY EFFICIENCY:  THE 
BROGI/SANTELLA MODEL 
/Ŷ ? ? ? ?ZŝĐĐĂƌĚŽƌŽŐŝŽĨƚŚĞ/ƚĂůŝĂŶĂŶŬĞƌƐ ?ƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚWĂƵůŽ^ĂŶƚĞůůĂŽĨĂŶĐĂ
Ě ?/ƚĂůŝĂĂŶĚƚŚĞK ?ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚĂƐƚƵĚǇƚŽƚŚĞĂŶŶƵĂůĐŽŶĨĞƌŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ
Association of Law and Economics that proposed two empirical models for evaluating 
the efficiency of bankruptcy and creditor protection legislation.8 These two models, 
intended to be complementary, focused on length of insolvency procedures, the 
recovery rate of banks in the event of insolvency, and how this impacted on the 
differential cost of credit.  The work represented an ambitious effort to demonstrate 
how the relationship between insolvency workouts and cost of credit could be 
measured, but makes the fatal mistake of confusing a logically consistent model with 
a proof. 
They begin by suggesting that costs in insolvency can be divided into direct costs, the 
measurable expenses associated with the bankruptcy procedure, such as legal and 
administrative costs, and indirect costs, which are considered unmeasurable and 
include lost sales, decline in value of inventory, or poorer business performance due 
to insolvency procedures.9  Other work has been done to explore the impact of direct 
costs of insolvency, for example adjusting net returns from proceedings by reducing 
realised asset value by a combination of practitioner remuneration and costs and 
fees of realisation10, but direct and indirect costs are inevitably interrelated.  An 
example is that paying for a more experienced administrator may result in higher 
returns from asset sales.  There is also is an element of the straw man in the notion 
that there is a hard line between measurable and unmeasurable costs.  Maintaining 
                                                          
8
 Brogi R and Santella P ? “dǁŽEĞǁDĞĂƐƵƌĞƐŽĨĂŶŬƌƵƉƚĐǇĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇ ? ?dŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶDŽŶĞǇĂŶĚ&ŝŶĂŶĐĞ&ŽƌƵŵ ?
Vienna:  SUERF (SEURF Studies:  2004/6) (2004), found at http://suerf.org/download/studies/study20046.pdf 
(accessed 30 Nov 2012) 
9
 Ibid, p29 
10
 Armour J, Hsu A, Walters A (2008), p167 
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the measurability of legal costs was part of the argument for restricting COMI (Centre 
of Main Interest) migration in Re Daisytek11, and insolvency professionals are 
regularly involved in measuring these un-measurable indirect costs.  Lopucki and 
Doherty provide an excellent summary of how this is done, even though they observe 
that this sort of valuation is occasionally referred to as  “ŐƵĞƐƐĐŽŵƉŽƵŶĚĞĚďǇĂŶ
ĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞ ? ?12  Yet the distinction made by Brogi and Santella is important because it 
allows them to highlight that measuring the costs of insolvency is exceptionally 
problematic, which is used to justify why their models are intended to circumvent 
this issue. 
In the first of their models Brogi and Santella broadly categorise national regimes 
ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽĚĞŐƌĞĞŽĨĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌ ?ƐƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶĂŶĚůĞŶŐƚŚŽĨƉƌŽĐĞĞĚŝŶŐƐ ?dŚĞh< ?ĂƐ
ŐŽǀĞƌŶĞĚďǇƚŚĞ/ŶƐŽůǀĞŶĐǇĐƚ ? ? ? ? ?ŝƐĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐ “ůŽǁĐŽƐƚ ? ?ĂŶĚ&ƌĂŶĐĞ ?
governed by the loi  ? ? ? ?ŝƐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ “ĂǀĞƌĂŐĞ-ŚŝŐŚ ?ĐŽƐƚ ?ĚŽǁŶĨƌŽŵ “ŚŝŐŚ ?ƉƌŝŽƌ
to the modifications to the process made in 1994.   
 Brogi and Santella13 La Porta et 
al14 
Country Bankruptcy 
Procedure 
Length 
(months) 
Average Length 
of Civil 
Procedures 
(months) 
Legal Costs for 
Creditors 
Creditor 
Rights Ratings 
(0 low 4 high) 
Sweden 12 48 Low 2 
UK <1 year 52 Low 4 
                                                          
11
 Re Daisytek-ISA Ltd & Ors [2003] BCC 562,p567, citing Virgos-Schmidt report on the Convention on Insolvency 
Proceedings. 
12
 Lopucki LM and Doherty JW (2007), p8, preceeded by a useful summary of methods used to evaluate the value of a 
failing business. 
13
 Brogi R and Santella P (2004), p28 
14
 La Porta R, Lopez-de Silanes F, Shleifer A, Vishny RW (1998), p1136-1137 
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Germany 12/27 50 Low (Average-
Low) 
3 
France 24-36 89 High (Average-
High) 
0 
Italy 72 116 High 2 
 
Essentially they have made a list of five countries according to average length of 
insolvency proceedings, alongside their assessment of the legal cost to creditors 
(which appears to correlate positively with the length of proceedings).  This is used as 
the basis of the argument that longer proceedings weaken creditors and returns to 
creditors, and ƚŚƵƐ “ĞǀĞƌǇůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŽƌƐŚŽƵůĚŐŝǀĞĚŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞƉŽǁĞƌƐƚŽĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌƐŝŶ
ďĂŶŬƌƵƉƚĐǇ ?15 in order to improve insolvency efficiency.  It should be noted that 
when we compare Brogi and Santella ?ƐŚŝĞƌĂƌĐŚǇǁŝƚŚ>ĂWŽƌƚĂĞƚĂů ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? )ƐǇƐƚĞŵ
of creditor rights rating, as in the above table, there does not appear to be much 
correlation (although it is hard to say with only five countries). Their categorisation is 
principally a precursor to their second model, where they justify why focusing on 
length of procedure and banking returns enables to most effectively evaluate the 
impact of insolvency regulation.   
As businesses fund their operations through a combination of equity and credit, then 
the efficiency of a regulatory framework will be reflected in the cost of credit: 
Any insolvency system brings about losses to all creditors involved in a bankruptcy event.  If 
attention is paid to banks  W as main financial creditors  W [it] can be maintained that granting 
loans to firms which probably will default results in higher ĐŽƐƚĚƵĞƚŽƚŚĞďĂŶŬ ?Ɛ ?ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚ ?
capital position.  In other words, within this scenario any banking industry meet[s] an 
 ‘ŝŶƐŽůǀĞŶĐǇ-ůĂǁĐŽƐƚ ?ŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĐŽŵƉůǇǁŝƚŚƐĂĨĞƚǇĂŶĚƐŽƵŶĚŶĞƐƐŝŶƚŚĞĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?
                                                          
15
 Brogi R and Santella P (2004), p11 
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The same cost, to the same extent, passes on to the borrower in terms of a greater interest 
rate. 
16
 
This complements the World Bank principles and guidelines, for example the 
ƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐůǇĐŝƚĞĚŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚ “ƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞĞŶĨŽƌĐĞĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚƵĂů
rights increases the cost of credit to compensate for the increased risk of non-
ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ ? ?17  Brogi and Santella suggest that longer insolvency proceedings will 
result on costs being passed on to consumers.  Focusing on the cost of credit as a 
measure of the efficiency of insolvency regulation allows the analyst to sidestep the 
problem of measurability of direct and indirect costs.   
Brogi and Santella begin by looking at how cumulative recovery changes if they 
decrease the length of the procedure.  Taking their estimate of the average Italian 
recovery rate of 38 Euro per 100, they apply a zero coupon yield curve to plot how 
the cumulative recovery rate changes by decreasing the length of the procedure from 
the Italian average of seven years to six and a half, and three and a half years (the 
average length of proceedings in other EU countries).  A yield curve maps the 
relationship between the cost of borrowing and the time to maturity of a loan for a 
given borrower in a given currency (in this case Euros), and is a fairly typical statistical 
device.  From this they determine that the yearly operational costs of banking and 
the length of the procedure are eroding Italian recoveries by almost 35% to 24.58 
Euros, and that successfully reducing the average length of the procedure would 
increase this recovery to 30.77 Euros.   
This is followed by a second sensitivity analysis, this time changing the recovery rate 
but maintaining a static recovery time of seven years.   Sensitivity analysis is the 
process of determining how the output of a model can be apportioned to different 
                                                          
16
 Ibid, p33 
17
 World Bank (2001), p4 
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sources of change in the model:  in this case, how much of the variable cost of credit 
can be assigned to the two factors in our model, the length of the recovery process 
and the rate of recovery in case of default.  Increasing the recovery rate results in an 
increased Net Present Value of the credit in the event of insolvency.  A comparison of 
these two analyses reveals that recovery rate is a more important factor than length 
ŽĨƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞ ? “ƚŚĞƌĞĐŽǀĞƌǇĞĨĨĞĐƚĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƐĨŽƌ ? ? per cent, while the length effect 
ƚŚĞƌĞŵĂŝŶŝŶŐ ? ?ƉĞƌĐĞŶƚ ? ?18 
From these two analyses Brogi and Santella present three models of Italian 
ŝŶƐŽůǀĞŶĐǇ PƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŵĞĂƐŝƚǁĂƐ ?ĂŶĚƚǁŽŵŽƌĞ “ǀŝƌƚƵŽƵƐ ?19 models.  From the Net 
Present Values of each model we can then determine the respective Loss Given 
Default.20  Their results are thus clear:   
It can be observed that an insolvency law is far from affecting only corporations that have 
gone bankrupt.  This is the proof that the whole Italian economic system suffers from such a 
regulatory competitive disadvantage.  As a result, not only is any virtuous process impeded, 
but also a vicious circle can be bred by a cumbersome insolvency regulation and by the same 
token the economic growth of a country can be dwarfed.
21
 
 Q except that their model could only ever produce this result because the reasoning 
is circular.   Brogi and Santella describe this model as a proof but it is derived from 
only two significant data points:  the recovery rate (which itself is an estimate) and 
the length of procedure in Italy.  Although the zero-coupon yield curve is applied 
through historical data, the use of a record of changes in economic cost implies into 
the model a relationship between our principle variables and cost of credit.  The rest 
of the data is similarly extrapolated from a statistical model.   
                                                          
18
 Brogi R and Santella P (2004), p41 
19
 Ibid, p39 
20
 Loss Given Default = 1  W Net Present Value 
21
 Brogi R and Santella P (2004), p42  
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Their models are an excellent exposition of an ideological position, but they do not 
solve the problem of how to measure insolvency costs because it is only a model and 
not a proof.  They may be right.  The median length of proceedings in the UK is 1.45 
years, compared to 2.15 years in the US, 3.05 years in France, which appears to 
correlate ŝŶǀĞƌƐĞůǇǁŝƚŚ>ĂWŽƌƚĂĞƚĂů ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? )ĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌƌŝŐŚƚƐƐĐŽƌĞ 22 until you notice 
that the average in Germany (creditor rights score of 3) is 3.82 years.23  The IMF 
observes that: 
Delays in court ?s adjudication can have an adverse effect on the value of the assets or the 
viability of the enterprise.  It is therefore critical that procedures be put in place that ensures 
that hearings can be held quickly and that decisions are rendered soon thereafter.  Similarly, it 
is critical that an accelerated appeal process be available.
24
  
The important distinction is between delay and duration.  Not all activity that takes 
time is a waste of time.  Specialist courts are more cumbersome than kangaroo 
courts.  It is reasonable to suspect that long duration is likely to correlate with long 
delay, but more evidence would be required to prove that.  One of the most 
significant changes that appears to have occurred with the introduction of the 
Enterprise Act is a reduction of the duration of insolvency proceedings.  IŶ&ƌŝƐďǇ ?Ɛ
outcomes investigation of 2004 while most receiverships lasted between 323-793 
days (558 on average), most administrations took between 206-548 (an average of 
377 days compared to 558 for receivership).25  Furthermore, pre-Enterprise Act 
administrations lasted an average of 438 days whilst post the act the average was 
348.26  This leads Frisby to the following observation about the impact on costs: 
It is worth noting that expedition is not an end in itself, and one would hope to find that the 
shorter average time spent in administration will bring with it a commensurate reduction in 
                                                          
22
 La Porta R, Lopez-de Silanes F, Shleifer A, Vishny RW (1998), p1136-1137 
23
 Davydenko SA and Franks JR (2008) , p581 
24
 IMF (1999), 5  W Institutions and Participants, p50-51 
25
 Frisby S (2006), p25 
26
 Ibid 
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the level of costs incurred and payable in priority to both unsecured, preferential and floating 
charge creditors. This outcome is not, of course, a foregone conclusion, as there will inevitably 
be cases where the automatic end date will simply mean that the company moves from 
administration into CVL, and a new generation of costs will be incurred from that time. There 
should perhaps, therefore, be research into the overall length of the two procedures before 
any concrete conclusions as to reductions in costs are proffered.
27
  
All other things being equal, a shorter procedure means lower costs but all things are 
rarely equal.  A shorter duration is not going to improve returns if it means 
administrations being prematurely terminated.  The reduction in the length of 
administrations may also be due to a change of culture in the banking sector with a 
ǀŝĞǁƚŽĞĂƌůŝĞƌŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂŶĚďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ ‘ŝŶƚĞŶƐŝǀĞĐĂƌĞ ? ?Research explored in 
Chapter 2 found that the new administration costs incurred higher direct costs than 
receivership.28  Could the increased complexity and cost be placing an upward 
pressure on the length of proceedings that is being disguised by changes in culture 
and the introduction of a default time limit?   A significant expansion of the outcomes 
research, particularly one that allowed time series analysis over an extended period, 
would help answer these questions.  For the time being it is essential to appreciate 
that a reduced length of procedure cannot reliably be taken to indicate a more 
virtuous insolvency system. 
 
  
                                                          
27
 Ibid, p31 
28
 Armour J, Hsu A, Walters A (2006), p30 
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4.3 CAN THE ASSUMPTION THAT CHEAP CREDIT SAVES 
BUSINESSES BE RELIED UPON? 
Insolvency costs were to be reduced in order to lower the cost of credit, which in 
turn would reduce the rate of business failure.  The Brogi and Santella model 
illustrates some of the difficulties of confusing an ideological model with an empirical 
proof.  This raises the question:  how certain is it that lower interest rates reduce 
business failure? 
Let us take figures for total number of liquidations by quarter29 and base Bank of 
England interest rates by quarter30, and perform a regression analysis:  in this form, 
this is a simple descriptive technique to see whether there is any obvious correlation 
between the two.  
 
                                                          
29
 Insolvency Service, http://www.insolvency direct.bis.gov.uk/otherinformation/statistics/201108/index.htm#tables 
(accessed 6 Oct 2011) 
30
 Bank of England, http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/index.htm, (Accessed 28 July 2011) 
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An OLS analysis shows a significant (P Value <0.00002) negative relationship between 
base interest rates and corporate insolvency where changes in base interest rate 
explain (unadjusted r2) 13% of the change in numbers of corporate liquidations.  This 
is the exact opposite of our hypothesis, which taken at face value suggests that 
reducing interest rates increases levels of failure.  However, plotting the residuals 
over time (dispersions from the line of best fit) reveals some interesting spikes: 
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The relationship becomes less reliable (the residuals diverge further from the central 
line) during the three major recessions of our sample period (the oil shock in the late 
1970s, the withdrawal from the ERM in the early nineties, and the current crisis 
beginning in 2008). This suggests that base interest rates are less influential over 
business failure during recessions.  Given that promoting Orderly and Effective 
insolvency stems from a desire to reform insolvency law during financial crisis, this is 
disconcerting.   
Another valuable observation can be seen if we simply plot interest rates against 
corporate liquidations:  
 
There is negative trend in interest rates, which may be reflective of the shift in policy 
from full unemployment to inflation targeting31, and a positive trend in corporate 
failure that may simply be explained by an increase in the number of companies in 
the country since 1977 (and therefore more companies available to fail).  This might 
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make it more reasonable to measure corporate insolvencies as a proportion of active 
companies, and certainly that would give a better idea of the impact of insolvency as 
a whole.  The problem is that even if the data were available knowing the proportion 
of companies failing over companies surviving would only be of limited use because it 
does not describe the size or form of the companies.  Walters and Frisby experienced 
a similar issue with their CVA report: 
The Company Register Statistics provides information on the number of companies registered 
at Companies House and, further, how many of these are public companies. There does not, 
however, appear to be any statistical analysis of companies according to their size. The 
statistics for November 2010 indicate that in England and Wales of all the active companies on 
the register 9,543, out of a total of 2,463,862, were public companies. The DTI Report on 
Companies for 2005- 2006 provides a number of different analyses of Companies House data 
but, again and regrettably, not specifically on the size of companies on the register.
32
 
Ultimately the most significant feature of the underlying regression analysis of the 
relationship between cost of credit and numbers of corporate insolvencies are the 
noise and the large and significant constant, strongly suggesting other important 
factors influencing business failure.  In fact, the more detailed the examination of the 
why and when businesses fail the more the relationship between credit and failure 
becomes unreliable.  CŽŶƐŝĚĞƌ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ƚŚĞ “ďůŝƉ ? 33 in levels of receiverships and 
at the end of 2004 which has been associated with an attempt to take advantage of 
the abolition of crown preference, or the impact of the business payment support 
scheme appearing to reducing corporate insolvencies resulting from the recent crisis 
ƐƵĐŚƚŚĂƚ “a movement out of recession will not necessarily be accompanied by a 
ĚƌŽƉŝŶƚŚĞůĞǀĞůŽĨĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞŝŶƐŽůǀĞŶĐǇ ? ?34   Interest rates are a clumsy tool at best 
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for influencing business failure because it is not a central driver of what causes 
business to fail. 
/ŶƐƚĂƚŝƐƚŝĐĂůĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐƚŚŝƐŝƐŬŶŽǁŶĂƐ ‘ŽŵŝƚƚĞĚvariable bias. ?  The picture is limited or 
even distorted by data that has not been considered or to which there is no access.  
Organisations like the Department for Business Information and Skills (BIS) and 
Companies House are making increasing efforts to gather and categorise data but the 
picture is incomplete and the time frames limited. The pioneering insolvency 
outcomes research explored in Chapters 2 and 3 struggles against similar problems; 
limited information on positions and classes of creditors, and on secured creditors 
generally35, a database of insolvency procedures where in almost half of the cases 
returns to secured creditors went unrecorded36 (leading Frisby to ĐŽŵƉůĂŝŶŽĨ “ƚŚĞ
paucity of available data on levels ŽĨƌĞƚƵƌŶ ?37), and a record of CVAƐǁŚĞƌĞ “ŝt was 
not possible to estimate the proportion of unsecured debt that was owed to HMRC in 
ƚŚĞĐĂƐĞƐŽŶƚŚĞĚĂƚĂďĂƐĞ ? ?38  Even if full data sets had been available the fact that 
ƚŚĞǁŽƌŬŝƐƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚŽĨŝƚƐŬŝŶĚŵĞĂŶƐƚŚĂƚŝƚĐĂŶŽŶůǇƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĂ “ƐŶĂƉƐŚŽƚ ? ?39  There is 
no way of being certain whether 2004 was an unusual year for administrations with 
repeating the study in following years, and good reason to suspect it might have 
been, being so close to the reforms in the law.  What is needed is  “Ăƌolling 
evaluation programme [which] will give a better idea of the true impact of the 
ŶƚĞƌƉƌŝƐĞĐƚŝŶƚŽƚŚĞĨƵƚƵƌĞ ? ?40  Only when there is sufficient consistently gathered 
data to conduct proper time series analysis will a clearer picture of the relationships 
begin to emerge. 
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The Bank of England Lending Committee, established in 2007 in response to the 
burgeoning financial crisis, now publishes information on aggregate lending.41 The 
data set is too small for the sort of time-series analysis required, and impossible to 
correlate with base interest rates as the entire data-set occurs during a period of 
record low rates.  Actual costs and quantities of lending are carefully guarded pieces 
of proprietary information, for obvious reasons.  Davydenko and Franks, whose 
access to proprietary banking data facilitates their production of high quality 
ƐƚĂƚŝƐƚŝĐĂůĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ?ŚĂǀĞĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞĚƚŚĂƚůĞŶĚŝŶŐƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐĂƌĞĂĚũƵƐƚĞĚƚŽ “ŵŝƚŝŐĂƚĞ
costly aspects of bankruptcy law [but] bank recovery rates in default remain sharply 
ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ? ?42  The relationship between credit and failure is too complex to render 
with ideological purity.  There are important empirical studies that show the 
importance of cost of credit to business success, for example de Mel, McKenzie and 
tŽŽĚƌƵĨĨ ?Ɛstudies showing 10% increases in Sri-Lankan microenterprises when one-
off grants were made available.43  The reliability of this study rests in its scale and 
refusal to extrapolate from the micro to the macro.  Common sense models are a 
false friend, particularly when you apply grand theories to small amounts of data. 
Writing in 2004 Frisby observed that  “ƚhere is little in the way of empirical evidence 
on the outcomes of insolvency procedures in general Qone might question whether 
the conduct of such should ŚĂǀĞƉƌĞĐĞĚĞĚĂƌĞǀŝĞǁŽĨƚŚĞůĂǁ ? ?44  It is extraordinary 
to think that two large scale revisions of insolvency law, the acts of 1986 and 2002, 
were performed without quantitative exploration of how insolvency procedures 
were actually being used.  Part of the problem is the attraction to the uniform 
application grandiose economic theories.  The regression analysis I performed simply 
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to describe what has happened in terms of interest rates and liquidation levels was 
made in the expectation that no particular relationship would emerge.  What 
happened was something much more dangerous.  At first glance there appears to be 
a situation where cheaper credit actually increases rates of failure.  It would not be 
difficult to move from here, supported by evidence that will be explored in the next 
section of the potential dangers of cheap credit, to argue that increased profit to 
lenders from higher base cost of lending reduced the need to screen firms and 
therefore led to economically unviable firms receiving funding and ultimately to 
more corporate failure.  There may even be something to this reasoning, but the 
essential problem is that there simply is not enough in the crude statistical analysis I 
performed to support this.  I would be making the same error as those claiming 
cheaper base cost of credit will reduce levels of corporate insolvency by treating a 
model as a proof, and scattering a little empiricism only as seasoning.  As Warren 
observed,  “ǁĞƐŚŽƵůĚŐĞƚĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐŽĨĂƐŬŝŶŐŚĂƌĚĞƌƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐ ?ůŽŽŬŝng for 
ďĞƚƚĞƌĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ?ĂŶĚĂƉƉƌŽǆŝŵĂƚŝŶŐďĞƚƚĞƌĂŶƐǁĞƌƐ ? ?45 The better approach is to 
work from the smaller scale, to look directly at the evidence from interviews with 
stakeholders and analysis of actually insolvency outcomes.  There is a clear need for 
both more detailed record keeping by insolvency practitioners and company house, 
and an expansion of the insolvencies outcome work done to date. 
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4.4 THE TENSION BETWEEN RESCUE AND LIQUIDATION RETURNS 
There is evidently a relationship between regulation of insolvency, the cost and 
availability of credit, and the levels of business failure.  Most likely there are multiple 
relationships.  Cost of credit for the demander is also clearly related to the 
profitability of credit for the supplier.  The contractualist model argues that 
maximum social welfare through effective insolvency law is achieved through 
absolute priority for secured creditors, thereby increasing returns for secured 
creditors and thus availability of credit.  Regulation of insolvency beyond mandatory 
structural rules is therefore considered an impediment to achieving maximum social 
welfare.  This chapter has been exploring some of the limits of this applying this 
approach as a general rule, largely focusing on its circularity and its unempirical 
foundation.  The relationship between credit and business failure is not 
straightforward, and difficult to quantify.  There have, however, been a number of 
empirical works exploring the operation of credit in specific markets, especially as 
statistical techniques and the supporting information technology have improved in 
recent years.  Stronger protection of security has been associated with a reduction in 
the cost of credit.  But, what is the nature of this relationship?   
In 2009 Benmelech and Bergmen sought to test the relationship between collateral 
and the availability of credit, in particular: 
Theories based on borrower moral hazard and limited pledgeable income predict that 
collateral increases the availability of credit and reduces its price by limiting the downside risk 
born by creditors.  [This is because] upon default, creditors can obtain at least a portion of the 
return on their investment through the repossession and liquidation of pledged collateral.
46  
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They did this with an industry specific study of US airlines, finding that redeployable 
capital does indeed lower the cost of financing and increase debt capacity.  The 
advantage of the single market study is it produces more accurate results, but the 
disadvantage is that it is difficult to separate from its context.  These results emerge 
ŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ?ƐŵŽƐƚĚĞďƚŽƌĨƌŝĞŶĚůǇƌĞŐŝŵĞƐ ?It is good 
evidence, as they state, that creditors must be able to recover at least a portion of 
their investment and that increasing this proportion most likely increases the 
willingness to lend, but is it possible to be more precise about what is required to 
encourage collateral lending?  
ĂĞĂŶĚ'ŽǇĂů ?ƐĐƌŽƐƐĐŽƵŶƚƌǇĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨůĞŐĂůƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨďĂŶŬůŽĂŶƐŽŶƚŚĞƐŝǌĞ ?
maturity and interest rate spread loan attempts to do this, and finds the consistent 
result that banks respond to poor debt enforcement by reducing loan amounts, 
shortening loan maturities, and increasing loan spreads.47  What makes Bae and 
'ŽǇĂů ?ƐƐƚƵĚǇƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝng is that, as well as applying the typical LLPV 
creditors ? rights scale48(automatic stays, creditor consent for reorganisation, secured 
creditor priority and replacement of debtor management), they measure for a 
scheme of property rights concerns issues like corruption, and risk of expropriation 
or of contract repudiation.  They find that while both have a significant positive 
relationship with willingness to lend, property rights are much more important than 
creditor rights, leading them to suggest that size restrictions and reluctance to lend 
are principally driven by uncertain legal environments.49  This is reminiscent of the 
/D& ?ƐƉŽŝŶƚĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞŽĨĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇĂŶĚĐƌĞĚŝtor friendliness, 
discussed in Chapter 3.1 and repeated here: 
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The degree to which an insolvency law is perceived as pro-creditor or pro-debtor is, in the final 
analysis, less important than the extent to which these rules are effectively implemented by a 
strong institutional infrastructure... effective implementation requires judges and 
administrators that are efficient, ethical, and adequately trained in commercial and financial 
matters and in the specific legal issues raised by insolvency proceedings.  A pro-debtor law 
that is applied effectively and consistently will engender greater confidence in financial 
markets than an unpredictable pro-creditor law.
50
 
When insolvency laws are revised they are likely to impact both open property rights 
generally and creditor friendliness particularly, making it difficult to ascertain which 
parts are having what impact.  This helps explain the results of Djankov et als51 work 
on specialists courts, first discussed in Chapter 3.3, where they found that whilst rich 
ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ? expensive rescue procedures produce an aggregate improvement in 
creditor returns, middle and low income countries that attempt to mimic their 
success end up with a more expensive liquidation process: 
 This suggests that, for small and medium firms, poor countries should avoid debt 
enforcement mechanisms that involve detailed and extensive court oversight since the 
administrative capacity of their courts may not tolerate such proceedings. Simpler 
mechanisms, such as foreclosure with no or limited court oversight and floating charge, which 
essentially transfer control of the firm to the secured creditor, might be preferred.
52
  
Measures that improve creditor inclusivity and are designed to improve co-operation 
towards rescue outcomes are of no use if the court cannot be relied upon to provide 
objective rulings or enforce legal contracts.  This helps explain some of the other 
important results regarding improvements in national insolvency regimes and their 
relationship to lending post the publication and implementation of the Orderly and 
Effective guidelines.  Haselmann, PistoƌĂŶĚsŝŬƌĂŶƚ ?ƐƐƚƵĚǇŽĨůĞŶĚŝŶŐŝŶƚƌĂŶƐŝƚŝŽŶĂů
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economies, the very countries intended to benefit from the IMF guidelines, found 
that the level of formal creditor rights protection is positively associated with the 
lending volume.53  While they link this to problems of collective enforcement rising 
from co-ordination failures, the critical factor is the existence in the first place of a 
strong collateral regime.54  The ability to reliably pledge assets at all is the most 
important determinant of credit supply and a pre-requisite for other creditor friendly 
measures to have any affect at all. 
Similarly, ZŽĚĂŶŽĞƚĂů ?ƐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨĚĂƚĂƐĞƚƐĚƵƌŝŶŐ ? ? ? ?-2006 Italian bankruptcy law 
reform found that introduction of the reorganisation procedure increased interest 
rates on loan financing, and that reform accelerating liquidation procedures both 
decreased firms cost of finance and also relaxed creditor constraints.55  They argue 
that their results show rescue measures are substantially less efficient than improved 
liquidation procedures, because the  “ǁŽƌƐĞƌĞƉĂǇŵĞŶƚŝŶĐĞŶƚŝǀĞƐŽƵƚǁĞŝŐŚ
efficiency gains from improved creditor co-ordination. ?56  There are a number of 
issues with using this result to draw conclusions about the relative value of rescue 
and liquidation.  The first is that although the changes to the law were introduced in 
a staggered fashion, with the rescue regime introduced in 2005 and liquidation 
scheme in 2006, the extent to which this truly allows their impacts to be measured 
separately is debatable.  Reorganisations take time.  It is unlikely that many 
reorganisations begun after the introduction of the 2005 law were finished before 
the introduction of the 2006 law.  There are transition costs with the introduction of 
a new system, and it is unreasonable to players to have a great deal of confidence in 
a new system just as it is being introduced.  The benefits of a new rescue system will 
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only emerge once it is established and having a positive impact on rescue returns 
(something which is by no means certain to occur, explaining entirely rational 
hesitancy by financial institutions).  Meanwhile, improved secured creditor returns in 
liquidation are likely to have a much more immediate effect.  The liquidation 
procedure introduced by Italy in 2006 is equally no paragon of pure insolvency 
efficiency.  It introduces a creditor committee, with powers to control the process 
ĂŶĚǀĞƚŽƚŚĞĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĨŝƌŵ ?ƐĂĐƚŝǀŝƚǇĂůŽŶŐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƉŽǁĞƌƚŽƐƵƐƉĞŶĚƚŚĞ
liquidation phase if it approves a settlement agreement pƌŽƉŽƐĞĚ “ďǇƚŚĞƐĂŵĞ
ĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌƐ ?ƚŚĞƚƌƵƐƚĞĞ ?ĂƚŚŝƌĚƉĂƌƚǇ ?ŽƌƚŚĞĚĞďƚŽƌ ? ?57 This improves creditor control 
but has more in common with a CVA than a pure liquidation measure, and it would 
be very interesting to study insolvency outcomes from this new system to determine 
if calling the rose by another name has had an impact on its scent. 
More important than this window is the truly dysfunctional state of Italian 
insolvency.  This is perhaps part of the reason why analysts of Italian insolvency, like 
Rodano et al here and Brogi and Santella earlier, are so prepared to entertain radical 
efficiency based solutions.  Prior to the 2005 introduction of a new reorganisation 
procedure the main instrument for firms in distress was liquidation  W only 1% used 
the reorganisation system.  This increased from 1% to 10% of total procedures in 
2009.58  In 1998 La Porta et al scored Italy at 2 out of 4 on the creditor rights scale, 
and much more importantly with an efficiency of only 6.75  W in the company of 
nations like Egypt and Peru, below Sri Lanka and Nigeria.59  Rodano et al use their 
results to take the leap to the conclusion that granting a second chance to an 
entrepreneur in distress will translate into lower incentives for that entrepreneur to 
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behave with care.60  It is submitted that their work is a better example of Djankov et 
al ?s point that middle income nations with poor legal infrastructures are not able to 
implement effective rescue procedures, and are better advised to concentrate on 
improving their foreclosure and collateral enforcement systems until their 
infrastructure is capable of inspiring the confidence required for rescue.  
This also helps explains some of the apparent anomalies that emerge from the 
creditor/debtor friendly analysis when we examine countries that do have effective 
infrastructures.  Davydenko and Franks identify the United States as having a 
recovery rate of 70%61, which alongside higher than expected levels of delistings and 
fewer acquisitions does not fit comfortably with its reputation as a debtor-friendly 
jurisdiction.62  The creditor friendly United Kingdom has a higher proportion of going-
concern reorganisations than debtor friendly France63, and the instances of 
liquidation in the UK (42.9%) are lower than Germany (56.9%) or France (62.0%)64, 
directly contradicting classical association between creditor control and less frequent 
use of acquisitions/greater use of liquidation.65    
Once countries have developed effective infrastructure then the meaning of creditor 
friendliness becomes more complex.  Absolute priority is not optimal because it 
interferes with rescue, and effective rescue systems grant substantially greater 
aggregate returns.  Bae and Goyal explain how a tension begins to emerge between 
security and returns:  
loan securitization (as well as the growth of loan sales and syndication) fosters financial 
integration and investor diversification. Integration allows capital to flow between markets, 
dampening the consequences of shocks to local banks and other lenders. Diversification 
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facilitates risk sharing and risk management. But both have downsides.  With integration, 
collateral shocks like the recent drop in real estate values in the United States and United 
Kingdom spread rapidly across the financial system. Diversification may weaken incentives for 
investors to engage in proper due diligence and credit evaluation.
66
  
There is an underlying tension between best chance of rescue returns (recalling that 
higher probability of viable rescue results in higher rescue returns in the aggregate), 
and returns achieved through liquidation (as the costs of investigating viability and 
attempting rescue reduce the size of the pot in the event of failure followed by 
liquidation).  Investment is not simply a battle to lower costs but more generally for 
greater value.  Lower costs can be a part of that, but it is not the entirety.  As every 
employer knows who has sought a healthy, educated workforce, or a place of 
business not subject to military attack or state seizure, or a bank which is unlikely to 
suddenly collapse or suffer a run without state intervention, governments can and do 
ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞ ‘ŐŽŽĚ ?ĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůŝƚŝĞƐǁŚŝĐŚŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞƚŚĞǀĂůƵĞŽĨ ĂŶŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚ P 
Regulations which further the public interest will not necessarily impose net private costs on 
firms.  In particular, regulations that seek to correct a market failure, if they work effectively, 
may result in a net benefit to the firms that comply.  This will be felt through the price 
mechanism of the market in question.
67
  
Housten et al68 have empirically demonstrated a tension between successful rescue 
and returns to secured creditors in liquidation:  achieving higher returns in rescue 
places a downward pressure on returns in liquidation.  The reason for this is that 
every attempt at rescue impose expenses that reduce the size of the pool in the 
event that the enterprise is ultimately liquidated.  However, the evidence suggests 
ƚŚĂƚ “a larger probability of default doeƐŶŽƚŵĞĂŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞůĞŶĚĞƌƐ ?Ğǆ-post losses 
are greater.  With the greater probability of default but greater protection (e.g. 
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smaller losses) in the case of default, ůĞŶĚĞƌƐ ?ĂĐƚƵĂůůǇůŽƐƐĞƐŵĂǇĞŝƚŚĞƌƌŝƐĞŽƌĨĂůů ? ?69 
This also implies that a lesser probability of default does not mean the ex-post losses 
are smaller either.  In turn ? “Ăcross all specifications, stronger creditor rights are 
correlated with a greater likelihood of financial crisis ?70, which is related directly to 
the point Bae and Goyal made about the impact of security on risk management.  
Davydenko and FrankƐŽďƐĞƌǀĞƚŚĂƚ “banks may respond to poor creditor protection 
by screening and monitoring borrowers more carefully at loan origination ?71, a 
hypothesis that was supported in the work of Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer72.  
Empirical data emerging from studies of reforms in Asia support this by suggesting 
that this is true in both directions, as greater creditor security leads to less scrutiny:   
With improved creditor rights (CR) protection, the losses of the creditor in the state of default 
decrease.  Thus, the marginal benefit of monitoring necessarily declines, implying a lower 
equilibrium level of monitoring effort by the creditor, and a greater probability of default.  This 
reduction in monitoring is a response by a rational lender to a favourable change in the legal 
environment which leads to greater protection to the lender should the borrower default.
73
   
Increased security reduces the marginal benefit of screening.74  Screening and rescue 
are both expensive.  Lenders may be able to undercut their more responsible 
colleagues by avoiding screening and taking the chance that the increased probability 
of failure will not outweigh the reduced costs.  They are prepared to do this because 
the increased security in the insolvency regime has passed the costs of their risk 
taking on to the other creditors of the insolvent firm.  Greater risk taking over time, 
however, leads to greater failure, and in the long term this sort of behaviour 
damages the whole market.  The reason why the financial sector is prepared to 
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engage in normative management of behaviour, and support law that restricts the 
ability to avoid the costs of screening, is because it protects the industry from this 
sort of hit-and-run banking.  Developments reflecting this in the UK market and the 
industƌǇ ?s responses are explored in Chapter 5.  Excessive secured creditor priority 
weakens the connection between stronger creditor rights and the reduced likelihood 
of systemic crisis75, and reducing the risk of systemic crisis is an important part of 
ŝŶƐŽůǀĞŶĐǇůĂǁ ?Ɛ “ŵĂũŽƌƌŽůĞŝŶƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚĞŶŝŶŐĂĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƐĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂŶĚĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů
ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? ?76  Enhanced returns in liquidation can actually have a negative impact on 
the level of creditor rights in a regime because they distance creditors from the costs 
of their own activities, and somewhat counter-intuitively they reduce creditor control 
by trapping them in a race to the bottom.   
Stronger creditor rights are associated with higher growth,77 but taken too far this 
growth is like the bubbles at the peakƐŽĨƚŚĞĐǇĐůĞŽĨďŽŽŵĂŶĚďƵƐƚ P “ƚŚĞ ‘ĚĂƌŬ ?
side of greater risk taking is that it significantly increases the likelihood of financial 
ĐƌŝƐŝƐ ? ?78  Financial crisis not only results in a greater number of businesses going 
bust, and a reduced chance of going-concern sale, but even if the only interest is 
immediate security returns it is found that attached assets are worth less in a 
recession. This goes a step beyond considering that  “ƐǁŝĨƚĂŶĚĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚůŝƋƵŝĚĂƚŝŽŶ ?79, 
where  “ƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶŽĨbankruptcy is to allow unpaid creditors to seize the 
ŝŶƐŽůǀĞŶƚĚĞďƚŽƌ ‘ƐĂƐƐĞƚƐ ?ƐĞůůƚŚĞŵĂŶĚŝŶǀĞƐƚƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞĞĚƐŝŶŽƚŚĞƌǀĞŶƵĞƐ ?80, is not 
the most important feature of a creditor friendly regime.   
Excessive creditor rights are not a problem in a regime that does not have adequate 
infrastructure or property rights.  In such situations lenders cannot be insulated from 
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risk and need to invest in screening to gain the sort of informational advantages that 
allow them to compete in the special conditions of the domestic arena.81  Put bluntly, 
it is more expensive and more risky to be a hit and run investor in an environment 
where you need to spend time learning whom to bribe to stay in business.  However, 
in regimes that have overcome these problems, recognising the potentially harmful 
impact of excessive security demonstrates that if too much emphasis is placed upon 
protecting rights in liquidation it will actually harm creditor returns in general.  
This concern that excessive creditor rights may provoke crisis may seem incongruous 
ǁŝƚŚƌĞƐƵůƚƐůŝŬĞƚŚŽƐĞŽĨĐŚĂƌǇĂĞƚĂů ?ǁŚŽĨŝŶĚ “ƐƚƌŽŶŐĞƌĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌƌŝŐŚƚƐŝŶ
ďĂŶŬƌƵƉƚĐǇĂĨĨĞĐƚĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚĐŚŽŝĐĞďǇƌĞĚƵĐŝŶŐĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞƌŝƐŬƚĂŬŝŶŐ ? ?82  
This really interesting piece of work identifies the way which fear of secured creditor 
ĐŽŶƚƌŽůŝŵƉŝŶŐĞƐŽŶĨŝƌŵ ?ƐǁŝůůŝŶŐŶĞƐƐƚŽƚĂŬĞŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚƌŝƐŬƐ ?/ƚĨŝƚƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŶŽƚŝŽŶ
that secured credit shifts the risk of investment from the bank to the company.  The 
temptation is to slide into a debate about what constitutes excessive risk or excessive 
growth, when the crucial concern is to ensure that no party is able to completely 
divest themselves of the consequences of risk.  Acharya et al bring these issues 
together as follows: 
It may well be that stronger creditor rights may induce managers to reduce risk and to stifle 
even non-opportunistic risk taking that would be beneficial to all claimholders QThe existence 
of stronger creditor rights is not always desirable.  The optimal level of creditor rights should 
balance their positive effect on the supply of credit against their negative effect on corporate 
risk-taking and on operating performance, as well as on the demand for debt.
83
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The essential issue is to find a balance between creditor and debtor rights that 
encourages engaged risk taking from both sides.  For many developing insolvency 
regimes dealing with the intricacies of this balance is an unnecessary luxury, but once 
an effective infrastructure is in place then the optimal position is not the one 
described by insolvency efficiency.  Some redistributive measures are necessary to 
prevent the sorts of hit-and-run banking and short-termism that drives the financial 
sector into a race to the bottom.  This is not about legislating for acceptable levels of 
risk but rather creating systems that allow the invested parties to effectively 
determine what does or does not constitute a good risk, and that can only achieved if 
it ensures that none of them are fully insulated from the decision.  
CHAPTER 5:  THE POSITIONING OF BANKS AND OTHER 
INSTITUTIONAL CREDITORS AS STRATEGIC PLAYERS  
 
5.1 OPERATING IN AN OLIGOPOLISTIC CREDIT MARKET 
In a series of empirical papers on English corporate insolvency, Franks and Sussman 
ƐƚĂƚĞĐůĞĂƌůǇƚŚĂƚ “ĐŽůůĂƚĞƌĂůĂŶĚůŝƋƵŝĚĂƚŝŽŶƌŝŐŚƚƐĂƌĞŚŝŐŚůǇĐŽŶĐĞŶƚƌĂƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞ
ŚĂŶĚƐŽĨƚŚĞŵĂŝŶďĂŶŬ ? ?1  Banking in the United Kingdom became oligopolistic in 
ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽƚŚĞƌĞĐĞƐƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĞĂƌůǇ ? ? ? ?Ɛ ?ƐƵĐŚƚŚĂ  “ďĞĐĂƵƐĞĂĨĞǁ large banks 
dominate the UK market, centralization of the management of distressed firms may 
ŚĂǀĞĂůůŽǁĞĚƚŚĞŵƚŽƌĞĚƵĐĞĂŶǇĞǆĐĞƐƐƐƵƉƉůǇŽĨďĂŶŬƌƵƉƚĂƐƐĞƚƐ ? ?2  An oligopoly is 
 “ĂŵĂƌŬĞƚƚŚĂƚŝƐŽŶůǇƐƵƉƉůŝĞĚďǇĂĨĞǁĨŝƌŵƐ ?3, whose qualifying feature is that 
these firms act interdependently.  Oligopolies have three important consequences 
for the market.4  First, sellers are price makers, so unlike in a perfectly competitive 
market they have control over prices and can achieve super-normal profits.  Second, 
sellers behave strategically such that decisions are made taking into account the 
actions and expected actions of the others.  Third, entry and exit to the market may 
be blocked or limited.  
Firms that wish to become banks have been subject to a prior approval regime since 
the Banking Act 1979, and are now licensed under the Financial Services and Markets 
Đƚ ? ? ? ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝŶǀŽůǀĞƐ “ŐŝǀŝŶŐĂďŽĚǇ5 the power to screen out institutions which 
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ĨĂŝůƚŽŵĞĞƚŵŝŶŝŵƵŵƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƐ ? ?6  The unavoidable consequence of limiting the 
number of suppliers into the market is to limit competition.7  Even without the 
recession or the regulator, it may simply be the case that the natural shape of the 
banking industry is oligopolistic.  Banking is subject to significant economies of scale, 
most notably cost buffers required to deal with systemic risk, and larger banks enjoy 
a natural advantage.  Therefore collateral and liquidation rights are highly 
concentrated in the hands of an oligopoly. 
In the classic macro-economic model, oligopolies achieve super-normal profits (a 
term in economics which means profits above cost) by restricting supply in order to 
push up price8.  This would mean that an oligopolistic credit market would have a 
consistent tendency towards tightening credit availability, particularly during a 
financial crisis where demand for credit increased, in order to maximise profit.  This 
control over pricing severely undermines the use of free market models to analyse 
insolvency law because insolvency laws are not regulating a free market:  changes in 
underlying costs of credit and even returns from credit have only a secondary impact 
in relation to the changing strategic relationship between banks.  Concerns about the 
ŚĂƌŵƚŽĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌƐƚŚĂƚĂƌŝƐĞƐĨƌŽŵĂŶŽůŝŐŽƉŽůǇ ?ƐĂďŝůity to manipulate price through 
supply have led to encouragement and maintenance of competition being 
 “ĨƌĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇĐŝƚĞĚĂƐŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉĂůŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐŽĨĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?9 
There are, however, advantages to oligopolies.  As Hayek famously observed: 
If the state of affairs assumed by the theory of perfect competition ever existed, it would not 
ŽŶůǇĚĞƉƌŝǀĞŽĨƚŚĞŝƌƐĐŽƉĞĂůůƚŚĞĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞǀĞƌď ‘ƚŽĐŽŵƉĞƚĞ ?ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐďƵƚŝƚǁŽƵůĚ
ŵĂŬĞƚŚĞŵǀŝƌƚƵĂůůǇŝŵƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ Q ?,ŽǁŵĂŶǇĚĞǀŝĐĞƐĂĚŽƉƚĞĚŝn ordinary life to that end 
would still be open to a seller in a market in which so-ĐĂůůĞĚ ‘ƉĞƌĨĞĐƚĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ ?ƉƌĞǀĂŝůƐ ?/
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believe that the answer is exactly none.  Advertising, undercutting, and improving 
 ? ‘ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŝĂƚŝŶŐ ? )ƚŚĞŐŽŽĚƐŽƌƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐƉƌŽĚƵced are all excluded by definition  W  ‘ƉĞƌĨĞĐƚ ?
competition means indeed the absence of all competitive activities.
10
 
Achieving supernormal profits gives the banking industry the capacity to survive 
systemic shocks by effectively spreading the cost amongst the consumers (a kind of 
inversed depositor protection scheme), and also the flexibility to innovate and adapt 
to changing circumstances.  Davydenko and Franks observe that the harm of the 
ƌĞĐĞƐƐŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?ƐǁĂƐĞǆĂĐĞƌďĂƚĞĚ “ďǇůĂĐŬŽĨĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚŝŶďĂŶŬƐ ?11 
because it restricted their ability to dispose of bankrupt assets; the oligopolisation of 
the market was, in part, a response to this.  Institutional creditors are able to operate 
strategically, which is to say in the aggregate and playing the long game, for example 
taking losses on individual failures in order to increase their profitability elsewhere.   
This suggests that banks have a far more important role in the insolvency process 
than simply being providers of cheap credit, and that the power of the banking sector 
in the UK may in turn be one of the stronger factors of the English insolvency regime.   
 
5.2 THE CENTRAL ROLE OF BANKS IN THE DECISION TO 
LIQUIDATE 
dŚĞ/D&ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞƚŚĂƚ “Ăn insolvency proceeding is a dynamic process.  Unlike many 
other adjudicative proceedings, which involve an inquiry into historical events, an 
ŝŶƐŽůǀĞŶĐǇƉƌŽĐĞĞĚŝŶŐƚĂŬĞƐƉůĂĐĞŝŶ ‘ƌĞĂůƚŝŵĞ ? PĚĞůĂǇƐŝŶĂĐŽƵƌƚ ?ƐĂĚũƵĚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĐĂŶ
have an adverse effect on the value of the assets or the viability of the enterpriƐĞ ? ?12  
Although they recognise that there is a process, the focus remains on court 
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adjudication.  There is a similar problem in US analysis of insolvency law where the 
so-ĐĂůůĞĚ ‘ĚĞĂƚŚďĞĚ ?ƚĞƐƚŚĂƐƐƚŝŵƵůĂƚĞĚĚĞďĂƚĞďĞĐĂƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞĨĂƐŚŝŽŶŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞ
focus on imminence of liquidation distorts their evaluation of the business as a going 
concern.13  Focusing on the end is distortive because the insolvency process exists 
throughout the lifespan of all companies, healthy or otherwise. 
If a small ŽƌŵĞĚŝƵŵƐŝǌĞĨŝƌŵďƌĞĂĐŚĞƐƚŚĞƚĞƌŵƐŽĨŝƚƐůŽĂŶĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ?ŽƌƚŚĞďĂŶŬ ?Ɛ
credit officer determines that high leverage or low profitability indicate poor 
ƉƌŽƐƉĞĐƚƐ ?ƚŚĞĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝƐƚƌĂŶƐĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽƚŚĞďĂŶŬ ?Ɛ ‘ƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ^ƵƉƉŽƌƚhŶŝƚ ? (BSU) 
whose distinct objective is  “ŝƐƚŽturn around the company and send it back to 
branch. ?14  /ĨƚŚŝƐĨĂŝůƐƚŚĞŶŝƚŝƐƐĞŶƚŽŶƚŽĂ ‘ĞďƚZĞĐŽǀĞƌǇhŶŝƚ ? (DRU), or a 
differently named department with similar function, where formal bankruptcy 
proceedings begin or the firm will pay off its debts and rebank elsewhere.  Rebanking 
is highly successful (Franks and Sussman find a near 80% survival rate amongst 
rebanked firms15), allowing us to safely infer that the BSU/DRU process is effective at 
distinguishing good firms from bad.  A firm only enters insolvency proceedings if not 
only their current bank, but every other available bank and ABL that they approach 
rejects them.  As Armour and Deakin observe: 
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Since, under English law, insolvency proceedings may be provoked by a single creditor, we 
would expect to observe frequent collapse into formal insolvency of large firms. The fact that 
we do not suggests that non-legal constraints are operating on the parties' behaviour.
16
  
The important strategic players and the significant drivers in the majority of formal 
proceedings are the institutional creditors, because they dominate the proceedings 
that precede formal insolvency proceedings:   
17 
The data on appointment in administrative receivership makes it clear who is 
steering the ship.  Banks appoint nearly 60% of receivers, although the significant 
role of independent factoring and invoice discounters (another form of institutional 
creditor) is important and will be discussed momentarily.  An individual charge holder 
is usually (but not always) the director of the company18, and appoints the receiver 
only 4% of the time. This should be compared, however, with the data on 
appointments of administrators: 
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19 
At first glance this appears to represent a huge shift in who is driving insolvency 
ƉƌŽĐĞĞĚŝŶŐƐƉŽƐƚƚŚĞŶƚĞƌƉƌŝƐĞĐƚ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?&ƌŝƐďǇ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĚĂƚĂĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞƐ
that this is not illustrative of a change in who drives insolvency proceedings but 
rather a change in approach by banks, as many director led appointments are 
actually the result of a period of consultation and negotiation with their charge 
holders:20  
dŚĞďĂŶŬƐĚŽŶ ?ƚůŝŬĞĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŝŶŐĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŽƌƐ ?dŚĞǇĚŽŶ ?ƚůŝŬĞƚŚĞĨĂĐƚ ?ĨŝƌƐƚŽĨĂůů ?ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇ ?ƌĞ
dealing with a bad debt, but assuming that it has to be done they would much rather not be 
ƚŚĞĨŽƌŵĂůĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŽƌ QDƵĐŚŵŽƌĞůŝŬĞůǇŝƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞďĂŶŬǁŝůůŚĂǀĞŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐĞĚƚŚĞ
practitioner, or his firm, in the first place and then, if an appointment has to be made, will 
ŚĂǀĞƉĞƌƐƵĂĚĞĚƚŚĞĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐƚŽŵĂŬĞŝƚ QdŚĞƌĞ ?ƐƚŚĂƚƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐŝĐĂůďĂĐŬĚƌŽƉƚŽŝƚ ?ƚŚĞďĂŶŬƐ
ĂƌĞŵŽƌĞĐŽŵĨŽƌƚĂďůĞŝĨƚŚĞǇĐĂŶƉŽŝŶƚƚŽĂĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐ ?ƌĞƋƵĞƐƚ ?21   
An important reason for this step into the background by the banks is a growing 
ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞĂƚƚĂĐŚĞĚƚŽ “ƌĞƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶĂůƌŝƐŬ ? ?22 and the desire not to be seen as 
responsible for pushing firms under.  Taking into account the judicial response to the 
Farepak mentioned in Chapter 3.3, where the perfectly legal and rational behaviour 
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of HBOS resulted in approbation and an effective fine, this is clearly a legitimate 
concern.  Banks prefer consensual rescue based outcomes because they seek to 
 “ƉƌĞƐĞƌǀĞĂŶĚƉƌŽůŽŶŐĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐĐƵƐƚŽŵĞƌƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐ ?23, and in the process avoid 
the inevitable loss of value associated with formal insolvency proceedings: 
Thus, the earlier the bank can intervene, the greater prospects it has of limiting its exposure. It 
follows that major lenders have powerful incentives to pursue informal rescues and 
increasingly view formal rescue procedures as mechanisms of last resort for salvaging value 
over and above the break-up value of the company's assets that would be obtained on a 
winding-up. 
24
 
This means that at an earlier stage, long before formal proceedings are considered, 
 “ƚŚĞďĂŶŬƐĂƌĞďĞŐŝŶŶŝŶŐƚŽůŽŽŬĂƚǁŚŝĐŚŽĨƚŚŽƐĞĐůŝĞŶƚƐƚŚĞǇǁĂŶƚŝŶƚŚĞĨĂĐƚŽƌŝŶŐ
ĂƌŵĂŶĚƚŚŽƐĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇĚŽŶ ?ƚǁĂŶƚĂƌĞďĞŝŶŐƐƚĞĞƌĞĚƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚƐ ?
dŚĞƐĞǁŝůůƉƌŽďĂďůǇďĞƚŚĞƉƌŽďůĞŵĐůŝĞŶƚƐ ? ?25  
^ŽĂůůŽĨĂƐƵĚĚĞŶƚŚĞƉƌŽďůĞŵƐŚĂǀĞŐŽŶĞƚŽĂŚŽŵĞƚŚĂƚůŽǀĞƐƚŚĞŵ ?ĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚĂĐƚƵĂůůǇƚŚŝŶŬŝŶ
a negative way, you know, fretting over the balance sheet and the risk. All these guys care 
ĂďŽƵƚŝƐǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƚŚĞǇ ?ǀĞŐŽƚĂŶĂƐƐĞƚƚŚĞǇĐĂŶĐĂƐŚŝŶŝĨƚŚĞĐŽŵƉany goes bad on them. So 
there is life after death now, and they may go through two or three phases, they could go to [a 
big independent] then there are other tertiary players whose lower quartile matches their top 
quartile. So instead of migrating down thĞƐĂŵĞďĂŶŬ ?ƐĨŽŽĚĐŚĂŝŶŝŶƚŽĂĚŝƐƚƌĞƐƐƉŽƌƚĨŽůŝŽĂŶĚ
finally an exit through insolvency, it now migrates down a different quality of funders and at 
ƚŚĞĞŶĚŽĨƚŚĞĚĂǇ ?ŝĨŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŚĂƐŶ ?ƚůĞĂƌŶĞĚŝƚƐůĞƐƐŽŶĂŶĚƚƵƌŶĞĚŝƚĂƌŽƵŶĚ ?ƚŚĞŶŝƚŐŽĞƐ
bust.
26
  
The lower risk associated with fixed charges means that they will lend more against 
it, the risk of loss in insolvency directly reflected in lending: 
                                                          
23
 Armour J, Hsu A, Walters A (2008), p157 
24
 Ibid 
25
 Frisby S (2006), p38 
26
 Ibid 
  
158 
 
[Asset Based Lenders are prepared to operate] on a rather more racy rate of return. The 
consequence is that there are costs of jumping out of that relationship, or if you fail, the costs 
of exit through insolvency. A lot of asset-based lenders are interested in the distressed end of 
ƚŚĞŵĂƌŬĞƚĂŶĚƚŚĞǇǁŝůůĨƵŶĚĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐŝŶĚŝƐƚƌĞƐƐ ?dŚĞǇǁŝůůƐĂǇ ? ‘ZŝŐŚƚǁĞ ?ůůfund it for three 
ŵŽŶƚŚƐ ?ĂŶĚŝĨŝƚĨůŝĞƐ ?ŝĨǁĞŐĞƚŝƚŽƵƚŽĨŐĂŽůĨŝŶĞ ?ďƵƚŝĨŝƚĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚǁĞ ?ůůŚĂǀĞŚĂĚƚŚƌĞĞŵŽŶƚŚƐ ?
ǁŽƌƚŚŽĨŝŶĐŽŵĞ ?ĂŶĚǁĞ ?ůůƐƚŝĐŬŝŶƚŚĞƌĞďĞĐĂƵƐĞǁĞ ?ůůŽŶ ǇƐĞĐƵƌĞƵƉƚŽ ? ?A?ŽĨƚŚĞĚĞďƚ ?ĂŶĚ
ƚŚĞƌĞ ?ƐĂ ? ?A? ‘ŐĂƉ ?ƚŚĞƌĞ ?ŝĨǇŽƵůŝŬĞ ?ĂŶĚǁĞ ?ůůƚĂŬĞƚŚĂƚĂƐĂ ƉĞŶĂůƚǇ ?ŶĚǁŚĞŶƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?Ɛ
in that position, when it really needs that money, then it will sign up to anything.
27
   
The result has been a fragmentation ŽĨƐĞĐƵƌĞĚůĞŶĚŝŶŐ ? “ĂƐƐĞƚďĂƐĞĚůĞŶĚĞƌƐĂƌĞ
increasingly a part of the market place. Interestingly, they are somewhat less 
ĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚƚŚĂŶƚŚĞďĂŶŬƐ ? ?28  The prominence of independent firms in receiverships 
appointments, illustrated above, is evidence of their importance.  The opinion that 
independent firms are less developed than banks reflects the discussion in Chapter 
3.4.2 about concerns over new entrant phenomenon, where disguised liquidation via 
administration asset based sales was principally being carried out by smaller firms.29  
It is also suggested by <ĂƚǌĂŶĚDƵŵĨŽƌĚ ?ƐĨŝŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƉŽŽƌŽƌĂďƐĞŶƚũƵƐƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ
for administration purpose took place in their sample of administrations in 29% of 
the number of cases but only 3% of the total value of cases30, failure to properly 
justify administration possibly therefore more illustrative of practice by smaller 
independent firms.  This has led to concerns that independent practitioners will 
undermine the rescue culture: 
the bank is out-manoeuvred, if you liŬĞ ?ďǇŽƚŚĞƌƐƚĂŬĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐǁŚŽĚŽŶ ?ƚŚĂǀĞƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?Ɛ
interests as much at heart. We found this with a case last year, quite a big case, where there 
was a clearing bank who are probably at the forefront of restructuring and trying to work 
things through, even to the point of putting more money in to sort the problem out. That bank 
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ǁĂƐďĂƐŝĐĂůůǇďůŽǁŶŽƵƚďǇĂŶĂƐƐĞƚďĂƐĞĚůĞŶĚĞƌǁŚŽƐĂŝĚ ? ‘EŽ ?ǁĞũƵƐƚǁĂŶƚƚŚĞŵŽŶĞǇŽƵƚ
ŶŽǁ ? ?ĂŶĚǁŚŽǁĂƐŶ ?ƚŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚŝŶĂƌĞƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞĂƚĂůů ?31 
Any rush to legislate, however, would be exceedingly premature  W because the 
position of independent lenders in the market place is evolving.  Frisby observes that 
 “ƚŚĞŝŶƚĞŶƐĞĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶƚŽůĞŶĚŵŽŶĞǇƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŵĂƌŬĞƚŝƐĐƵƌƌĞŶƚůǇĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐŝŶŐ
might be persuading receivables financiers to cooperate in an attempt to save the 
ďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ ?ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĂŐŽŝŶŐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐĂůĞ ? ?32  It is submitted that this is reflected in a 
ŚĂƌŵŽŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ P “ůĂƌŐĞƌŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚƐŚĂǀĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚ
approaches not dissimilar to those of the clearing banks in dealing with those of their 
ĐƵƐƚŽŵĞƌƐǁŚŽĞŶĐŽƵŶƚĞƌĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚŝĞƐ ? ?33 ǀĞŶƐŵĂůůĞƌ> ?ƐĂƌĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐ
informal workout techniques, such as call centre credit control departments that 
provide a valuable outsourcing service to SMEs. 34   
This hĂƌŵŽŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŽĐĐƵƌƐďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝƚŝƐŝŶĂůůƉůĂǇĞƌƐ ?ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐƚŽŵĂǆŝŵŝƐĞƌĞƐĐƵĞŽĨ
viable firms and to quickly and efficiently remove unviable firms.  The shift in the 
structure of the market has not changed these harmonisation incentives.  Even with 
85% security it is better to recover the 15% gap because the firm continues trading 
than it is to claim the assets and walk away, not just because of the 15% lost but also 
the lost opportunity for further business.  Firms across the spectrum will always have 
an incentive to find cost effective means to encourage viability, which means co-
operating with other lenders.  The fragmentation of secured lending was not such 
that distressed firms are handed wholesale over to independent lenders but because 
different typeƐŽĨĨĂĐŝůŝƚǇǁŝůůďĞĐĂƌƌŝĞĚďǇƚŚĞŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇŽĨĚŝƐƚƌĞƐƐĞĚĨŝƌŵƐ ? “ĂůŽĂŶŽƌ
overdraft facility will be serviced by a bank, with an independent receivables 
financier providing further capital through a factoring or invoice discounting 
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ĨĂĐŝůŝƚǇ ? ?35  This makes co-ordination a necessity.  The existence of independent 
lenders is not as detrimental to the oligopoly argument as it might initially appear. 
A very different type of strategic institutional creditor that merits consideration is 
,ĞƌDĂũĞƐƚŝĞƐ ?ZĞǀĞŶƵĞ and Customs (HMRC).  TŚĞĚŽǁŶŐƌĂĚŝŶŐŽĨ,DZ ?ƐƉƌŝŽƌŝƚǇ36 
has significantly changed the dynamic of their relationship with insolvency 
ƉƌŽĐĞĞĚŝŶŐƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚĂƐƚŚĞǇǁŝůů “predictably be a potential 
casualty of all corporate insolvenciĞƐ ? ?37  Their position is very different from that of a 
bank: 
HMRC, as an involuntary creditor, cannot withdraw supplies or threaten to repossess them 
under retention of title or similar contractual clauses and it cannot transact on cash-on-
delivery terms. Its continued co-operation and goodwill therefore probably ranks several 
notches below that of other trade creditors in the corporate psyche.
38
 
Like the financial institutions, however, they are repeat players with the institutional 
depth to be able to consider long term strategic goals with regards to debtors.  This 
was envisaged as a potential benefit of the changes of priority in the Act, in that the 
ƌŽǁŶǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞ “ĂŶĂĚĚĞĚŝŶĐĞŶƚŝǀĞƚŽŵŽŶŝƚŽƌĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐĨŽƌƐŝŐŶƐŽĨĚŝƐƚƌĞƐƐ ?
and, if such were picked up, to take appropriate action, perhaps by steering such 
ĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƚĂŬŝŶŐĂĚǀŝĐĞ ? ?39  This does appear to be the case, with interview 
results suggesting that HMRC ĂƌĞ “ƚƵƌŶŝŶŐƵƉŵŽƌĞĂƚĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌƐ ?ŵĞĞƚŝŶŐƐ QdŚĞǇŐŽ
through their checklist that somebody has given them, and they are keeping their 
ĞǇĞƐŽƉĞŶ ? ?40   
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>ŝŬĞŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚ> ?ƐƚŚĞŝƌƉůĂĐĞŝŶƚŚĞŶĞǁŵĂƌŬĞƚŝƐũƵƐƚĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌ
objectives may not simply be directed towards maximising returns.  This has caused 
some disquiet amongst practitioners: 
 I honestly think it boils down to the fact that they bent over backwards for Rover, and they 
ĂůƐŽĚŝĚƚŚĂƚĨŽƌĂĐŽƵƉůĞŽĨĨŽŽƚďĂůůĐůƵďƐ ?dŚĞƌĞŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶƐǁĞ ?ǀĞƐĞĞŶǁŚĞƌĞ
ƚŚĞǇ ?ǀĞƚƌŝĞĚƚŽƚƌĞĂƚŽŶĞĨŽŽƚďĂůůĐůƵďĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚůǇƚŽĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞǇ ?ǀĞďĞĞŶƚŽůĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇ
ĐĂŶ ?ƚĚŽƚŚĂƚ ?/ĨƚŚĞǇ ?ƌĞƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŝǀĞƚŽǁĂƌĚƐŽŶĞĐůƵďƚŚĞŶƚŚĞǇĐĂŶ ?ƚ ?ƐŝǆŵŽŶƚŚƐĚŽǁŶƚŚĞůŝŶĞ ?
ƚƌĞĂƚĂŶŽƚŚĞƌŽŶĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚůǇ ?ƚŚĞǇĐĂŶ ?ƚƚƌĞĂƚŽŶĞƚĂǆƉĂǇĞƌĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚůǇƚŽƚŚĞŶĞǆƚƚĂǆƉĂǇĞƌ ?/
ƚŚŝŶŬŶŽǁƚŚĞǇ ?ƌĞĂďŝƚŚĂmstrung by that, they can justify discriminating between their 
treatment of different taxpayers.
41
  
HMRC displayed a perfect example of how strategic selection of goals other than 
short term wealth maximisation can operate in their dealings with Portsmouth 
Football Club.  Here they chose to pursue a liquidation even though there was a more 
individually profitable rescue offer, as part of their effort to overturn the so called 
'football creditors' rule which was harming their tax revenues generally.42  Another 
example is the Business Payment Support scheme, set up in the wake of the financial 
ĐƌŝƐŝƐƚŽĂƐƐŝƐƚ “companies, partnerships, and individuals by the economic downturn 
by offering a range of options for those encountering difficulties in meeting Crown 
debƚƐĂƐƚŚĞǇĨĞůůĚƵĞ ?ƉƌŽďĂďůǇƚŚĞŵŽƐƚĐŽŵŵŽŶďĞŝŶŐĂĨŽƌŵŽĨ ‘ƚŝŵĞƚŽƉĂǇ ?
arrangement, whereby arrears could be deferred over an agreed period without the 
ŝŶĐƵƌƌĞŶĐĞŽĨƐƵƌĐŚĂƌŐĞƐ ? ?43 The strategic role of HMRC is certainly worthy of further 
research, and this writer would be reluctant to draw additional conclusions without 
seeking empirical data from the organisation itself.  
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As an involuntary creditor, however, their role in the structuring of financing and 
determination of the viability of business is arguably limited.  As observed above, by 
the time a distressed firm reaches formal insolvency proceedings it is likely that they 
will be subject to multiple security interests: 
There is so much more secured lending around now that we are finding it rarer and rarer to go 
into a small/medium sized basic business, a metal bashing business or whatever, and finding 
that there are any unencumbered assets. We typically find a sale and lease back of property, 
the book debts have been factored, the plant and machinery has finance on it and the bank 
will have an overdraft and a charge on any goodwill.
44
  
To illustrate how this works, Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 contain the statement of 
affairs (form s95/99) ĂŶĚĨŝŶĂůĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌŵĞĞƚŝŶŐƌĞƉŽƌƚ ?ĨŽƌŵƐ ? ? ? )ŽĨ “ƐŬWd>ƚĚ ? ?
a firm that entered voluntary liquidation in 2008 and was finally liquidated in 2011.45  
The details in these forms will be familiar to anyone who works in the field, and 
although chosen at random Ask PETE Ltd is largely typical of a service provider.   The 
firm was liquidated with debts of more than £200,000 and a shortfall of more than 
£115,000.  The largest proportion of these debts were to the Royal Bank of Scotland 
(RBS), held in the form of factored book debts of around £70,000 and a smaller 
floating charge over equipment.  When the firm was liquidated RBS recovered all of 
the book debts, and the floating charge subject to the reduction for the prescribed 
part under s176 Insolvency Act 1986.  Meanwhile ?ƚŚĞĨŝƌŵ ?ƐƌĞŵĂŝŶŝŶŐĂƐƐĞƚƐǁĞƌe 
realised for almost £16,000, but the costs of realising the assets left only £3,500 
distributed between the preferential and unsecured creditors (including HMRC).  By 
seeking these types of security RBS avoided the need to decide whether to liquidate 
the firm or not.  Everything remaining of real value in the firm was already owned by 
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 Frisby S (2006) , p34 
45
 This firm was selected at random from Dr ^ĂŶĚƌĂ&ƌŝƐďǇ ?ƐĚĂƚĂďĂƐĞŽĨĨĂŝůĞĚĨŝƌŵƐ ?ǁŝƚŚŚĞƌŬind permission and 
assistance.  See also Frisby S (2006).   ŽƉŝĞƐŽĨƚŚĞĨŽƌŵƐƉƵƌƐƵĂŶƚƚŽĂĨŝƌŵ ?ƐůŝƋƵŝĚĂƚŝŽŶĂƌĞŚĞůĚďǇŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐ
House, and are publically available on their website at www.companieshouse.gov.uk. 
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the bank.  It was no accident that RBS arrived in this position, and indeed this will be 
reflective of general practice.  The significant recent development is that instead of 
all the assets being swept up by one bank, riskier investments are left to independent 
asset based lenders.  However, as their activity begins to strategically harmonise with 
the clearing banks, they effectively become a part of the oligopoly. 
It would be a mistake to assume that the state of play when a distressed firm enters 
formal insolvency shows that financers simply gain security over all assets from the 
outset  W or even that they seek to do so.  Failure to take into account of the fact that 
strategies change over the lifespan of a firm was a significant part of the problem 
with the deathbed test, described earlier in the chapter.  There are two reasons why 
a firm will not have all its assets tied up to secured lending from the outset.  Firstly, a 
firm that is not in distress is in a stronger bargaining position to seek credit with 
lower security (and ABL is actually a much more expensive form of credit).  This is 
reflected in the interview quote above that describe how when a firm reaches an 
ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚĂŶ>ƚŚĂƚ “ǁŚĞŶƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ƐŝŶƚŚĂƚƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?ǁŚĞŶŝƚƌĞĂůůǇ
needs that money, then it will sign up to anything. ?46  Secondly, reducing the 
profitability of the firm with a rigid debt structure reduces potential future returns to 
the bank, as a prosperous firm is a better consumer of credit.  Overleveraging the 
firm increases the likelihood of its failure.  A bank that reduces the survival prospects 
of its clients is harming its own profitability in the aggregate.   This is supported by 
ƚŚĞĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐǁŚŝĐŚĨŝƌŵƐĂƌĞƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚƚŽŐŝǀĞƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ P “the few firms that 
are able to obtain loans without providing significant collateral are of high quality, 
implying effective screening of unsecuƌĞĚďŽƌƌŽǁĞƌƐďǇƚŚĞďĂŶŬ ? ?47  Strong firms are 
able to negotiate credit without security.  Weak firms hand over security, protecting 
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the banks in the event of liquidation but also increasing the likelihood of that 
liquidation.  This is directly linked to the tension between rescue and liquidation 
explored in more detail in Chapter 4.3. 
 
5.3 Ǯǯ 
dŚĞ ?>ŽŶĚŽŶƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ?ŚĂƐďĞĞŶĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐĂ “non statutory and informal 
framework introduced with the support of the Bank of England for dealing with 
temporary support operations mounted by banks and other lenders to a company or 
group in financial difficulties, pending a possible restructuring."48  Its roots are in the 
ĂŶŬŽĨŶŐůĂŶĚ ?ƐŝŶǀŽůǀĞŵĞŶƚŝŶƌĞƐŽůǀĞƚŚĞďĂŶŬŝŶŐĐƌŝƐŝƐŝŶƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?Ɛ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ
developed into a role as an honest broker in multi-bank workouts: 
In 1990 a number of discussions were held with London-based banks and their professional 
advisers, as a result of which a set of principles of best practice was formulated. The Bank's 
strategy was deliberately not to reduce these to "rules", but rather to publicise the general 
nature of the "Approach" through a number of papers by Bank officials, which avoided dealing 
with specific details.  The idea was that these principles would be developed and applied by 
market participants without any need for "hands-on" intervention by the Bank.
49
  
The advantages of a soft law approach include that it can be regularly and swiftly 
updated to account for changing commercial circumstances, and that it is more likely 
to be followed by the financial institutions as they have an investment in its 
development.50  Armour and Deakin argue that the London approach has come to 
ŽƉĞƌĂƚĞĂƐĂƐŽĐŝĂůŶŽƌŵ ? “ĂĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĂƚ ?ŵĂǇŚĞůƉĂŐĞŶƚƐƚŽĐŽ-ordinate upon 
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 Armour J and Deakin S (2001),p31, citing British Bankers Association, Description of the London Approach, 
unpublished memo (1996) 1 
49
 Armour J and Deakin S (2001),p34 
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sets of strategies which maximise ƚŚĞŝƌũŽŝŶƚǁĞůĨĂƌĞ ?51  Normative behaviour was 
discussed as one of the two main theories for how laws impact upon decision making 
in Chapter 1.2: 
private norms can substitute for publicly supplied and/or enforced legal rules in the context of 
ĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞƌĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ Q ?dŚĞƐƵďƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶŝƐŶŽƚ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞ ?ĂŶĚŝƚĂƉƉĞĂƌƐƚŚĂƚ
existence of legal insolvency procedures "in the shadows" plays an important role in 
underpinning the stability of the observed norms.
52
  
The London Approach norm is even supported by shaming behaviour.  The 
importance of shaming in insolvency law will be a central theme of the next chapter, 
and is part of the way in which normative standards are enforced and potential 
prisoner dilemmas overcome.  This would involve a meeting behind firmly closed 
doors with officials of the Bank of England, at which "eyebrows would be raised" at 
ƚŚĞďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌŝŶƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ? ?53  It might be argued that to relate this to shaming is a 
mischaracterisation of the character of the meeting, as prior to 1998 the Bank of 
ŶŐůĂŶĚ ?ƐƌĞŐƵůĂƚŽƌǇƉŽǁĞƌƐŵĞĂŶƚƚŚĞǇŚĂĚƚŚĞƉŽǁĞƌƚŽĂĚũƵƐƚƚŚĞƚĞƌŵƐŽĨƚŚĞ
ĂŶŬ ?ƐůŝĐĞŶĐĞ ?ĂŶĚĂƐƐƵĐŚĂŶǇĐŚĂŶged behaviour was a simple rational penalty 
response to the threat of dire sanctions.  As will be illustrated and explored in the 
closing third of this thesis, while fear of penalty will certainly be an important factor, 
it would be a mistake to exclude shame from the equation, even for bankers. These 
sorts of interpersonal and emotional factors have an enormous impact on how 
people make decisions.  Interviews with practitioners have found that the changes in 
their duty imposed by the Enterprise Act were less important than the way in which 
they felt  “ĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶĞĚby professional regulation and reputational conĐĞƌŶƐƚŽ ‘ĚŽƚŚĞ
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ũŽďƉƌŽƉĞƌůǇ ? ? ?54  English insolvency processes seem to be heavily influenced by 
normative values that favour informal collaborative workouts. 
London Approach workouts are organised in two phases.  First, a standstill phase in 
which no enforcement action is taken and existing lines of credit are kept open, with 
additional working credit where necessary.  During the standstill phase a team of 
accountants are used to investigate the firm ?s finance.  The report of their results 
leads to a second phase of negotiation and implementation of a restructuring plan, 
spearheaded by the lead bank, which in the case of the vast majority of multi-banked 
firms leads to some sort of financial restructuring.55  One notable quality is the 
emphasis on co-ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞůĞŶĚĞƌƐ P “/ŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞĞƐĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ
more representative the composition of the committee, the more effective it was as 
a mechaniƐŵĨŽƌƌĞĚƵĐŝŶŐŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŶŐĐŽƐƚƐ ? ?56  
/ŶƌĞĐĞŶƚǇĞĂƌƐƚŚĞƌĞŚĂƐďĞĞŶ “ĂƐĞĂ-ĐŚĂŶŐĞŝŶĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐŽŶƚŚĞŐƌŽƵŶĚ ? ?57  There is 
an increasing use of the term  ‘business recovery professional ? to described insolvency 
practitioners, who are now described as operating in a  ‘ƚƵƌŶĂƌŽƵŶĚƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶ ?.  
Intensive care units have been introduced  “ĚĞƐŝŐŶĞĚƚŽĂĚĚƌĞƐƐƚŚĞƉƌŽďůĞŵƐŽĨ
ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůůǇĚŝƐƚƌĞƐƐĞĚĐƵƐƚŽŵĞƌƐǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞĐůĞĂƌŝŶŐďĂŶŬƐ ? ? 58  Specialist in-house 
teams have been set up, including insolvency professionals on secondment and other 
ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇƐƉĞĐŝĂůŝƐƚƐǁŚŽ “ŚĂǀĞĂƚƚĞŵƉƚĞĚƚŽŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶĞĂƚĂŵƵĐŚĞĂƌůŝĞƌƉŽŝŶƚŝŶƚŚĞ
ĐǇĐůĞŽĨĚĞĐůŝŶĞ ? ?59  The reason for this investment is commercial pragmatism:  
 “dŚĞƌĞŝƐĂĐĞƌƚĂŝŶŝŶĞǆŽƌĂďůĞůŽŐŝĐƚŽƚŚĞďĂŶŬƐ ?ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƚhat it makes commercial 
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sense for them to support troubled customers, and clearly enlightened self-interest 
would dictate this approach. ?60  
ŶŐůŝƐŚ/ŶƐŽůǀĞŶĐǇůĂǁŝƐŬŶŽǁŶĨŽƌŝƚƐ “ƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůĚĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽƚŚĞƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůĂŶĚ
commercial judgment of insolvency pƌĂĐƚŝƚŝŽŶĞƌƐ ?61, and even amidst the 
introduction of the Enterprise Act a debtor in possession approach was rejected due 
ƚŽĂƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŚĂƚŝƚƐŚŽƵůĚďĞ “left to private sector lenders to vet administration 
proposals and support only those with a suĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚĐŚĂŶĐĞŽĨƐƵĐĐĞƐƐ ? ?62  The 
emphasis has always been on market-led solutions, with the availability of strong 
state institutions as neutral arbitrators facilitating collaboration (be they the Bank of 
England or courts of law).  Collaborative structures allow the majority to overcome 
holdout minority creditors.  This facilitates out-of-court restructuring63 and in turn 
increases bargaining power outside of bankruptcy64, which may involve smaller 
creditors being pushed out of the picture but appears to give the best chance of 
maximised recovery for all parties.  Furthermore, creditor led solutions reduce the 
opportunity for debtors to abuse rehabilitation procedures to gain stays on debt 
while retaining control where there is no realistic prospect of rehabilitation.65  What 
the evidence in this chapter, alongside particularly the data from Chapters 2 and 3, 
shows is that the creditors are leading the law towards a focus on investment in 
rescue.  Indeed, it would not be unreasonable to posit that the Enterprise Act was 
inspired by the developing culture in the industry, rather than that the culture 
developed from the Act, given that the London Approach had been focusing on 
ǁŽƌŬŽƵƚƐĨŽƌĂĚĞĐĂĚĞƉƌŝŽƌƚŽƚŚĞůĂǁ ?ƐŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ? 
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One hears anecdotal evidence of the sentiment that the London Approach has had its 
day, thanks in part to the financial crisis and also because of the difficulties of co-
ordination due to the increased role of independent lenders.  Furthermore, with the 
increased number of players and the greater geographic space they occupy, it is 
ĂƌŐƵĂďůĞƚŚĂƚ ‘ĐůƵď ?ŵŽĚĞůƐŽĨƌĞƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌŝŶŐŚĂǀĞŚĂĚƚŚĞŝƌĚĂǇĂƐƚŚĞĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽ
impose reputational sanctions is diminished by the reduced likelihood of repeated 
interactions.  There are three reasons why this writer believes that the London 
Approach will survive, although probably rebranded and certainly with changes in 
practice and principle.  The first is that any disruption caused by the independent 
lenders is to some degree due to disruption caused by the fact that the market has 
changed quite recently, similar to the way in which HMRC is finding its feet after 
being de-prioritised, and the market will harmonise as best practice is established.  
As it does so repeat interactions will increase and the impact of reputational 
sanctions will be re-established.  Second, this is hardly the first time that the London 
Approach has had to evolve since its birth in the 1920s.  Flexibility and ability to 
adapt to changes in the market are perhaps the most fundamental advantage of soft 
commercial law.  Finally, the London Approach exists because it is profitable for all 
parties.  Collaboration is not something they are being forced into, but rather a 
strategic choice that is increasing their returns.  As long as institutional lenders 
remain in such a position of power then there is every reason to believe that they will 
continue to work together to maximise their ability to determine viability and co-
ordinate appropriate rescue. 
Is this a victory for the insolvency efficiency model?  The central point of this chapter 
seems to be that sophisticated parties do a good job of resolving debt restructurings 
when left to their own devices.  If this is the case, then why not remove rescue 
proceedings, enforce absolute priority and leave the banks to it?  To do so would 
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reduce the levels of going-concern recoveries and in turn reduce recoveries for the 
financial institutions, as described in chapters 2 through 4.  The London Approach has 
developed in tandem, in response to and directly influencing the development of our 
insolvency laws.  The shadow of the law in which this sophisticated and highly 
effective system of debt restructuring has emerged is a law that has rescue, co-
operation and inclusivity at its heart.  The availability of specialist courts and 
insolvency professionals who are able to exercise their discretion in the application of 
formal insolvency proceedings better facilitates effective private ordering than a 
system of absolute priority, which is why we have the first and not the second. 
 
CHAPTER 6:  THE HISTORY OF INSOLVENCY AS QUASI-
CRIME  
 
6.1 A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON MANAGING DISORDERLY 
INSOLVENCY 
In Chapter 1 disorderly workouts were defined as being where an illiquid or insolvent 
borrower is driven into liquidation even though they are worth more as a going 
concern.  Effective workouts were then those that maximised the returns from the 
process.  In chapters 2 and 3, I presented evidence that part of the strength of 
creditor friendly English law lies in its range of options, the availability of specialist 
courts, and opportunities for inclusive workouts.  I then explored the relationship 
between finance and workouts, and argued that provided there is adequate property 
rights protection and legal infrastructure in place there is a point after which secured 
creditor priority actually begins to harm secured creditor returns because of its 
behavioural impact upon the market.  The crucial question, however, is how much 
secured creditor priority is to be sacrificed? 
At the end of Chapter 3 I explored the example of the Pre-Pack.  Pre-packs have a 
good record in terms of creditor returns, going concern rescue and maintaining 
employment.  They are also subject to heavy criticism and are unpopular among 
unsecured creditors.  This may seem irrelevant, as pre-packs can be pushed through 
regardless (indeed that is one of their key strengths).  I suggested that as well as 
damaging public confidence in the law, short to medium term pre-pack survival rates 
were being reduced due to creditor exclusion.   Pre-packs are a clear example of the 
way in which decisions made in the insolvency context do not follow a simple cost 
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function analysis.  If we begin to unpack the features of this decision making, and the 
reasons why popular opinion finds pre-packs so unfair and found Farepak so 
disgusting, it begins to give an answer to the question of where the optimal balance 
between secured creditor priority and debtor/creditor inclusivity lies.   
This chapter begins the process of exploring inclusivity by considering the history of 
insolvency laws, from pre-history to the birth of the 20th century, in terms of this 
struggle for order and finding a balance between protection for both debtor and 
creditor.  It highlights the historical quasi-criminal nature of bankruptcy and how 
social stigma, shame and outrage regarding commercial failure impact upon both 
commercial decision-making and law-making, in order to show that this very tension 
is still very much in operation today.  Recognising this, and offering specialist support 
in the courts and from insolvency professionals, as well as taking relatively 
inexpensive steps to redress the impression of unfairness, can have significant 
benefits for the likelihood of an orderly workout.  
It is hard to look past the lurid detail of ancient insolvency law, and this makes it 
seductively easy to dismiss ancient problems as being irrelevant to modern times.  
ZĞŐŝŵĞƐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ “ƚǇƉŝĐĂůŽĨƉƌŝŵŝƚŝǀĞůĂǁŝŶŐĞŶĞƌĂů ?1 allowed limbs to be 
removed in proportion to debt, eyes to be gouged out, children to be sold into 
slavery and wives to be raped.  When aŶĐŝĞŶƚůĂǁƐĂƌĞĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐďĞŝŶŐ “ǁƌŝƚƚĞŶŝŶ
ďůŽŽĚ ?2, the writer is characterising the past as savage or primitive in order to 
ĐŽŶƚƌĂƉŽƐĞĞŝƚŚĞƌƚŚĞǁƌŝƚĞƌ ?ƐƉĞƌŝŽĚŽƌŚŝƐĂŵďŝƚion as modern and therefore 
ƐƵƉĞƌŝŽƌ ?ŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƚŚŝƐƉĂƐƐĂŐĞŝŶ&ƌĂŶĐŝƐZĞŐŝƐEŽĞů ?Ɛ ? ? ? ?ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨƚŚĞ
superiority of modern Anglo-Saxon debtor leniency: 
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ĂƌůǇ,ŝƐƚŽƌǇŽĨĂŶŬƌƵƉƚĐǇ>Ăǁ ? ?University of Pennsylvania Law Review 66 (1918) 1-28, p8 
2
 Noel FR, A History of the Bankruptcy Law, General Books (Milton Keynes:  2009), First published 1919 by CH Potter 
co., p8 
  
172 
 
In semi-civilized parts of the earth harsh treatment of debtors persists.  It is well established in 
Peru and the adjacent countries of East India a creditor is given full sanction in disposing of a 
debtor, his wife and children.  Extreme cases are recorded in which a debt was satisfied by the 
ĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌǀŝŽůĂƚŝŶŐǁŝƚŚŝŵƉƵŶŝƚǇƚŚĞĐŚĂƐƚŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞĚĞďƚŽƌ ?Ɛ wife.3   
dŚĞƌĞŝƐƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐƚĞůůŝŶŐůǇĂŶĂĐŚƌŽŶŝƐƚŝĐŝŶZĞŐŝƐEŽĞů ?ƐŚŽƌƌŽƌĂƚƚŚĞƉƌŽƐƉĞĐƚŽĨ
ƚŚĞǀŝŽůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĐŚĂƐƚŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞĚĞďƚŽƌ ?ƐǁŝĨĞƌĂŶŬŝŶŐĂŚĞĂĚŽĨƚŚĞƌŽƵƚŝŶĞ
mutilation that was another part of the legal codes he references.  Strip away the 
agenda of trying to justify some radical difference between our times and those 
which have gone before us, and we find societies throughout history struggle with 
the problem of debt and credit.  In their study of ancient land law, Ellickson and 
Thorland warn that although  “English struggles are presented as if they are without 
parallel...  the peoples of ancient Mesopotamia, Egypt and Israel grappled with 
ĐŽŵƉĂƌĂďůĞŝƐƐƵĞƐƐŽŵĞ ? ? ? ? ?ǇĞĂƌƐďĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞŶŐůŝƐŚEŽƌŵĂŶƐĚŝĚ ? ?4  Although the 
fundamental problems of insolvency remain the same there is an unfortunate habit 
to dismiss the past as savage and the modern as exceptional. 
Nonetheless, somewhere on the journey from homo antecessor to homo sapiens the 
concept of debt and credit must emerge.  Before they existed there would be no 
need for a system to manage their default, but such a system might easily predate 
the existence of money, or even recorded history.  >ĞǀŝŶƚŚĂů ?ƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚ “ĐƌĞĚŝƚ
is an ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚůŝǀĞƐďǇǀŝƌƚƵĞŽĨŵĂŶ ?ƐĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶĐĞŝŶŚŝƐĨĞůůŽǁ-ŵĂŶ ?ƐŐŽŽĚ
ĨĂŝƚŚ ?ĂŶĚŐŽŽĚĨĂŝƚŚĂŶĚƚŚĞƉƌŝŵŝƚŝǀĞŵĂŶĂƌĞƐƚƌĂŶŐĞƌƐ ?5 seems to belie that sort of 
social interdependency that was essential to even the earlier forms of man.  Any 
form of co-operation requires a means to deal with those who take without 
returning, so how far back into pre-history was a time when man did not require a 
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mechanism for managing the behaviour of those who make promises they are unable 
to keep?  The words commerce and credit should be interpreted in the widest 
ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƐĞŶƐĞǁŚĞŶ<ĞĂǇĂŶĚtĂůƚŽŶŽďƐĞƌǀĞƚŚĂƚ “ĂƐĐŽŵŵĞƌĐĞŚĂƐĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚƐŽ
have the laws regulating the credit relationship.  By necessity, these laws have had to 
deal with the consequences of a person beŝŶŐƵŶĂďůĞƚŽƉĂǇŚŝƐŽƌŚĞƌĚĞďƚƐ ? ?6  Given 
that even the simplest forms of social life develop some means for punishing default 
it seems insolvency is an inherent problem of social grouping. 
Economic analysis is useful here.  ĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƚŚĞŽƌǇ “ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐŽŶly that scarce 
ƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐŵƵƐƚďĞĂůůŽĐĂƚĞĚĂŵŽŶŐĐŽŵƉĞƚŝŶŐƵƐĞƐ ? ?7  The fundamental problem of 
insolvency is insufficient resource to satisfy obligation, and so the interpretation of its 
emergence invites economic analysis.  In his application of economic theory to 
primitive law Posner concluded that violence is twinned to a need for strict liability 
due to the information costs of distinguishing the fraudulent from the unlucky.8  
Violence against transgressors maintains the credible threat of vengeance, which acts 
as a deterrent to other potential wrongdoers.  As societal infrastructure improves 
retribution against the person is supplanted with systems that permit the  “ĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŽƌ
ƚŽƉĂǇƚŚĞǀŝĐƚŝŵŽĨŚŝƐĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ ?9, which fits Levinthal ?s explanation for why over 
ƚŝŵĞ “ĞǆĞĐƵƚŝŽŶĨŽƌĚĞďƚĐĂŵĞƚŽďĞĚŝƌĞĐƚĞĚĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇŽĨƚŚĞĚĞďƚŽƌ
ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶŚŝƐƉĞƌƐŽŶ ? ?10  It also, rather conveniently, fits the desire to describe the 
development of the law as a constant process of excluding the primitive and 
replacing it with the modern.   
Posner thus argues that this evolution from execution against person to execution 
against property can only occur when a society has developed sufficient legal 
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infrastructure to support property and contract rights.11  But those regimes whose 
violence has led insolvency lawyers to classify as primitive have often been highly 
sophisticated:   
Mesopotamia and Egypt rightly are regarded as cradles of civilization. By 3000 B.C., before any 
other society, the peoples of these lands had separately developed systems of writing, were 
capable of living in cities, and were beginning to engineer earthworks and other massive 
construction projects that for millennia would awe travellers from abroad.12   
Far from operating strict liability, the major ancient legal systems contained means to 
distinguish between the dishonest and the unfortunate insolvent.  Levinthal argues 
that discharge for the honest was not a fundamental feature of the law13 but the fact 
is that it exists in some form in all insolvency laws, for example the Code of 
Hammurabi protected the life and freedom of the unlucky,14 and Solon cancelled the 
debts of agriculturalists struggling due to the harsh economic climate.15  Early 
systems of discharge may have been imperfect but the violence of early law was not 
due to a strict liability required by primitive societies.  Violence was not even the 
principle characteristic, and a much more sophisticated system of regulation tended 
to be in operation.  It would be hasty to assume that lower information costs have 
absolved us from the economic needs that led to violence being used to manage 
insolvency.   
Roman law is credited with being the birthplace of modern insolvency systems,  “ƚŚĞ
origin and fountain-head of all bankruptcy proceedings ?16, and it is not difficult to see 
ĂŶĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŽŐůŽƌŝĨǇŵŽĚĞƌŶůĂǁ ?ƐĐŝǀŝůŝƚǇďǇŵĂŬŝŶŐŝƚĂƉƉĞĂƌƉĂƌĂůůĞůƚŽZŽŵĂŶ
ůĂǁ ?ƐƐƵƉƉŽƐĞĚĐŽŶƋƵĞƐƚŽĨƉƌŝŵŝƚŝǀĞƐĂǀĂŐĞƌǇ ?dŚƵƐZŽŵĂŶůĂǁƐĞŶĚƵƉďĞŝŶŐ
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described in terms of a steady reduction in savagery from the literally Draconian 
ƚŚĞŶŝĂŶĐƌŝŵŝŶĂůĐŽĚĞŝŶ ? ? ?ƚŚĂƚ “ĐůĂƐƐŝĨŝĞĚĚĞďƚǁŝƚŚŵƵƌĚĞƌĂŶĚůĂǌŝŶĞƐƐĂƐĂ
ĐĂƉŝƚĂůĐƌŝŵĞ ?17 to the rules of cessio bonorum under Augustus that permitted a form 
of discharge for the honest debtor.18  The degree of violence through the rise and fall 
of Rome is nowhere near as simple as this.  Capital punishment for thieves and 
bankrupts during the reign of Draco was no unthinking act of violence.  The aim was 
to stimulate industry by deterring crime. 19  ^ŽůŽŶ ?ƐƌĞǀŝƐŝŽŶŽĨƌĂĐŽ ?ƐůĂǁs in 594BC, 
in which he abolished servitude for debt and the engagement of the body for 
ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ?ŵĂǇŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶďĞĐĂƵƐĞŚĞ “ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚĚĞďƚĂŵŝƐĨŽƌƚƵŶĞ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĂ
ĐƌŝŵĞ ? ?20 but it was also influenced by Egyptian law and the idea that the attachment 
of private debt to the person was a usurpation of the state ?s prior rights to use their 
citizens as soldiers, labourers or slaves.  Beneath the headlines of dismemberment in 
the infamous law of the 12 Tablets lies a complex tiered system of punishment and 
shaŵŝŶŐĚĞƐŝŐŶĞĚ “ƚŽĂƌŽƵƐĞƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂƐƐŝŽŶŽĨŚŝƐƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞƐĂŶĚĨƌŝĞŶĚƐ ? ? ? ?ƐƵĐŚƚŚĂƚ
ŽŶůǇ ?ŝŶĐĂƐĞŽĨĨƌĂƵĚŽƌŽďƐƚŝŶĂƚĞƌĞĨƵƐĂůƚŚĞĚĞĂƚŚƉĞŶĂůƚǇǁĂƐŝŶĨůŝĐƚĞĚ ? ?21  The 
development of Roman law was just as much a complicated mess of efforts to find 
the right balance between deterrence and economic support as any other era of 
insolvency law. 
Having incorrectly categorised Roman insolvency law as a steady progression 
towards a romanticised precursor to English law, it is then necessary to group the 
period between the fall of Rome and the first bankruptcy statute of Henry VIII into 
one long period where laws are  “ƉĞĐƵůŝĂƌůǇƐŝŵŝůĂƌƚŽƚŚŽse of the most primitive 
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period. ?22 The dark ages are something that gets skipped over on the way to the 
emergence of the Law Merchant as a kind of next step on the way from the Romans 
to the British,  “ĂĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚďŽĚǇŽĨůĂǁǁŚŝĐŚŐƌĞǁƵƉĂŶĚĂƌŽƵŶĚƚŚĞĐƵƐƚŽŵƐĂŶĚ
ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐĂĚŽƉƚĞĚďǇƚƌĂĚĞƌƐĂĐƌŽƐƐĐŽŶƚŝŶĞŶƚĂůƵƌŽƉĞ ? ?23   For the insolvency 
historian the Dark Ages saw a collapse of social order and an era where insolvency 
law became principally a mechanism to assert the power and moral authority of the 
state through the mechanism of punishment.  As Roy Goode describes: 
Life for the medieval debtor was likely to be nasty, brutish and short.  Just as the charging of 
usury by moneylenders was regarded as contrary to the laws of God and was punished 
accordingly both by the church and by the powers temporal, so also falling into debt was 
considered mortal sin.
24
  
Certainly for the non-historian this is a period characterised by long periods of war, 
destruction, and pestilence.  Most notable the long slump of the 15th century in an 
era where, by the end of the 16th century, the population of England had fallen to 
half of its pre-Black Death peak, and  “ǁŝƚŚƐĐĂƌĐĞůǇĂŶĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂůůĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞŝŶĚŝĐĞƐ
of production and exchange weakened. ?25  One might expect a society facing the 
rising information costs consequent to a collapsed infrastructure to move to strict 
liability and creditor controlled punishment  W and there may be some evidence of 
that  W but what can be seen is the law desperately trying to maintain confidence in 
the economy through brutal punishment of bankrupts.  One cannot presume the 
existence or direction of causality here, but note that  “Đƌedit trade again became 
unusual ?26 and that in times of recession credit would quickly collapse.27  Violence in 
insolvency law emerges as a response to broader social pressures, and the desire to 
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categorise business failure as a moral offence rather than recognising the inherent 
vulnerability of commerce.   
The introduction of creditor-friendly English law and the rise and fall of capital 
punishment for bankruptcy neatly demonstrates the way in which the same 
economic and social vulnerabilities persist for all credit based societies.  34 & 35 
Henry VIII c4 (1542) is typically recognized as the first English bankruptcy law, and 
was focused on helping creditors recovering from those who were made bankrupt.  
The problem was determining to whom this law should apply.  When, in 1571, 
Elizabeth I limited the crime of bankruptcy to merchants and traders, it was 
considered unjust that they should be condemned for an action another man could 
do with impunity.  IŶĂŶǇĞǀĞŶƚ “creditors early began to make use of the bankruptcy 
law against honest but unfortunate debtors, even though by its terms the Henrician 
ůĂǁǁĂƐŶŽƚŝŶƚĞŶĚĞĚĂƉƉůǇƚŚĞŵ ? ?28 Making the all too familiar error of confusing an 
increase in bankruptcies with a failure in deterrence, the 1604 Act of 1 James I c15 
enhanced punishment to allow the bankrupt to have one ear nailed to the pillory and 
ƚŚĞŶĐƵƚŽĨĨ ?ĂŶĚĂůƐŽ “practically absorbed into the bankruptcy law the case of 
simple non-payment of debt... but the act-fiction still clings to it. The debtor's 
conduct, not his financial condition, is still the technical basis of his bankruptcy. ?29 
Draco and James might have profited from comparing notes. 
The Pitkin Affair, an Enron-like scandal that provoked a storm of outrage, motivated 
parliament to take the final steps in the 1706 Act 4&5 Anne, which made fraudulent 
bankruptcy a capital offence where one was fraudulent simply for failing to appear 
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before a commission and disclose all assets after failure to pay a debt.30  This had 
been preceded, however, by an attempt to soften the law between 1678 and 1698 in 
ďŝůůƐƚŚĂƚďĞŐĂŶŶŐůŝƐŚůĂǁ ?ƐƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚ “honest bankruptcy is not a 
contradiction in terms but a phenomenon of daily occurrence ?31 ĂŶĚ “that the debtor 
was far more likely to hand over his assets if he knew he was getting something in 
ƌĞƚƵƌŶ ? ?32  The original 1706 act took the hugely important step of introducing 
discharge for bankrupts in order to induce their co-operation.  It was intended to 
 “offer the debtor a carrot to balance against the existing sticks ?33, and early drafts of 
ƚŚĞůĂǁŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚĂƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶƚŽŐƌĂŶƚƚŚĞďĂŶŬƌƵƉƚĂƐŵĂůůĂůůŽǁĂŶĐĞŽĨ “up to five 
per cent of their net estate to ĞŶĂďůĞƚŚĞŵƚŽďĞŐŝŶĂŐĂŝŶ ? ?34  This eminently practical 
measure was designed to encourage debtors to participate in the formal bankruptcy 
structure, and as such had the predictable effect of a surge in bankruptcy 
ƉƌŽĐĞĞĚŝŶŐƐ P “In 1705, an estimated 159 commissions were opened; in 1706, the 
number was 567. ?35  But the legislators had not sufficiently taken into account the 
enduring quality of the ĨŝĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ “ĂĐƚŽĨďĂŶŬƌƵƉƚĐǇ ?Ănd the perception of 
business failure as a moral failing. 
Therefore, instead of welcoming this as a sign that the statute was working as 
intended and encouraging debtor co-operation, a rise was once again interpreted as 
a failure of deterrence.  After only one year the discharge provision was modified so 
that it required a majority vote from four-fifths of the creditors.36  Commentators 
were likely satisfied to see the subsequent collapse in the number of commissions, as 
the law now reverted to all stick, no carrot, total creditor control and the widest 
possible definition of fraudulent bankruptcy.  Predictably to the student of insolvency 
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law and economics, the revised 1706 act was a near complete failure.  Not only could 
one or two significant creditors keep the undischarged bankrupt imprisoned 
indefinitely out of spite, but it became commonplace for creditors to expect bribes 
before they would sign the discharge certificate.37  Meanwhile, when push came to 
shove, most believed capital punishment to be too severe a penalty, such that in the 
century that the law was in force only four men were hanged:   
Imposing capital punishment for fraudulent bankruptcy was a spectacular failure because it 
did not prevent the frauds at which it was aimed, but also because the fact that it was so 
rarely enforced permitted other frauds to flourish...  The threat of death turned out to be so 
useless that the fist the legislators thought would keep debtors in line ended up being an 
empty glove.  
38
  
Thus began another withdrawal from both harsh punishment and the broad 
application of the notion of fraudulent bankruptcy.  Trieman argues that the law 
ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞĚĂĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůƐŚŝĨƚ P “/ŶƐƚĞĂĚŽĨĚĞĂůŝŶŐƉƌŝŵĂƌŝůǇǁŝƚŚƚŚĞůĞŐĂů
phenomenon involved in the debtor's conduct, it seeks to regulate the economic 
situation that arises out of the debtor's financial ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶ ? ?39 1 George IV (1820) 
replaced capital punishment with transportation or hard labour, and imprisonment 
for debt was virtually ended with the DĞďƚŽƌƐ ?Act of 1869.  The stage was set for the 
birth of 20th century commerce, but the image of the fraudulent bankrupt remains 
vivid in the social consciousness. 
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6.2 THE SOCIAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A BANKRUPT AND AN 
INSOLVENT, THE IMPORTANCE OF SHAME AND THE IMPOTENCE OF 
PUNISHMENT 
There is a social difference between a bankrupt and an insolvent.40  Insolvency is a 
condition, and hopefully a temporary one, where your assets are less than your 
debts.  One makes oneself a bankrupt through one ?s actions.  The notion of being 
bankrupt being a different thing from being unable to pay your debts has been 
integral to much of insolvency law.  The Roman right of Bonorum Vendititio, for 
ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ǁĂƐŐƌĂŶƚĞĚĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞŝŶƐŽůǀĞŶƚŚĂĚĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĚĂŶ ‘ĂĐƚŽĨďĂŶŬƌƵƉƚĐǇ ?ƐƵĐŚ
as hiding from creditors or taking no steps to pay a debt on demand.41  Thus 
someone might be bankrupt without actually being insolvent.  The honest bankrupt 
cannot escape by claiming he lacks intent as the act demonstrated the intent, and 
thus  “ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚƚŚĞactus reus and the mens rea of the crime of bankruptcy. ?42  To be 
a bankrupt is treated in itself a mark of dishonesty. 
As creditor influence increased so those things that constituted an act of bankruptcy 
steadily expanded to include simple non-compliance with creditors, such that  “ǁŚĂƚ
is evidently nothing more than an insolvent condition, occasioned perhaps through 
no culpable conduct on the part of the debtor, is classified together with such overt 
conduct of a fraudulent nature as fraudulent conveyances and fraudulent evasion of 
ĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌƐ ? ?43   The law is trying to manage the consequences of insolvency and 
distinguish between the honest and the dishonest.  However, it associates insolvents 
with bankrupts and stigmatises the unfortunate and the fraudulent alike.  To be 
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fiscally bankrupt is to be morally bankrupt;  “the status of bankruptcy commenced 
with some positive and intentional act on the part of the debtor, and that, such an 
ĂĐƚŚĂǀŝŶŐďĞĞŶĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĚ ?ƚŚĞƐŽůǀĞŶĐǇŽĨƚŚĞĚĞďƚŽƌǁĂƐƵŶŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ? ?44  This 
notion of situational fairness being grounded in character and identity is borne up in 
other fields, for example in <ĂŚŶĞŵĂŶ ?<ŶĞƚƐĐŚĂŶĚdŚĂůĞƌ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŽŶĨĂŝƌŶĞƐƐ ?ĨŝŶĚŝŶŐ
that people felt a carpenter had a greater right to pass along cost in price than a 
wholesaler or a company.45  Whether we consider a situation to be fair or not is 
ĚĞĞƉůǇƌŽŽƚĞĚŝŶĂũƵĚŐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?ƐĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌ ?ĂŶĚŽƵƌũƵĚŐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞŝƌ
character will in turn be impacted upon by the fairness of their conduct.  
The historical severity of punishment is one manifestation of a consistent negative 
perception of bankrupts.  Another is the frequent use of shaming in insolvency law.  
Bankrupts have been made to wear ridiculous clothing or put baskets on their heads 
in public, to bang their buttocks on a rock before a heckling crowd, or stand naked in 
court, alongside ĂŶ “ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůĐŽŶƚĞŵƉƚƵŽƵƐĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚůĂďĞůůĞĚďĂŶŬƌƵƉƚƐĂƐ
 ‘deceivers, ?  ‘frauds, ?  ‘offenders, ?  ‘cheaters, ? and  ‘squanderers. ? ?46  The practice of 
 ‘ƐŝƚƚŝŶŐŝŶŚĂƌŶĂ ?ŝŶ/ŶĚŝĂŽƌ ‘ĨĂƐƚŝŶŐŽŶ ?ŝŶ/ƌĞůĂŶĚƉƵďůŝĐĂůůǇƐŚĂŵĞĚƚŚĞĚĞďƚŽƌƚŽƉĂǇ
ƵƉďĞĨŽƌĞŚŝƐĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌƐƚĂƌǀĞĚƚŽĚĞĂƚŚŽŶŚŝƐĚŽŽƌ ? “ĞŶĨŽƌĐĞĚƌĂƚŚĞƌďǇƚŚĞ
ƐĞŶƚŝŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇƚŚĂŶďǇƚŚĞůĂǁ ? ?47  The notion of society acting in the 
shadow of the law has been a consistent feature of this thesis, but of course laws 
develop in the shadow of society as well, and these two parts of enforcement cannot 
be separated.   
Benson observes that customary systems of law maintain order even in societies 
lacking a government, are often  “quite complex, systemically covering all types of 
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torts and breaches of contract relevant to the society ?48, and have persisted 
throughout history including societies like medieval Iceland and the 18th century Wild 
West.  Bankruptcy strikes at the heart of several qualities important in civilised 
society:  the importance of making good your promises to those who have trusted 
you, of honesty towards  members of society, of responsible management of 
personal means, and not becoming the `grasshopper among the ants ?49.  The 
ďĂŶŬƌƵƉƚ “ǁĂƐƐĞĞŶŶŽƚŽŶůǇĂƐƐƚĞĂůŝŶŐŵŽŶĞǇŽŶǁŚŝĐŚŚŝƐĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌƐŵŝŐŚƚďĞ
relying but more importantly as stealing their confidence. ?50 Primitive societies used 
a mixture of the threat of violence to illustrate stigma, and the application of 
community shaming to encourage a return to social norms before stigmatization 
becomes necessary.   
As civilisation grew it became harder for communities to internally shame, and this 
led to the development of state mediation in the Roman Empire.  Roman law was 
neither the most creditor controlled nor the least violent, but it did employ 
increasingly sophisticated state intervention in the enforcement of collective 
proceedings by creditors.  Collective proceedings allow the creditor to co-operate for 
mutual benefit, as he no longer needs ƚŽǁĂƐƚĞƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ “to anticipate and outwit 
ŚŝƐĨĞůůŽǁƐ ? ?51  State intervention is not a pre-requisite.  Contrast 19th century Chinese 
law, which left distribution entirely in the hands of creditors, and medieval Jewish 
law which put all authority in the hands of an official administrator.52 There are, 
however, certain attractions to an enhanced state role.  A government can employ 
economies of scale through the creation of a specialist commercial court and sheriffs 
to instigate and enforce judgements, reducing the information cost of distinguishing 
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the honest from the dishonest.53  It can mediate the impact of creditor fraud - 
collusion between fraudulent debtor and favoured creditors is a common problem in 
creditor friendly regimes, 17th century England being an excellent example54 - and 
ĞŶĨŽƌĐĞĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞƉƌŽĐĞĞĚŝŶŐƐŝŶƚŚĞƉƌĞƐĞŶĐĞŽĨƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůƉƌŝƐŽŶĞƌ ?ƐĚŝůĞŵŵĂƐ ?
Finally, it can compensate for the breakdown of community shaming.  As civilisation 
ƐƉƌĞĂĚƐĂŶĚďĞĐŽŵĞƐŵŽƌĞĐŽŵƉůĞǆ “people have less need to use membership in a 
close-knit village or hierarchical institution as a method of coordinating economic 
ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ?55, which has the consequence of reducing the ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?Ɛability to 
shame its members.  In a civilisation that spans the seas the bankrupt might simply 
disappear.  A centralised government has a much better chance of bringing home to 
debtors the consequences of their defaults.     Thus the benefits of state 
infrastructure might conceivably outweigh the costs to efficiency where they 
effectively manage the behavioural consequences of the bankruptcy stigma. 
Traditional punishment (violence, financial sanction, imprisonment) is not an 
effective deterrent for bankruptcy.  Recent research has not found any particular 
correlation between the public perception of bankrupts and rates of bankruptcy 
filing.56 This directly contradicts a common notion that bankruptcy stigma increases 
during periods of financial downturn.  NŽƌŝƐƚŚĞƌĞƚƌŝďƵƚŝǀĞĨŽĐƵƐŽĨŽƵƚƌĂŐĞ “ǁĞůů-
ƐƵŝƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞĚĞƚĞƌƌĞŶĐĞ ? ?57  While people may deliberately lie, defraud and cheat, 
ƚŚĞŐƌĞĂƚĞƌƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶŽĨŝŶƐŽůǀĞŶĐǇŝƐŵŽƌĞƚŽĚŽǁŝƚŚĚĞďƚŽƌƐŚĂǀŝŶŐĂ “ ‘ŚĞĂĚin 
ƚŚĞƐĂŶĚ ?ŵĞŶƚĂůŝƚǇ ?58 about their problems or simple poor performance.59  
Businessmen generally fail not because they are bad people but rather because they 
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are bad at business.  Being a bad person may be bad for business but it is not the 
determinative factor. 
While shame encourages compliance, promoting better spending habits and even 
encouraging insolvents to settle debts before they become bankrupts, stigmatization 
can actually have a negative effect and lead to the party rejecting the social rules that 
have rejected him.60  The archaic use of the word stigma was for a brand burned into 
ƚŚĞƐŬŝŶŽĨƐůĂǀĞŽƌĂĐƌŝŵŝŶĂů ?ĂŶĚŽŶĞĐĂŶƐĞĞŚŽǁƚŚĞŶĂŵĞ “ďĂŶŬƌƵƉƚ ?ĐŽƵůĚĐŽŵĞ
to operate in the same way.  The difficulty is that the line between shaming and 
stigmatization is a fine one.  Sherman has found that while individuals with high 
interdependencies, such as working married men, found arrest shameful and were 
rehabilitated, groups upon whom arrest had a counter-deterrent effect were  
disproportionately unemployed (in four studies) and disproportionately black (in three).  They 
were people who had lived with a great deal of stigma; their reaction to further shame was 
rage and vindictive escalation of violence rather than remorse.  In Sherman's interpretation, 
'Defiance is a means of avoiding shame in the face of any effort to cut one down to size, 
including arrest'
61
   
ZĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶďĞŝŶŐĂ “more direct means of compelling payment ?62, violence in 
insolvency law was intended to operate indirectly to provide the bright light beneath 
which the shadows of shame provide the real disciplining effect.   It is perhaps easy 
to be dismissive of the importance of shame, particularly compared to financial ruin 
or physical dismemberment.  But shame is an incredibly powerful emotion  “ƌŽŽƚĞĚŝŶ
ƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚǁŚŝĐŚǁĞŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůŝǌĞŚŽǁǁĞŝŵĂŐŝŶĞŽƚŚĞƌƐƐĞĞƵƐ ? ?63  Efrat 
ŽďƐĞƌǀĞƐƚŚĂƚ “ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ?ĐŽŚĞƐŝǀĞŶĞƐƐŵĂĚĞŝƚƉŽƐƐŝďůĞĨŽƌƚŚĞƐĞƉƵďůŝĐůǇ 
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humiliating and labelling practices to be powerful in generating deep fear of 
bankruptcy in the minds of the people. ?64  Modern neuroscience has even made it 
possible to objectively quantify the impact of shame, as demonstrating in a large 
scale meta-study by Dickerson and Kemeny: 
Tasks that include a social-evaluative threat (such as threats to self-esteem or social status), in 
which others could negatively judge performance, particularly when the outcome of the 
performance was uncontrollable, produced larger and more reliable cortisol changes than 
stressors without these particular threats.
65
   
Cortisol is a steroid hormone produced in response to stress that increases blood 
sugar and suppresses the immune system.  Stress levels interfere with decision 
making, and the ability to measure cortisol levels makes it possible to quantify stress 
responses to different social stimuli.  People are physiologically wired to respond in a 
negative fashion to shame and threats to our social status to the extent that it will 
override other concerns like achieving the best possible financial return.  An 
insolvency law that ignores this will find itself unable to reconcile effective rescue 
with creditor control because creditors will repeatedly appear to act irrationally by 
ƌĞũĞĐƚŝŶŐƐƵƉĞƌŝŽƌĐŽŵŵĞƌĐŝĂůŽƵƚĐŽŵĞƐ P “Models of decision-making cannot afford 
to ignore emotion as a vital and dynamic component of our decisions and choices in 
ƚŚĞƌĞĂůǁŽƌůĚ ? ?66  This is what is happening when we express confusion that 
creditors have rejected a rescue option that would have brought them better 
returns, or are baffled when creditors are outraged by a pre-packaged sale that 
preserves a going concern is chosen ahead of a profitless liquidation.   
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Shame, stigma, and the underlying desire to believe that success and failure are due 
principally to the moral quality of the parties have influenced insolvency law 
throughout its history.  This is why  “ƚhe insolvency of a company inevitably generates 
dismay and, in many cases, resentment ? ?67  The dismay is a stress response to socially 
threatening behaviour.  The desire for punishment is aimed at redressing this feeling 
of injustice and threat but it can directly conflict with the commercially superior 
outcome, demonstrated in the feelings of the disappointed Farepak creditor who 
stated: 
I think the bosses of Farepak need to be made accountable and go down the legal system for 
ǁŚĂƚƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞĚŽŶĞ ?/ĚŽŶ ?ƚƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĞǇƐŚŽƵůĚďĞĂůůŽǁĞĚƚŽĞǀĞƌĚŽďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐĂŐĂŝŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ
general public, and I think they should be punished through the justice system for that they 
ŚĂǀĞĚŽŶĞ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞǁŝƚŚĞĨĨĞĐƚ ?ƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞƐƚŽůĞŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ?ŵŽŶŝĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĞǇƐŚŽƵůĚ
not be swept under the carpet, they should be made accountable for what they have done, 
ďƵƚƚŚĂƚ ?ƐŚŽǁ/ĨĞĞůĂďŽƵƚŝƚ ?68 
Equally this observation by the British insolvency practitioner: 
/ƚŚŝŶŬĂůƐŽƚŚĞƌĞ ?ƐƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚƉƐǇĐŚĞ ?ĂƐĐŽŵƉĂƌĞĚƚŽƚŚĞŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƉƐǇĐŚĞ ?
ǁŚŝĐŚǀŝĞǁƐŝƚĂƐ ? ‘tĞůů ?ŝĨƚŚĞĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐŚĂǀĞƌƵŶƚŚĞďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐůŝŬĞƚŚĂƚĂŶĚŶŽǁ/ ?ŵƚŚĞŽŶĞ
ŽƵƚŽĨƉŽĐŬĞƚ ?ƚŚĞƌĞ ?ƐŶŽǁĂǇ/ ?ŵůĞƚƚŝŶŐƚŚĞŵŬĞĞƉƚŚĞŝƌĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ? ?69  
An orderly insolvency law must take into account the quasi-criminal quality of 
insolvency.  Its heritage is in the act of bankruptcy that taints the most innocent 
insolvent.  If the insolvent is presumed to be morally at fault for the failure of the 
business, it may seem defacto inequitable that their business is rescued.  This must 
be taken into account both because it brings an additional element to creditors 
objectives beyond simply best financial returns, threatening viable rescues due to the 
                                                          
67
 Frisby S (2011), p350 
68
 From an interview ǁŝƚŚĂ&ĂƌĞƉĂŬ ‘ǀŝĐƚŝŵ ? ?^ƉĂůĞŬĂŶĚ<ŝŶŐ^ ? “&ĂƌĞƉĂŬǀŝĐƚŝŵƐƐƉĞĂŬŽƵƚ PĂŶĞǆƉůŽƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ
ŚĂƌŵƐĐĂƵƐĞĚďǇƚŚĞĐŽůůĂƉƐĞŽĨ&ĂƌĞƉĂŬ ? ?ĞŶƚƌĞĨŽƌƌŝŵĞĂŶĚ:ƵƐƚŝĐĞ^ƚƵĚŝĞƐ ? ?<ŝŶŐƐŽůůĞŐĞ>ŽŶĚŽŶ ? ?>ŽŶĚŽŶ P
2007), found at http://www.crimeandjustice.org.uk/opus392/FAREPAK_Full_report.doc (accessed 18 Nov 2012), p34 
69
 Frisby S (2006), p64 
  
187 
 
impression of injustice, and also because stress, shame and stigmatisation undermine 
the decision making process.  The orderly insolvency law protects creditors, debtors 
and employees not only from each other but also from themselves. 
CHAPTER 7:  ǯ ROLE IN MARKET 
DISCIPLINE AND THE LIMITED BENEFIT OF PERFECT 
INFORMATION 
 
7.1 FAREPAK AND CHRISTMAS VOUCHERS 
The desire to protect unsecured creditors, particularly those who appear to be 
innocent victims of a business failure, can have a major impact upon whether an 
insolvency regime remains Orderly and Effective.  It is also has a significant impact on 
decision making around insolvency.  The case of Farepak is a useful illustration of 
how this can happen. 
I think the bosses of Farepak need to be made accountable and go down the legal system for 
ǁŚĂƚƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞĚŽŶĞ ?/ĚŽŶ ?ƚƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĞǇƐŚŽƵůĚďĞĂůůŽǁĞĚƚŽĞǀĞƌĚo business again with the 
general public, and I think they should be punished through the justice system for that they 
ŚĂǀĞĚŽŶĞ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞǁŝƚŚĞĨĨĞĐƚ ?ƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞƐƚŽůĞŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ?ŵŽŶŝĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĞǇƐŚŽƵůĚ
not be swept under the carpet, they should be made accountable for what they have done, 
ďƵƚƚŚĂƚ ?ƐŚŽǁ/ĨĞĞůĂďŽƵƚŝƚ ?1 
&ĂƌĞƉĂŬǁĂƐĂ “ŚƌŝƐƚŵĂƐŚĂŵƉĞƌ ?Ĩŝƌŵ ?ĂĨĂŵŝůǇďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐĞ ƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚďǇŽď
Johnson in 1968 and run by his son at the time it went into administration.  Agents 
collected money from up to 150,000 clients every month in return for vouchers.  
These vouchers could be used at a selection of retailers or exchanged for hampers of 
festive food, allowing customers to spread their Christmas costs over the year.  
Farepak would reimburse the retailers for the price of the vouchers after Christmas, 
allowing them to profit from the extended credit they had received from their 
customers. 
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In early 2006 High Street stores began to demand payment upfront rather than 
offering credit, responding to the failure of a similar voucher firm the year before.  
&ĂƌĞƉĂŬ ?ƐƉĂƌĞŶƚĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ,ŽŵĞZĞƚĂŝůŝŶŐ ?ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚĞĚƚŽĞǆƚĞŶĚŝƚƐ
borrowing.   HBOS plc, its bank, refused the new business plan and called in the 
ĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ƐŽǀĞƌĚƌĂĨƚ ?dŚĞĨŝƌŵƌĞŵĂŝŶĞĚƐŝůĞŶƚĂďŽƵt its difficulties and continued to 
ĂĐĐĞƉƚǀŽƵĐŚĞƌƉĂǇŵĞŶƚƐƚŽŚĞůƉƉĂǇŽĨĨƚŚĞƉĂƌĞŶƚĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ƐĚĞďƚƐ ?ƵƉƵŶƚŝů
October 2006 when administrators were brought in. 2 
&ĂƌĞƉĂŬĐƵƐƚŽŵĞƌƐůŽƐƚŽŶĂǀĞƌĂŐĞ ? ? ? ? ?dŚŝƐŚĂƐďĞĞŶĐĂůůĞĚ “ĂŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƚƌĂŐĞĚǇĂŶĚ
emergeŶĐǇ ?ďǇDWƐĂŶĚ&ƌĂŶŬ&ŝĞůĚ ?>ĂďŽƵƌDWĨŽƌŝƌŬĞŶŚĞĂĚ ?ĂƚƚĂĐŬĞĚƚŚĞƌŽůĞŽĨ
,K^ŝŶĂŽŵŵŽŶƐĚĞďĂƚĞ ?ƐƚĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇƐŚŽƵůĚ “ďĞĂƌĂŚĞĂǀǇƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇĨŽƌ
ƚŚĞŵŝƐĞƌǇĐĂƵƐĞĚ ? ?3  ^ƉĂůĞŬĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚ&ĂƌĞƉĂŬ “ŝƐƐǇŵƉƚŽŵĂƚŝĐŽĨƚŚĞƐŽĐŝĂůŚĂƌŵƐ
perpetuated under the current economic climate of deregulation and the 
liberalisation of markets, where there are many sites of trust that can be potentially 
ĞǆƉůŽŝƚĞĚďǇƵŶƐĐƌƵƉƵůŽƵƐŽƌƵŶĞƚŚŝĐĂůŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?4  The exposure of consumers 
to the consequences of business failure is once again being tied to moral failure.   
Farepak highlights a number of interesting issues regarding price, investment and 
insolvency.  First, consumers did not have a clear idea of the risk they were taking 
with their investment.  As Spalek ŽďƐĞƌǀĞƐ ? “ƚŚĞ&ĂƌĞƉĂŬƐĐĂŶĚĂůƌĂŝƐĞƐƐŽŵĞƐĞƌŝŽƵƐ
ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĂďůĞĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌŵŽĚĞů Q ?ƚŚĞ ?ǀŝĞǁŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌĂƐ
a rational being, who will assess potential risks and ask appropriate questions to 
gather information. ?5  Instead participants followed the scheme through or with 
ĨƌŝĞŶĚƐ ?ĨĂŵŝůǇĂŶĚǁŽƌŬĐŽůůĞĂŐƵĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇƚŽŽŬ “ĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞŽĨƚŚĞƐŽĐŝĂů
                                                          
2
 For Reporting on the Farepak insolvency:  http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/6124406.stm, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/6159672.stm, http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/news/special-
report/article.html?in_article_id=414074&in_page_id=108, See also the website for the campaign representing 
Farepak customers at http://www.unfairpak.co.uk/ (accessed 11 Mar 2012) 
3
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/6124406.stm 
4^ƉĂůĞŬ “ŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞŚĂƌŵĂŶĚǀŝĐƚŝŵŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ PdŚĞĐĂƐĞŽĨ&ĂƌĞƉĂŬ ? ?Criminal Justice Matters 71(1) (2008) 8-10, p8 
5
 Ibid, p9 
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ďŽŶĚƐŽĨƚƌƵƐƚĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚďĞƚǁĞĞŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ ? ?6  The creditors relied on the fact that 
this was a socially normal way to invest, rather than fully investigating the security of 
the investment. 
Second, the bank operated strategically and it is their withdrawal of the overdraft 
facility that triggered the failure of the firm.  This is evidence of the important role of 
banks in business failure, which was explored in Chapter 5. 
dŚŝƌĚ ?ƚŚĞĨĂŝůƵƌĞŽĨ&ĂƌĞƉĂŬŚĂĚƚŚĞƌĞƐƵůƚŽĨƐƵĚĚĞŶůǇĐŚĂŶŐŝŶŐƚŚĞĐƵƐƚŽŵĞƌƐ ?
understanding of the value of the vouchers they were holding.  The customers 
considered themselves to be savers rather than creditors, and had not incorporated 
ƚŚĞƌŝƐŬŽĨƚŚĞŝƌĂĐƚŝǀŝƚǇŝŶƚŽƚŚĞŝƌĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶŵĂŬŝŶŐďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ‘ƐĂǀŝŶŐ ?ǁĂƐƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚƚŽ
be an inherently prudent activity: 
These consumers had attempted to be prudent with their money and their savings, by saving 
with what they thought to bĞĂƌĞůŝĂďůĞĂŶĚƐĂĨĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ Qso that they could have the sort of 
Christmas that they were hoping to experience.  This aspect of the financial impact of the 
scandal transcends the financial dimension.
7
 
Fourth, as highlighted earlier, the failure of the company was considered unethical 
and scandalous, precisely because of the perceived virtue and vulnerability of the 
creditors. The Insolvency Service took action on behalf of the creditors against the 
directors of the firm, but in June 2012, at the High Court, Smith J exonerated the 
directors of blame and instead focused on the conduct of the bank: 
 “They in effect forced the directors to carry on in September and October collecting deposits, 
that at a time when they believed there would be an insolvent solution," he said.  An extra 
£10m came in from customers, £4m of which went into Farepak's bank account and £6m of 
which was used to keep on trading, which would be to the benefit of HBOS when the firm was 
                                                          
6
 Spalek B (2008), p9 
7
 Spalek B and King S (2007), p7 
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eventually sold after going bust.  HBOS knew that those deposits would be paid and would be 
lost if their expected solution went out and that the only beneficiary of those deposits would 
ďĞ,K^ ? ?ƚŚĞũƵĚŐĞĂĚĚĞĚ “ŶĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶŽĨ&ĂƌĞƉĂŬ ?ƐŽǀĞƌĚƌĂĨƚďǇ ? ?ƚŽ ? ?ŵĨƌŽŵ,K^
might have kept Farepak gŽŝŶŐ ? ?ƚŚĞũƵĚŐĞƐĂŝĚ ? “ďƵƚƚŚĞďĂŶŬǁĂƐŶŽƚƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚƚŽĚŽƚŚŝƐ ? ?
dŚĞĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐ ?ĞĨĨŽƌƚƐ ?ĨĂŝůĞĚŽǀĞƌƚŚĞƉĞƌŝŽĚďĞƚǁĞĞŶDĂƌĐŚĂŶĚKĐƚŽďĞƌ ? ? ? ?ŽŶƚŚĞĨůŝŶƚǇ
ground of HBOS, which had a policy of playing hardball, of which it appeared to be proud, and 
conceding nothing," he said.  "It seems to me that what happened there, whilst apparently 
legally acceptable, might not be regarded in the public's eyes as being acceptable. ?8  
This decision was briefly referred to in Chapter 3.3 as an example of an exercise of 
judicial discretion that is disorderly because it causes commercial uncertainty.  Lloyds 
ĂŶŬŝŶŐ'ƌŽƵƉ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĂĐƋƵŝƌĞĚ,K^ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞŶĂĐĐĞƉƚĞĚƚŚĂƚŝƚŚĂĚ “ǁŝĚĞƌ
ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ?9 in spite of a lack of legal obligation.  It sought to meet this 
responsibility by adding an extra £8m to the compensation it offered to the Farepak 
savers, leading to the extraordinary return of 50p in the pound back on their lost 
investment.10  The returns the Farepak savers received were much greater than those 
to which they had a legal right, and the bank accepted a public sanction from the 
court having been told that they had done no legal wrong.  The desire to intervene 
and protect vulnerable unsecured creditors undermined the orderliness of the 
insolvency regime.   
This chapter explores the difficult place of unsecured creditors in an Orderly and 
Effective insolvency regime, starting with an exploration of the impact of consumer 
protection upon consumer decision making and then following this with a willing-to-
pay experiment that demonstrates that dangers of protecting unsecured creditors.  
                                                          
8
 &ĂƌĞƉĂŬĐŽůůĂƉƐĞ P:ƵĚŐĞƉĂƌƚůǇďůĂŵĞƐ,K^ďĂŶŬ ? ? ? ?:ƵŶĞ ? ? ? ? ?http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-18540914 
(accessed 17 August 2012) 
9
  “&ĂƌĞƉĂŬĐŽŵƉĞŶƐĂƚŝŽŶďŽŽƐƚĞĚďǇĞǆƚƌĂ ? ?ŵĨƌŽŵ>ůŽǇĚƐ ? ? ? ?:ƵůǇ ? ? ? ? ?
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-18743363 (accessed 17 August 2012) 
10
  “&ĂƌĞƉĂŬĐƵƐƚŽŵĞƌƐƚŽƌĞĐĞŝǀĞŚĂůĨŽĨŵŽŶĞǇŽǁĞĚ ? ? ? ? ?:ƵůǇ ? ? ? ? ?http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-
18782300 (Accessed 17 August 2012) 
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This leads back into the question of who is the consumer of insolvency laws, and how 
we are to best improve their participation in achieving orderly workouts. 
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7.2 CREDITOR PROTECTION AND THE ǯ
MARKET DISCIPLINE 
Classical economic theory holds that consumers select goods and services to meet a 
pre-existing set of preferences.  Expected utility theory ŚŽůĚƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ “ƵƚŝůŝƚŝĞƐŽĨ
outcomes are weighted by their probaďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ?11 ?ƐƵĐŚƚŚĂƚ “ƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƉƌŽďĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨĂ
given event is defined by the set of bets about this event that such a person is willing 
ƚŽĂĐĐĞƉƚ ? ?12  Thus the more information a consumer has about risk, the better able 
they are to match goods to their internal preferences.    Modern consumer 
regulation, built on this theory, ƐĞĞŬƐƚŽƉƌŽŵŽƚĞ “ƌĞĂůŝƐƚŝĐĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌĞǆƉĞĐƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ
ďĂƐĞĚŽŶƌĞůŝĂďůĞŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?13    The 2000 Cruickshank report stated that: 
Knowledgeable consumers provide the best incentive to effective competition. With the right 
information, consumers can take responsibility for their own financial well-being, shop around 
and exert the pressures on suppliers which drive a competitive and innovative market.
14
  
The European Community believes ƚŚĂƚ “ĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌƐ ?ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚďĞƚƚĞƌŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂƌĞ
ĂďůĞƚŽŵĂŬĞŝŶĨŽƌŵĞĚ ?ĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂůůǇĂŶĚƐŽĐŝĂůůǇƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞĐŚŽŝĐĞƐ ? ?15 and the 
2001 Financial Stability Forum observed that keeping the consumer informed was 
ĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůĨŽƌ “ƚŚĞƐƚĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů system and to protect less-financially-
ƐŽƉŚŝƐƚŝĐĂƚĞĚĚĞƉŽƐŝƚŽƌƐ ? ?16   This is reflected in the World Bank principles for Orderly 
and Effective insolvency:   
Principle 19:  The law should require the provision of relevant information on the debtor.  It 
should also provide for independent comment on and analysis of that information. Directors 
                                                          
11
 Kahneman D and Tversky A (1979), p265 
12
 dǀĞƌƐŬǇĂŶĚ<ĂŚŶĞŵĂŶ ? “:ƵĚŐĞŵĞŶƚƵŶĚĞƌhŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇ P,ĞƵƌŝƐƚŝĐƐĂŶĚŝĂƐĞƐ ? ?Science 185 (1974) 1124-1131, 
p1130 
13
 Howells G (2005), p355 
14
 Cruickshank D (2000), para 50 
15
 EC Commission, Healthier, safer, more confident citizens:  A Health and Consumer Policy Strategy (2005) at 10, cited 
by Howells G (2005), p351 
16
 Financial Stability Forum, Guidance for Developing Effective Deposit Insurance Systems (September 2001), found at 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0109b.htm (accessed 30 November 2012) 
p42, Public Policy Objective 3(a) 
  
194 
 
of a debtor corporation should be required to attend meetings of creditors. Provision should 
be made for the possible examination of directors and other persons with knowledge of the 
ĚĞďƚŽƌ ?ƐĂĨĨĂŝƌƐ ?ǁŚŽŵĂǇďĞĐŽŵƉĞůůĞĚƚŽŐŝǀĞŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞĐŽƵƌƚĂŶĚĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŽƌ 
Principle 25:  require disclosure of or ensure access to timely, reliable and accurate financial 
information on the distressed enterprise.
17
 
The concept of the less-financially-sophisticated depositor that the Financial Stability 
Forum wished to protect is interesting.  Behavioural economics has consistently 
demonstrated that most decision making regarding risk is made intuitively, and that 
even those with extensive training in statistics are prone to bias when making 
intuitive decisions18.  Tversky and Kahneman have shown ƚŚĂƚ “ƉĞŽƉůĞƌĞůǇŽŶĂ
limited number of heuristic principles which reduce the complex tasks of assessing 
probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgemental operations. ?19  Howells 
argues this weakness in the human mind leaves us fundamentally ill-suited to 
evaluating financial situations20, and similarly Campbell and Cartwright suggest that 
few possess the financial acumen to make informed choice.21   For the consumer, 
 “ĐŚŽŝĐĞďĞĐŽŵĞƐƚŽƌŵĞŶƚ ? ?22  If even those with both high levels of sophistication 
and training in finance and probability are bad at making investment decisions, will 
compelling the sharing of accurate financial information make insolvency regimes 
more effective? 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the Enterprise Act sought to ŵĂŬĞĐŚĂŶŐĞƐƚŽ “ƚŝƉƚŚĞ
balance firmly in favour of collective insolvency proceedings - proceedings in which 
ĂůůĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌƐƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞ ? ?23   A significant part of the reasoning behind remodelling 
                                                          
17
 World Bank (2001), p10-11 
18
 Tversky A and Kahneman D (1974), p1130 
19
 Ibid, p1124 
20
 Howells G (2005), p358-360 
21
 ĂŵƉďĞůůĂŶĚĂƌƚǁƌŝŐŚƚW ? “ĞƉŽƐŝƚ/ŶƐƵƌĂŶĐĞ PŽŶƐƵŵĞƌWƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶŬ^ĂĨĞƚǇĂŶĚDŽƌĂů,ĂǌĂƌĚ ? ?European 
Business Law Review (1999) 6-102, p99 
22
 Howells G (2005), p354 
23
 Productivity and Enterprise: Insolvency - A Second Chance Cm 5234 (London: HMSO, 2001), para. 2.5 
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ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƌĞŵŽǀŝŶŐƌĞĐĞŝǀĞƌƐŚŝƉǁĂƐƚŚĂƚ “ƌĞĐĞŝǀĞƌƐǁĞƌĞŝŶƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚůǇ
accountable to the unsecured creditors ?24, resulting in waste and excessive 
liquidation.  The result is that unsecured creditor compliance is of much greater 
importance in the modern law, for example, it is pivotal in CVAƐǁŚĞƌĞ “ĨŽƌƚŚĞŵŽƐƚ
part, proposals will be directed to them and aimed at persuading them that the CVA 
will in some respects improve their prospects of ĂĚŝǀŝĚĞŶĚ ? ?25  Creditor involvement, 
ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ŝƐŽĨƚĞŶ “ŵŽƌĞĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚƚŚĂŶƌĞĂů. ?26  Frisby observes that  “ĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌ
meetings are ĂůǁĂǇƐǀĞƌǇƉŽŽƌůǇĂƚƚĞŶĚĞĚ Q ?/t is] strongly suspected that when 
reports, proposals and progress reports were sent out these were dispatched 
without ceremony to a cylindrical filing cabinet under the desk which is emptied 
ĚĂŝůǇ ? ?27  Efforts to increase creditor involvement do not appear to have worked in 
the way that was hoped. 
Katz and Mumford speculate lack of unsecured creditor involvement is due to there 
ďĞŝŶŐ “little cost-ďĞŶĞĨŝƚŝŶĐĞŶƚŝǀĞ ?28 to getting involved.   Another possibility is lack 
ŽĨŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ P “ƵŶsecured creditors will not routinely be provided with the kind of 
company information available to directors and floĂƚŝŶŐĐŚĂƌŐĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐ ? ?29 Any 
benefit of involvement must both extant and perceived.  Finally, lack of creditor 
involvement may involve a lack of confidence in the system, as  “ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌĂŶĞǆƚƌĂ
few pounds will do anything to improve the somewhat jaundiced view that 
unsĞĐƵƌĞĚĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌƐŚĂǀĞ QƌĞŵĂŝŶƐƚŽďĞƐĞĞŶ ? ?30 Frisby, however, argues that 
unsecured creditor inclusiveness was  
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 Armour J, Hsu A, Walters A (2008), p159 
25
 Walters A and Frisby S ( 2011), p23 
26
 Katz A and Mumford M (2006), p47 
27
 Frisby S (2006), p54 
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 Katz A and Mumford M (2006), p47 
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 Frisby S (2004), p258 
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an unrealistic and counterproductive aim in the first place. Creditors are not an homogenous 
ĂƐƐĞŵďůǇĂŶĚĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌƐ ?ŵĞĞƚŝŶŐƐĂƌĞŶŽƚfocus groups. In reality, the only consensus likely to 
emerge is a desire to recover as much of the outstanding debt as possible. In this regard there 
may be inherent conflicts of interest which cannot be resolved by application to the court and 
which, if allowed to support litigation, will simply drive up the costs of administration at the 
expense of everyone with anything at stake.
31
  
Interviews with bankers have raised questions about  “ƚŚĞǀĂůƵĞŽĨƐĞŶĚŝŶŐŽƵƚƌĞĂŵƐ
of paper to those without any financial stake in the business, who, as a consequence 
ŽĨƚŚŝƐĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůĚŝƐĞŶĨƌĂŶĐŚŝƐĞŵĞŶƚ ?ǁŽƵůĚĂůŵŽƐƚĐĞƌƚĂŝŶůǇŝŐŶŽƌĞƚŚĞŵ ? ?32 
Unsecured creditor inclusivity was enhanced to attempt to provide greater oversight 
of secured creditors and in doing so provide them with a greater degree of 
protection, but there appear to be grave concerns that unsecured creditors are not 
playing their part.  The reasons this is happening, however, is in part because of an 
erroneous understanding of how unsecured creditors perceive business failure, how 
they make decisions around it, and what causes them to make a decision one way or 
the other. 
Some of the most interesting exploration of the impact of consumer protection from 
insolvency on the behaviour of consumers has been in the field of banking failure.  
Arguments that failed banks should be treated like any other type of insolvent firm33 
appear to have fallen before Directive 94/19/EC and the introduction or refinement 
by all Member States of the European Union of schemes of depositor protection.  In 
the United Kingdom, the Financial Services Compensation scheme, introduced in the 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, ensures that customers of failed banks have 
their first £85k of deposits guaranteed (this was increased after the Northern Rock 
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 Frisby S (2004), p265 
32
 Frisby S (2006), p54 
33
 Dowd K, Laissez-Faire Banking, Routledge (London:  1993) 
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crisis).  Why are bank savers protected while Farepak savers need a little extra-
judicial intervention? 
The standard answer to this question is that depositor insurance is a consumer 
protection device but this is incidental to its role in the reduction of systemic risk:34 
ƚŚĞĨĞĂƌŽĨĂ “ĚŽŵŝŶŽ-like failure of other institutions and even the collapse of the 
finanĐŝĂůƐǇƐƚĞŵŝƚƐĞůĨ ? ?35  The special nature of fractional reserve banking is often 
cited as justification for this fear.  Given the highly leveraged nature of modern 
companies, fractional reserves are not sufficient to distinguish banks from other 
types of business.  The systemic importance of banking to the economy in general is 
undeniable, and banks do seem to have  “ĂƐƉĞĐŝĂůƉůĂĐĞŝŶƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐƉƐǇĐŚĞ ?ĂŶĚĂ 
special trust attached to them ?36, but banking exceptionalism risks encouraging 
observers to ignore the obvious similarities between essentially analogous corporate 
failures.  Non-banking industries are just as subject to systemic failure, leading to 
insolvencies that are due to causes exogenous to the individual qualities of the firm, 
and this is particularly the case in an economy where businesses are so reliant on 
debt.  Similarly, ĚĞƉŽƐŝƚŽƌƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶďǇĂŶŽƚŚĞƌŶĂŵĞ ?ƐĂǇ ‘ĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?
could be applied to all corporate insolvency, or to protect any other class creditors or 
circumstances that also appear to occupy a special place in the public psyche.  A law 
that compensated voucher holders of failed retail firms like Farepak would be one 
example, and in fact there are a number of measures that exist to protect consumers 
in the event of insolvency, which will be returned to at the end of the chapter. 
Remaining for the time being, however, in the analogous world of banking 
regulation, it has proved difficult to effectively draft depositor-protection type laws 
that clearly define who is and is not to be protected.  The current UK depositor 
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ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶƐĐŚĞŵĞŝƐĚĞĨŝŶĞĚĂƐ ‘ĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐƚŽƐĂǇƚŚĂƚĐůĞĂƌĞǆƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽĨůĞǀĞů
of protection offered37 which instils consumer confidence and thus prevents bank 
runs.38  dŚŝƐŝƐĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚĞĚǁŝƚŚ ‘ŝŵƉůŝĐŝƚ ?ƐĐŚĞŵĞƐ ?ĚĞĐŝĚĞĚŽŶĂĐĂƐĞďǇĐĂƐĞďĂƐŝƐ ?
ǁŚŝĐŚĂƌĞĂĐĐƵƐĞĚŽĨĐĂƵƐŝŶŐ “ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂďůĞƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇ ? ?39    The Government 
response to the Northern Rock crisis, where an attempted merger over the weekend 
was followed by a declaration of enhanced protection on Monday, fits with the 
characterisation of implicit response40 even though an explicit scheme was nominally 
already in place.  In a miserable epitaph to the Financial Services Authority ?s  ‘EŽŶ-
ĞƌŽ&ĂŝůƵƌĞZĞŐŝŵĞ ?ƚŚĞŐƌĞĂƚĞƌƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůƐĞĐƚŽƌŝƐ simply too big to fail, 
and any explicit scheme is fatally undermined the moment it seems the government 
might change its mind.  A voucher protection scheme could easily fall to this sort of 
public pressure, which may in part explain why the High Court felt compelled to push 
HBOS into paying out further money to the Farepak creditors.   
Restricting protection of unsecured creditors, however, is not simply a question of 
ƐĂǀŝŶŐŵŽŶĞǇ ?ŶǇƐĐŚĞŵĞŽĨĚĞƉŽƐŝƚŽƌƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶŵƵƐƚ “ǁĞŝŐŚƚŚĞďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐŽĨ
public policy intervention against the costs of distorting risk-taking incentives 
ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƐƵĐŚŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ?41, which ŝƐŶŽƌŵĂůůǇĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐƚŚĞ “ŵŽƌĂůŚĂǌĂƌĚ ? ?  
Begg describes this succinctly: 
 You are sitting in a restaurant and remember you left your car unlocked.  Do you abandon 
your nice meal and rush outside to lock it?  You are less likely to if you know the car is fully 
insured against theft.
42
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A depositor is less likely to pay attention to the condition of their bank if their deposit 
is protected.  This is self-evidently also the case for a creditor of a non-banking 
company whose investment is protected.  In the context of banking the impact of this 
moral hazard was observed in Argentina in the 1980s, where after the government 
ƌĞŝŶƐƚĂƚĞĚĚĞƉŽƐŝƚŽƌŝŶƐƵƌĂŶĐĞ “ĚĞƉŽƐŝƚŽƌƐƐŽƵŐŚƚŽƵƚƚŚŽƐĞŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚǁĞƌĞ
thought most likely to fail as they paid the best rates of interest. ?43  Haldane and 
Schiebe found evidence of correlation between IMF lending of last resort and 
increased bank returns, although they noted other efforts at quantification have 
produced mixed results.44  Truman has attacked the notion of moral hazard, 
ŽďƐĞƌǀŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ “ƵŶƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂƚĞĚƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂůƉƌŽƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚĂŶĞĐĚŽƚĞƐƉƌovide an 
insufficient intellectual foundation for dramatic changes in international financial 
ƉŽůŝĐǇ ? ?45  The experiment in the second part of this chapter aims to add a little 
further substantiation to the moral hazard question. 
A behavioural analysis of moral hazard has to make the following observation: if I am 
not the sort of man to abandon a good meal, then having car insurance may increase 
the likelihood that I stay but it is not going to make any difference either way.  If 
deposit insurance increases the likelihood that I fail to verify the solvency of the bank 
by 0.1%, then how much do I care?  As Cartwright observes, ensuring the consumer 
knows they are protected is insufficient to definitely alter their behaviour.46  The 
crucial difference is that payment is drawn from those resources remaining to the 
firm, and not some separate government fund or insurance policy. 
Extending this logic back to unsecured creditors of non-banking firms may explain 
why they do not receive the sort of legal protection bank savers do.  If trade creditors 
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and consumers are protected then they will not take care in their investments.  
Concerns about market discipline do not appear to have tamed the pity of Smith J 
ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞ&ĂƌĞƉĂŬƐĂǀĞƌƐ ?WƌŽĨĞƐƐŽƌdƌŝďĞŐĂƌŶĞƌƐ “ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌdiscontent with the 
ƵŶƐĞĐƵƌĞĚĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌƐ ?ůŽƚ ?47 from the law reports reflecting popular concern about 
ĨĂĐƚŽƌƐůŝŬĞƚŚĞǁĂǇŝŶǁŚŝĐŚĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŽƌ ?ƐĨĞĞƐĐĂŶƐǁĂůůŽǁƵƉƚŚĞůĂƐƚŽĨƚŚĞƉŝĞ
before trade creditors get a slice.  Keay and Walton describe it as a  “ƐĂĚĨĂĐƚŽĨůŝĨĞ
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐĞĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌƐƌĞĐĞŝǀĞůŝƚƚůĞŽƌŶŽƚŚŝŶŐŝŶŵĂŶǇďĂŶŬƌƵƉƚĐŝĞƐĂŶĚůŝƋƵŝĚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?48  
Part of the justification for the system of priority is that it allows private ordering.  
TŚĞ “ƐĞĐƵƌĞĚĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌŝƐĂĐĐŽƌĚĞĚƉƌŝŽƌŝƚǇďĞĐĂƵƐĞŚĞďĂƌŐĂŝŶĞĚĨŽƌŝƚ ?49, and this 
process of bargaining in the shadow of insolvency law50 imposes market discipline 
upon firms and consumers alike.  Players exposed to the risk of failure are more likely 
to pay attention to their investments, bringing price towards use value and allowing 
the market to accurately assess risk.  The Farepak customers were, in law, fully 
exposed to the folly of their savings choice, yet they did not incorporate the risk into 
their decision making and ultimately were spared the full consequences of their 
decisions.  Where does this leave creditor exposure and the system of priority as a 
tool for market discipline?  What is the place of creditor decision making in the 
orderly workout? 
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7.3 THE EXPERIMENT 
In order to explore these questions I performed an experiment.  Ninety-five 
volunteers, predominantly graduates and post-graduates, were presented with an 
on-line narrative presenting increasing levels of insolvency risk to a firm from whom 
they wished to buy a record voucher:  a fictional ƌĞĐŽƌĚƐŚŽƉŬŶŽǁŶĂƐ “sĂǆǆŝ ? ?dŚĞ
ĨŝƌƐƚƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ? “ǁŚĂƚŝƐƚŚĞŵĂǆŝŵƵŵǇŽƵǁŽƵůĚƉĂǇĨŽƌĂ ? ? ?ƌĞĐŽƌĚǀŽƵĐŚĞƌ ? ?ŵĂǇ
seem a little strange.  Anyone who has bought one knows that it costs £10.  Yet these 
ƐŽƌƚƐŽĨ ‘tŝůůŝŶŐƚŽWĂǇ ? ?tdW )ƚĞƐƚƐĂƌĞĂƐƚĂƉůĞŽf research into cognitive valuation51, 
both as a fundamental element of cost modelling and because they can provide 
accurate predictions even in the absence of real money transfers.   
When a price is below the willing to pay threshold, the artefact is purchased.  For 
some respondents this is confusing: 
 I found it interesting that you wanted the participants to quantify how much they would 
spend on a voucher. For me it was an either or scenario. I would expect to pay £10 for £10 of 
goods or I wouldn't purchase the gift voucher at all, I couldn't put a value (e.g. £8) because 
either I would buy the voucher or I wouldn't.  (Respondent 6) 
This sort of experiment has a good record of producing reliable results, however, and 
the question was used to filter sixty respondents who both completed the 
questionnaire and specified that they would pay £10 for the voucher.  The use of the 
£10 voucher was intended both to connect to the relevant events, and an 
exploitation of the phenomena of anchoring and coherent arbitrariness.52  People are 
better at scaling to an arbitrary value than determining absolute value.   By 
establishing a subset prepared to pay £10 for the voucher in normal conditions, we 
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ĐĂŶŚĂǀĞĂŚŝŐŚĞƌĞǆƉĞĐƚĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŝƌƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐǁŝůůďĞ “ůŽĐĂůůǇĐŽŚĞƌĞŶƚ ?53 and 
therefore more easily comparable. 
Participants were then asked the maximum they would pay if they heard from a 
respected journalist that the record shop might go bust over the weekend.  Reliance 
on hypothetical choices does present methodological problems but, as described by 
Kahneman and Tversky54, there is little that can be done to overcome this limitation 
without encountering other problems. 
What would you be prepared to pay if you hear that Vaxxi may be about to go 
bust? 
 
Three groups emerge.  Group A are effectively indicating their withdrawal from the 
transaction.  Once risk is highlighted Group A WTP becomes 0. For some this was a 
because the record voucher was intended as a gift: 
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/ƚ ?ƐĂƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĨŽƌĂĨƌŝĞŶĚ ?ƚŚĞƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůĨŽƌĂŶǇŚĂssle over redemption outweighs any of the 
financial issues. The point of a gift is to make them feel good; any kind of hassle, no matter the 
sum involved would defeat the purpose of the gift.  (Response 94) 
Group B has adjusted to take into account the risk of failure.  Why is the risk of failure 
quantified at £5?  Why is it not distributed more evenly across the spectrum 
according to relative risk aversion?  This suggests the arbitrary nature of the decision.  
CŽŶƐƵŵĞƌƐĂƌĞ “ƵŶĂďůĞƚŽƌĞƚƌŝĞǀĞƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůǀĂůƵĞƐĨŽƌŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇŐŽŽĚƐ ?55 and so 
decide that if they have to take risk into account, they may as well halve the price.  
Players have no other market to adjust their behaviour around. 
Group C are still WTP £10.  It was possible that some players would consider £10 
trivial.  In anticipation of this I asked for players WTP for a £100 voucher. 
What would you be prepared to pay for a £100 voucher? 
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Some of the movement here may well be from players who simply considered the 
notion of a £100 voucher to be ridiculous, but there is a significant shift, with a third 
no longer willing to buy and more than half only willing to pay less than £20 for the 
£100 voucher under risk.  There is particular volatility in amongst players who 
previously said they would pay £10 even under conditions of risk: 
 
This suggests, unsurprisingly, that magnitude of investment is a factor which 
increases sensitivity to risk.  Note that the full sample diagram maintains Group 
Moderate positive 
correlation but 
significant 
movement 
amongst those 
who would pay 
£10 for a £10 
voucher under risk. 
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 ? ?ƚǇƉĞƉĞĂŬƐ ? “ǁŚŝůĞƉĞŽƉůĞĂƌĞĂĚũƵƐƚŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶƐŝŶĂĐŽŚĞƌĞŶƚ ?
seemingly sensible, fashion to account for duration, they are doing so around an 
ĂƌďŝƚƌĂƌǇďĂƐĞǀĂůƵĞ ? ?56  The response to magnitude is explained by Kahneman and 
Tversky:   “WƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐŝĐĂůƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞŝƐĂĐŽŶĐĂǀĞĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŵĂŐŶŝƚƵĚĞŽĨƉŚǇƐŝĐĂů
change...  thus the difference between a gain of 100 and a gain of 200 appears to be 
ŐƌĞĂƚĞƌƚŚĂŶƚŚĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶĂŐĂŝŶŽĨ ? ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚĂŐĂŝŶŽĨ ? ? ? ? ? ?57   
Players were now told that they had consulted a super-computer that had told them 
with absolute certainty that there was only a 20% chance of the shop failing. 
How much will you pay with a certain 20% chance that the firm will fail?  
 
I hypothesised before the experiment that this would result in a peak in the £8 
valuation, a reasonable application of neo-classical utility maximisation theory.  
Utility should be weighted by probability.  While there is a movement to the £8 point, 
there is also a significant movement of players into Group C.  Group C valued the £10 
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voucher under a 20% risk of failure at £10.  We might expect movement from the 
Group B risk evaluators to the £8 valuation but what is particularly interesting is the 
drop in Group A withdrawals from fourteen players to six.  Of these players two 
moved to £10, two to £8, three to £5 and one to £2.  These players appear to have 
withdrawn from a purchase because of the uncertainty, rather than the risk of loss 
per se. 
 
Finally, note the three circled players were willing to pay less once they knew the 
(relatively low) risk of failure.  Obviously this is too small a number to indicate a 
trend, but it is an important reminder that consumers will not idly follow expected 
patterns.  This is not de facto an irrational choice (the player furthest to the right may 
simply trust computers more than journalists), but it does seem to demonstrate 
rather arbitrary behaviour by the participants.  The relatively weak correlation 
becomes even weaker if we remove changes caused by Group A being prepared to 
re-enter the market now that risk can be calculated and simply concentrate on the 
impact upon players who remained in the market.  Increasing the information does 
not seem to be enforcing an underlying preference for vouchers adjusted by risk.  
Risk averse players do not necessarily remain risk averse, and vice versa. 
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dŚĞŶĞǆƚƚǁŽƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐĞǆƉůŽƌĞĚƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚ ?ƐƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞŝƌůĞgal rights.  
,ĂǀŝŶŐŐŝǀĞŶƚŚĞŐŝĨƚǀŽƵĐŚĞƌƚŽƚŚĞŝƌĨƌŝĞŶĚ ?ƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞƚŽůĚƚŚĂƚ “Žď ?ŚĂĚƵƐĞĚƚŚĞ
voucher to order a CD.  They were asked if they thought that when Bob went to the 
closed down store and tried to take the CD he ordered from a mixed pile he had a 
legal right to do so, and whether he should have such a right.   
Who has the right, and who should have the right, to ordered CDs after the shop 
has failed? 
 
Two things are striking about these results.  The first is that nobody from the sample 
believed that the record shop both owned (legally) the CD and should (normatively) 
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keep the CD.  Second, even amongst those that correctly believed that Vaxxi had the 
legal right,58 only five of the thirty-seven thought that this was how the law should 
be.  Following on from this, players were asked about their own record voucher, still 
in their possession, and whether out of the creditors of the record shop they or the 
bank should be paid back first.  The dead fifty-fifty split indicates as much 
ambivalence about the law as the split in the first question. 
/ŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨĚĞƉŽƐŝƚŽƌƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?ŝƚŚĂƐďĞĞŶƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ “ŝĨĐƵƐƚŽŵĞƌƐĂƌĞ
not aware of what protection is offered, they are likely to assume that there is 
ŶŽŶĞ ? ?59  Nine out of the twenty-three (39%) who thought Bob had the right were 
prepared to pay the full £10 when they heard the rumour of failure (Group C).  
Sixteen out of the thirty-seven (47%) who thought the record shop had the right to 
the CD did the same.  Full information about risk is not impacting upon price. 
In the final question time leapt forward a year, and they were given another 
opportunity to buy a £10 record voucher from a shop that a journalist had suggested 
was about to fail.  The difference this time is that the government has intervened 
ǁŝƚŚĂŶĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶƐĐŚĞŵĞ ?ĂŶĚŚĂǀĞ “ƐĞƚƵƉĂĨƵŶĚƐŽƚŚĂƚĂŶǇŽŶĞ
ǁŚŽŽǁŶƐƚŚŝƐƐŽƌƚŽĨǀŽƵĐŚĞƌǁŝƚŚĂĨŝƌŵƚŚĂƚŐŽĞƐďƵƐƚǁŝůůŐĞƚƚŚĞŝƌŵŽŶĞǇďĂĐŬ ? ?
The following graphs speak for themselves:  protected consumers do not pay 
attention to risk. 
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How much would you pay with a government guarantee of a refund in the event of 
failure? 
 Without Guarantee (Question 2)  With Guarantee 
 
 
To summarise, players asked what they would pay for a £10 record voucher when 
exposed to possible failure displayed apparently arbitrary decision making rather 
than apparent probability * cost decisions, where passing a risk threshold (which was 
a lower proportion for a higher amount) caused them to withdraw rather than 
proportionately adjust their willingness to pay.  Where their ownership was 
threatened their legal rights did not match their expectations or their ideas of the 
social norms, but as soon as they were protected they ceased to give either risk or 
norms much consideration and simply stated a willingness to pay £10.  This could be 
expected to have a dolorous effect on market discipline. 
Instead of rationally analysing risk, consumers respond to proximity and magnitude.  
The majority will pay £10 for a £10 voucher, because the anchoring is straightforward 
(of the ninety-five participants, only fifteen suggested other prices).  If there is an 
immediate threat of danger (the journalist) many either withdraw from the market 
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altogether or mediate their investment, unless the investment is too small for them 
to care.  If the amount they imagine they will lose is big enough, then even a more 
distant threat of failure will do exactly the same thing (the £100 record voucher):  
 “dŚĞƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚŽĨƉƌŽďĂďŝůŝƚǇƌĞƐĞŵďůĞƐƚŚĞsubjective assessment of 
ƉŚǇƐŝĐĂůƋƵĂŶƚŝƚŝĞƐƐƵĐŚĂƐĚŝƐƚĂŶĐĞŽƌƐŝǌĞ ? ? ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚ ?ůĞĂĚƐ ƚŽƐǇƐƚĞŵĂƚŝĐĞƌƌŽƌƐ ? ?60    I 
am reminded of Father Ted explaining the difference between a small cow and one 
which is far away.61   
The market for vouchers has certainly changed: 
How many people still buy CDs? How many people still go to a record shop? I wouldn't ever 
consider buying a Vaxxi voucher in reality because I don't know anyone who still buys music 
that way! (Spotify, iTunes etc) (Response 6) 
Some part of this will be due to the failure of firms like Farepak, or music, games and 
ǀŝĚĞŽĐŚĂŝŶĂǀǀŝǁŚĞƌĞ “ƉĞŽƉůĞǁŚŽŐŽƚĂǀǀŝǀŽƵĐŚĞƌƐĂƐŚƌŝƐƚŵĂƐƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐ
ĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌĞĚƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞŶ ?ƚďĞŝŶŐĂĐĐĞƉƚĞĚŝŶƐƚŽƌĞƐĂĨƚĞƌŝƚǁĞŶƚŝŶƚŽĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶŝŶ
ĞĐĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?62  Another example is the pre-packaged sale of the fashion chain 
:ĂŶĞEŽƌŵĂŶǁŚŝĐŚƌĞƐƵůƚĞĚŝŶ “ŽŶĞƌŽƵƐ ?63 conditions being placed upon the 
redemption of their gift vouchers, and the recent entry of Comet into administration 
ƌĞƐƵůƚŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞ “ƐƵƐƉĞŶƐŝŽŶ ?64 of vouchers. 
ǀĞŶƚƐůŝŬĞƚŚŝƐŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚƚŚĞ “ŝŵĂŐŝŶĂďŝůŝƚǇ ?65 of failure and put off some consumers 
who would otherwise have bought vouchers.  Yet organisations like iTunes and many 
other department stores still successfully sell vouchers.  The assumption that this is 
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simply because consumers do not have sufficient information is dangerous, and akin 
to the workman blaming his hammer because it cannot saw wood.  It is reasonable to 
conclude both that: 
a) Enhanced protection of unsecured creditors, like Farepak voucher holders, 
presents similar risks to the moral hazard concerns that accompany 
depositor protection in banking regulation, and thus has broader systemic 
consequences. 
 
b) Increased information does not appear to lead consumers to incorporate the 
risk into their decision making in accordance with expected utility theory, 
thus undermining the validity of the information paradigm to consumer 
regulation and the model for Orderly and Effective insolvency. 
Clearly protecting people like the Farepak customers is more complex than it might 
initially appear.  The desire to protect the vulnerable against the harsh consequences 
of business failure has led to some difficult legal contortions.  This is manifest in the 
effort to divide unsecured creditors into trade creditors, who as commercial entities 
are expected to negotiate in the shadow of the law, and consumers, who are not.  
The Consumer Credit Act 1974 was introduced to provide protection of individual 
debtors, both by regulating the business practices of the credit industry in general 
ĂŶĚĐŽŶƚƌŽůůŝŶŐƚŚĞ “ĨŽƌŵ ?ĐŽŶƚĞŶƚ ?ƚĞƌŵƐĂŶĚĞŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƌĞŐƵůĂƚĞĚĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌ
ĐƌĞĚŝƚĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚƐ ? ?66  The act largely seeks to protect smaller, non-commercial 
transactions.  The most important revisions regarding insolvency are s56, which deals 
with antecedent negotiations (such as a hire purchase agreement) by creating agency 
between the negotiator and the creditor, to the effect that it gives   “ŶŽŶ-excludable 
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rights to the debtor or hirer against the negotiator in respect of breaches of express 
ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚǁĂƌƌĂŶƚŝĞƐŽƌŽĨĂĐƚŝŽŶĂďůĞŵŝƐƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?67, and s75, which 
makes the provider of credit jointly and severally liable for items with a cash price 
between £100 and £25,000.  The Consumer Credit Directive that came into force on 
the 1 February 2011 expanded this to cover arrangements where the cash price of 
the item exceeds £30,000 but the credit amount does not exceed £60,260 and 
specifically mentions the case of liability for the creditor where the supplier is 
insolvent.  This difficult dance of definition and value limits is the exact same 
challenge faced by drafters of depositor protection for banks.  How do you balance 
systemic risk with moral hazard and the protection of the vulnerable?  The answer in 
mainstream insolvency law has been to devise the construct of the consumer and 
then apply arbitrary limits to what constitutes non-commercial consumption. 
Another example of recent developments in creditor protection are the new rules set 
out in Chapter 5 of the Client Assets Sourcebook68, issued 31 October 2012, which 
have tightened the rules and particularly reporting requirements regarding client 
money by financial firms.  Client money is money a firm holds or receives that is not 
immediately due or payable, and they must be placed in a separate interest bearing 
account so that it is identified and segregated in the event of insolvency.  The reason 
for the tightening of the rules is the financial crisis, and particularly the failure of 
Lehman Brothers to properly segregate client money from mixed funds.  Tightening 
up the rules is about consumer protection but also about restoring confidence in 
banking and financial services. 
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Perhaps the most famous ruling regarding the protection of consumers in an 
insolvency context is the case of Re Kayford.69 A mail order business had created a 
ƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞĚĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶƚŽǁŚŝĐŚĐƵƐƚŽŵĞƌ ?ƐŵŽŶĞǇŚĂĚƚŽďĞƉĂŝĚ ?tŚĞŶƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ
became insolvent tŚĞĐƵƐƚŽŵĞƌƐ ?ŵŽŶĞǇǁĂƐƉƌŽƚĞĐƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞĐƌĞĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂƚƌƵƐƚ
over the separate account.  In his ruling, Megarry J observed that he was concerned 
ĨŽƌ “ŵĞŵďĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐ ?ƐŽŵĞŽĨǁŚŽŵĐĂŶŝůůĂĨĨŽƌĚƚŽĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞƚŚĞŝƌŵŽŶĞǇĨŽƌ
a claim to a dividend in thĞůŝƋƵŝĚĂƚŝŽŶ ?70, and that as such the establishing of a 
ƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞĂĐĐŽƵŶƚǁĂƐĂŶ “entirely proper and honourable thing for a company to 
ĚŽ Q/ǁŝƐŚƚŚĂƚ ?ƐŝƚƚŝŶŐŝŶƚŚŝƐĐŽƵƌƚ ?/ŚĂĚŚĞĂƌĚŽĨƚŚŝƐŽĐĐƵƌƌŝŶŐŵŽƌĞĨƌĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇ ? ?71  
Yet the Cork Committee did not choose to institute statutory reforms that would 
oblige firms to hold consumer pre-payments in separate accounts, in much the same 
way that financial services firms would later be required to hold client money.  Finch 
explains why, even if efficiency and removal of capital issues are ignored, such a 
statutory rule would fail on the grounds of fairness:   
The problem for proponents of consumer protection lies in any contention that consumers are 
in a worse position than all unsecured trade creditors.  The small unsecured trade creditor 
ǁŚŽŝƐŶŽƚŝŶĂĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŝŶŐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉǁŝƚŚĂĚĞďƚŽƌĐŽŵƉĂŶǇŵĂǇďĞǀĞƌǇƉŽŽƌůǇƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĞĚ Q
the case in fairness for special treatment of consumers as a general class seems not to be 
made out.
72
  
Similar problems would face a hypothetical rule designated a part of the prescribed 
part to be paid by consumers.  Some creditors are protected for social reasons, 
whether to protect individuals deemed worthy (eg.high street consumers) or 
organisations deemed important (eg. banks).  A difficult cost-benefit analysis is made 
to weigh the social value of the entity against the social cost of the moral hazard 
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created.  High street consumers are protected because they command sympathy in 
the public eye, confidence in financial services is preserved through protection of 
client money because of their importance to the economy, and trade creditors are 
left to hang because at the end of the day someone has to lose.  The distinction 
between the vulnerable consumer and the rational trade creditor is an artificial cover 
for this difficult process of prioritising.  This is only a problem if we fall for the idea 
that vulnerable creditors are protected because they are unable to make informed 
choices.  Individuals are incapable of purely rational decision-making.  If that was the 
basis of protection then everybody should be protected from their inability to make 
informed choice.  One suspects certain large financial institutions might have 
benefited from being protected from their inability to make informed choices as well. 
Orderly and Effective insolvency cannot rely on creditors to choose the best 
monetary returns outcome.  If it is not simply a lack of information but also cognitive 
failings when it comes to managing information and making the best decisions, then 
a rescue orientated system needs a means to reduce the impact of expectation and 
emotional involvement from the creditors without isolating them from the 
ĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƐŽĨƚŚĞŝƌĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƐWŽƐŶĞƌŽďƐĞƌǀĞƐ ? “ŚƵŵĂŶďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌĞǆŚŝďŝƚƐ
systemic departures from rationality.  Cognitive psychologists, economists, and 
economic analysts of law have presented evidence that most of us commit a variety 
ŽĨƐǇƐƚĞŵŝĐĐŽŐŶŝƚŝǀĞĞƌƌŽƌƐ ? ?73  If these cognitive errors are systemic then they 
require a systemic response.  This is where, in an insolvency regime that already has 
a good infrastructure and strong property rights, small inclusivity measures could 
have significant benefits. 
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CHAPTER 8:  THE USE OF ADR TECHNIQUES AND 
REINTEGRATIVE SHAMING TO IMPROVE INSOLVENCY 
OUTCOMES 
 
 
8.1 THE NORMATIVE ROLE OF THE ADR CULTURE IN ENGLISH 
LAW  
I have argued that in an insolvency system with a good infrastructure and strong 
property rights, inclusivity encouraged by an element of redistribution is a strength 
that improves creditor returns by increasing the likelihood of rescue.  I even went so 
far as to argue that inclusivity measures could improve pre-packs, in many ways the 
pinnacle of the non-inclusive English rescue measure.  This may be ringing alarm bells 
for the reader, particularly one who finds the word  “ƌĞĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶ ?ŝĚĞŽůŽŐŝĐĂůůǇ
disagreeable in the first place.  It should not.  The types of changes I recommend are 
already being adopted by commercially savvy operators.  The intention in this 
chapter is to share some of these ideas and give a clearer idea of why they work to 
improve orderly insolvency. 
This chapter aims to demonstrate the sorts of measures I mean when I talk about 
inclusivity, and some practical suggestions that might improve insolvency outcomes 
by increasing creditor compliance.  By compliance I mean willingness to co-operate in 
effective workout, whether that means directors accepting the firm is unsalvageable 
or creditors appreciating that a penny in the pound really is the best they are going 
to get.  It does so by building on the exploration of the role of punishment, shame 
and stigma in insolvency laws in Chapter 6, and the handling of information and 
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consumer decision making in Chapter 7.  The suggestions focus on marginal changes 
that will achieve small improvements in process, and include the use of mediation 
techniques and mediation training by insolvency professionals (including within 
financial institutions), encouraging opportunities for directors to explain why the 
failure happened and for stakeholders to describe its impact, and the power to 
require an apology.  The objective is to improve returns by reducing the instances 
where stakeholders choose to pursue impossible rescues or liquidate viable 
enterprises, be it due to hubris, anger, or simple mistake.  This is not a 
communitarian argument, in that I am not arguing that insolvency law should 
consider these factors for some reason beyond maximising financial returns, nor is it 
concerned with the emotional wellbeing of participants beyond the extent to which it 
improves effective wealth maximisation.  It will be argued, however, that a small 
expenditure on considering the emotional context of decision making will ultimately 
pay off in increased aggregate returns.  
It may be difficult to see, prima facie, the place of ADR and re-integrative shaming in 
the insolvency process.  Opportunities for litigation are deliberately limited by the 
use of moratoria, and the multiplicity of groups and interests makes it difficult to 
visualise the scenario in the same fashion as a simple two party civil litigation.  The 
Enterprise Act sought to enhance creditor participation in insolvency proceedings: 
dŚĞ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶŝƐƚŽƐƉŽŶƐŽƌŝŶƐŽůǀĞŶĐǇƉƌŽĐĞĞĚŝŶŐƐǁŚŝĐŚĂƌĞinclusive, in the 
sense that they afford all creditors participation rights and under which all creditors can look 
to the presiding insolvency practitioner to both represent their interests and to account if he 
fails to do so.  Whereas collectivity per se simply binds creditors, inclusiveness offers them a 
pro-active role in the procedure itself.
1
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Yet one might also question the need for encouraging creditor compliance given that 
many insolvency procedures involve little creditor decision making, and perhaps 
dismiss inclusivity as more of a communitarian concern and therefore a distributive 
goal in itself rather than being something that improve outcomes. 
 Three rebuttals are offered to these concerns.  First, this chapter is focused on low 
cost measures that achieve marginal increases on those occasions when they apply. 
They do not need to be universally applicable to be useful.  Second, CVAs need 
creditor votes and the Administration + CVA combination is the most viable approach 
available for successful rescue.  Measures that improve the chance of favourable 
voting and effective design of CVAs are worth investigating.  Third, this thesis is more 
concerned with insolvency laws operation on bargaining within its shadow.  These 
recommendations are more to do with changes in the culture and approach to 
informal workout than with substantive changes to the law. 
What is it about English law that makes it such an effective commercial mechanism?  
Perhaps the single most important cultural change to English civil law was the 
enactment of the Woolf Reforms2 with the introduction of the Civil Procedure Rules 
ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?dŚĞƐĞǁŝĚĞƌĂŶŐŝŶŐƌƵůĞƐƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚ “ĂĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůĐŚĂŶŐĞŝŶƚŚĞĐƵůƚƵƌĞ
ŽĨĐŝǀŝůůŝƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ?3 ĂŶĚĂƌĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ “ŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞƌĞĂůƐƵĐĐĞƐƐƐƚŽƌŝĞƐŝŶƚŚĞ history of 
ŶŐůŝƐŚ>Ăǁ ? ?4  Drawing on concerns that English adversarialism was having a 
deleterious effect on the justice system, Woolf emphasised the value of Alternative 
ŝƐƉƵƚĞZĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ?Z ) “ĐůĂŝŵŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŝƚƐĂǀĞĚƐĐĂƌce judicial and other resources, 
was usually quicker and cheaper, and often achieved a more mutually satisfying 
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ŽƵƚĐŽŵĞĨŽƌƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŝĞƐƚŚĂŶůŝƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ?5 Rule 1.4(1)(e) of the CPR states that the 
ĐŽƵƌƚ “ĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐĞƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŝĞƐƚŽƵƐĞĂŶĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞĚŝƐƉƵƚĞƌĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞŝĨƚŚĞ
court considers it appropriate and facilitating ƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨƐƵĐŚƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞ ? ?dhere is a 
fist in the glove.  Failure to consider ADR can activate the court ?s discretion regarding 
costs under the Senior Courts Act 1981 s51(1), thus a 10-15% reduction in costs order 
was held to be a proportionate response for not considering ADR6, and even a failure 
to take a reasonable position in mediation has resulted in an adverse costs order.7  
The result is that lawyers are obliged to consider alternatives to litigation and only go 
to court if there is no other reasonable alternative.8   
How is this relevant to insolvency law?  CPR rule 2.1(2) excludes insolvency 
proceedings from the rules, but same lawyers being required to embrace ADR are the 
ones advising parties long before litigation is considered, and the purpose of the 
reforms was to change the whole culture of English law.  This means they are more 
likely to consider alternative approaches to dispute resolution, with the attendant 
advantages described by Lord Woolf above.  Taken as a whole, and supported by the 
following arguments in this chapter, this change in culture informs my submission 
that greater inclusivity has made English law more effective at achieving greater 
returns in insolvency.  The focus of modern English civil law is on resolving disputes 
before they reach the court.  This is as effective in insolvency as it is anywhere else. 
  
                                                          
5
 Loughlin P and Gerlis S (2004), p6 
6
 Straker v Tudor [2007] EWCA Civ 368 
7
 Earl of Malmesbury v Strutt and Parker [2008] 118 Con LR 68 
8
 Cowl v Plymouth City Council (2001) The Times, 8 January 2002 
  
219 
 
8.2 INFORMAL WORKOUTS AND AUGMENTED DECISION MAKING 
The importance of informal workouts is clearly recognised in the Orderly and 
Effective model of insolvency;  “ĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞǁŽƌŬŽƵƚƐĂŶĚƌĞƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌŝŶŐƐƐŚŽƵůĚďĞ
supported by an enabling environment that encourages participants to engage in 
consensual arrangements designed to restore an enterprise to financial viability ?9.  
But the emphasis is still on the information paradigm notion that if consumers have 
all the information they will make the best choice.  The principles consistently return 
to the importance ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞůĂǁ “ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƚŚĞƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶŽĨƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŽŶƚŚĞ
ĚĞďƚŽƌ ?10  or  “ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚŝƐĐůŽƐƵƌĞŽĨŽƌĞŶƐƵƌĞĂĐĐĞƐƐƚŽƚŝŵĞůǇ ?ƌĞůŝĂďůĞĂŶĚĂĐĐƵƌĂƚĞ
financial information on the distressed enterprise. ?11  These are important principles 
but they do not address the whole problem. 
Chapter 7 both explored and demonstrated serious limitations to the information 
paradigm, but there is strong evidence that information sharing has significant 
positive benefits to the insolvency process.  ,ŽƵƐƚŽŶĞƚĂů ?ƐĞŵƉŝƌŝĐĂůŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ
the subject finds the benefits of information sharing to be universally positive, 
ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ “higher bank profitability, lower bank risk, a reduced likelihood of financial 
crisis, aŶĚŚŝŐŚĞƌĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŐƌŽǁƚŚ ? ?12  IMF policy regarding information sharing 
reflects the London AƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞǇƐƚĂƚĞƚŚĂƚ “decisions ĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞĚĞďƚŽƌ ?Ɛ
longer-term future should only be made on the basis of comprehensive information, 
which is shared among all the banks and other parties to a ǁŽƌŬŽƵƚ ? ?13  As suggested 
in Chapter 6 normative behaviour in banking was demonstrated to favour strategic 
co-operation amongst clearing banks and financial institutions.  As well as providing 
structural benefits that improves insolvency performance across the board, Houston 
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ĞƚĂů ?ƐƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐthat information sharing reduces the potential harm of 
ŚŝŐŚĞƌĨŝƌƐƚĐůĂŝŵƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ P “Stronger creditor rights lead to higher volatility, while 
greater levels of information sharing reduce volatility [and] helps mitigate the 
positive effects that stronger crediƚŽƌƌŝŐŚƚƐŚĂǀĞŽŶƌŝƐŬƚĂŬŝŶŐ ? ?14  Reconciling the 
two disparate findings  W the value of information sharing as opposed to the weakness 
of the information paradigm  W requires a better understanding of how people make 
decisions based upon the information they have. 
Neuroscientists Campbell, Whitehead and Finkelstein15 have found that decision 
making occurs in two stages:  first, pattern recognition looking for similarities 
between the current situation and our past experiences, and second, emotional 
tagging where the emotions associated with the patterns enable us to judge the 
importance of the current event.  Both components are essential because without 
ĞŵŽƚŝŽŶĂůĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ “ǁĞďĞĐŽŵĞƐůŽǁĂŶĚŝŶĐŽŵƉĞƚĞŶƚĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶŵĂŬĞƌƐĞǀĞŶƚŚŽƵŐŚ
we retain the capacity ĨŽƌŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ? ?16   The ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŚĂƉƉĞŶƐ “ĂůŵŽƐƚ
ŝŶƐƚĂŶƚĂŶĞŽƵƐůǇ ?17 and once the pattern is fixed it is very difficult to shift from this 
initial frame.   
Inappropriate self-interest, the presence of distorting attachments and misleading 
memories are  “ƌĞĚĨůĂŐĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ?18 that can lead to incorrect pattern recognition 
and thus bad decisions and inappropriate emotional responses.  Business failure 
contains a surfeit of opportunity to encounter these red flag conditions.  The name 
 ‘ďĂŶŬƌƵƉƚ ?ŝƐĂƐƚŝŐŵa.  It is ĂďƌĂŶĚŵĂƌŬŝŶŐǇŽƵƌ “ĚĞĐĞŝƚĨƵů ?ƋƵĂƐŝ-criminal conduct in 
ĞŶƚĞƌŝŶŐŝŶƚŽďĂŶŬƌƵƉƚĐǇ ?19, which can encourage distrust on the part of creditors 
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 Houston JF, Lin C, Lin P and Ma Y (2010), p496 
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and potentially inappropriate shame on the part of the debtors.  Although firms 
themselves are not emotional the people that run them are: 
dŚĞƌĞ ?ƐƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞƉƐǇĐŚĞŽĨĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐŽĨ^DƐ ?ĐĂůůŝƚƉƌŝĚĞŽƌƐƚƵďďŽƌŶŶĞƐƐ ?ǁŚĂƚĞǀĞƌ
you like, but they try solve their own problems for far too long and the problems just get 
worse and worse. And they can be very ŐŽŽĚĂƚƌŽďďŝŶŐWĞƚĞƌƚŽƉĂǇWĂƵů ?ŝĨǇŽƵĨŽůůŽǁ ?ƚŚĞǇ ?ůů
ŬĞĞƉƚŚĞďĂŶŬƋƵŝĞƚĨŽƌĂƐůŽŶŐĂƐƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ?ƚŚĞǇ ?ůůĞǀ ŶƚŚƌŽǁŝŶƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶŵŽŶĞǇƚŽƉĂĐŝĨǇ
ƐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞŵŽƌĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌƐ ?ǁŚĂƚƚŚĞǇĚŽŶ ?ƚĚŽŝƐŐĞƚŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚĂĚǀŝĐĞƵŶƚŝů
ƚŚĞƌĞ ?ƐĂǁŝŶĚŝng up petition threatened. And that means that there are a lot of very hacked-
off creditors out there, so that the chance of persuading them to go for a CVA is zero.
20
 
Even for those that pride themselves on their objectivity emotional tagging is an 
essential component of effective reasoning, and the emotions associated with 
making mistakes have been shown to interfere with reasoning and the ability to 
detect and prevent further errors.21   
The barrier concept developed by Mnookin describes two key factors that prevent 
successful negotiation.22  The first factor concerns strategic barriers, where players 
refuse to co-operate and share information even to their own advantage for fear of 
giving an exploitable advantage to the other side.  The second factor is cognitive bias, 
which Bush considers as follows: 
[During] cognitive processes by which people assimilate information, there are regular and 
ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĂďůĞ ‘ĚĞƉĂƌƚƵƌĞƐĨƌŽŵƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ?ƚŚĂƚůĞĂĚƚŽĚŝƐƚŽƌƚŝŽŶĂŶĚŵŝƐŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ
ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƌĞĐĞŝǀĞĚ QBecause of cognitive biases, each party is incapable of reading the 
information provided by the other side including offers and demands accurately and 
objectively. Therefore, each is likely to analyze this information with a false and distorted 
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 Ichikawa N, ^ŝĞŐůĞ, ?:ŽŶĞƐE ?<ĂŵŝƐŚŝŵĂ< ?dŚŽŵƉƐŽŶt< ?'ƌŽƐƐ:: ?KŚŝƌĂ, ? “&ĞĞůŝŶŐďĂĚĂďŽƵƚƐĐƌĞǁŝŶŐƵƉ P
emotion regulation and action monitoring in the anterior cingulate cortex ? ?Cognitive Affective and Behavioural 
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ǆƉůŽƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂƌƌŝĞƌƐƚŽƚŚĞZĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶŽĨŽŶĨůŝĐƚ ? ?Ohio State Journal 
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perspective that, once again, leads them to miss opportunities for deals entirely, or make 
deals that fail to realize all possible joint gains.
23
   
Business failure occurs in a scenario where mistakes most likely have been made and 
a sense of embarrassment, shame or disappointment heightened, creating a higher 
probability of cognitive bias, just as the bankruptcy stigma will aggravate distrust and 
exacerbate strategic barriers to negotiation.  Essentially,  “ƚŚŽƐĞĨĂĐŝŶŐĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů
difficulty are not best placed to assess their own situation.  The stresses and strains 
that inevitably accompany financial problems may cause undue panic, or 
ĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞůǇĂ ‘ŚĞĂĚŝŶƚŚĞƐĂŶĚ ?ŵĞŶƚĂůŝƚǇ ? ?24  Bankruptcy is not conducive to good 
decision making. 
Where parties have an unhelpful initial framing or informal unassisted negotiations 
have broken down, the key is to find a mechanism that helps overcome their barriers 
to negotiation.  It is not simply a question of providing parties with all the 
information, but providing it in a fashion that helps them overcome their initial 
impressions and the emotional response they provoked.  In management theory 
Campbell et al suggest that: 
For important decisions, we need a deliberate, structured way to identify likely sources of bias 
 W those red flag conditions  W and we need to strengthen the group decision-ŵĂŬŝŶŐƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ Q
the simple answer is to involve someone else  W someone who has no inappropriate 
attachments or self-ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ QdŚĂƚƉĞƌƐŽŶĐŽƵůĚĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞŚĞƌƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ ?ĨŽƌĐĞŚĞƌƚŽƌĞǀŝĞǁ
her logic, encourage her to consider options, and possibly even champion a solution she would 
find uncomfortable.
25
   
Formal mediation can improve inter-party decision making in a similar fashion to the 
way deliberate structures can improve internal decision making.  In a typical 
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mediation the mediator will briefly speak to the parties together before taking each 
individual party separately in a series of individual sessions and encouraging them to 
explore how the dispute arose, what they hope to achieve in a settlement and what 
they would be prepared to do in order to settle.  Meetings are entirely confidential, 
the mediator is a neutral third party, and offers are only passed to the other room 
under the explicit instruction of the parties.  ADRg, an association of accredited 
mediators, claims an 80% success rate in achieving binding agreements through 
mediation.26  ƵƐŚƐƚĂƚĞƐƚŚĂƚ “ŵĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶŝƐďĞƐƚƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚĂƐ ?ŝŶĞƐƐĞŶĐĞ ?ĂƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ
of "facilitated or assisted, negotiation" in which the mediator facilitates the parties' 
ŽǁŶŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ? ?27  Central to this ŝƐŝŵƉƌŽǀŝŶŐƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ? ‘ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĂů
ĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚ ?ǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞŵĞĚŝĂƚŽƌƐĞĞŬƐƚŽ “ŝŵƉƌŽǀĞƚŚĞĨůŽǁŽĨŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ
reduce the effects of false or biased ĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?28  The process helps parties 
reconsider how they have understood the problem. 
Having access to better information may not be sufficient to dislodge inaccurate 
initial framing, particularly in the context of strong emotion, and here the format of 
formal mediation is helpful.  It has been demoŶƐƚƌĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ “ŵĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶƉƌŽĚƵĐĞƐ
high levels of satisfaction and compliance, and that these levels are typically much 
higher than those generated by ĐŽƵƌƚƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŝŶŐŽĨƐŝŵŝůĂƌĐĂƐĞƐ ? ?29   This has been 
ůŝŶŬĞĚǁŝƚŚǁŚĂƚŝƐŬŶŽǁŶĂƐ ‘ƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĂůũƵƐƚŝĐĞƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?, where the means by which 
an outcome is achieved is shown to have value to the participants.  Early research 
into procedural justice theory emphasised consumer preference for the process 
control available in adversarial rather than inquisitorial justice because it gave a 
greater opportunity to put what they felt was important in front of a judge.30  This 
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 ADRg, Mediation Training Programme Course Manual, ADR Group (Bristol: 2012), p1.   
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goes beyond ĂƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚŐƌĞĂƚĞƌĐŚĂŶĐĞŽĨĂƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞƌĞƐƵůƚ P “ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐƵƐƵĂůůǇƉƌĞĨĞƌ
the consensual processes, even where the outcomes they receive in these processes 
ĂƌĞƵŶĨĂǀŽƵƌĂďůĞ ? ?31  McEwen and Maiman32 have demonstrated that parties are 
attracted to process advantages like the opportunity to express how they feel about 
what has happened, attention being paid to what clients feel are the key issues, and 
facilitating client involvement in shaping an agreement.  In their analysis of the Asian 
financial crisis, Radalet and Sachs observe that  “ƚŚĞŵĂƌŬĞƚŚĂƐƌĞĂĐƚĞĚŵŽƐƚ
ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞůǇƚŽŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞƐƚŚĂƚďƌŝŶŐĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌƐĂŶĚĚĞďƚŽƌƐƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ?33  Within the 
insolvency context this feeling of procedural fairness may help offset the impression 
of unfairness that can often accompany business failure, and consequently improve 
poorly framed decisions:  those decisions made in the heat of the moment, without a 
full appreciation of the facts or the consequences, and that tend to form the first 
impressions that are so hard to get rid of. 
That formal mediation has these benefits is all well and good but as observed at the 
beginning of the chapter the opportunities for formal mediation may be more limited 
in an insolvency context because of the multiplicity of players and the consequent 
problem of co-ordination, and the limited opportunities for litigation once moratoria 
have been put into place.   If legislation was passed to require mediation between 
ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐƚŽĂĨĂŝůŝŶŐďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ ? “ƚŚĞŵĞƌĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĐŽƵƌƚŚĂƐŵĂŶĚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ
parties participate in mediation might suggest that the court should have the means 
to enforce the mandate through a participation in good faith requirement, or by 
ĞŶĨŽƌĐŝŶŐĂŵĞĚŝĂƚĞĚĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ?34, not only resulting in rapidly escalating costs and 
complexity but also bringing it within the auspices of the courts, which reduces its 
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independence and thus its force.  If the most important negotiations - those that are 
most likely to determine the life or death of the firm - are those that take place 
during an informal workout, then formal mediation appears to have little utility to 
the process as a whole.  There is nothing, however, to prevent insolvency 
practitioners, workout specialists and clearing banks from adopting techniques of 
formal mediation into their procedures for informal workouts.   
These professionals are already in a valuable position to assist stakeholders to an 
insolvency.  Heath, Larrick and Klayman observe that decision making in conditions of 
ĚƵƌĞƐƐŝƐŽĨƚĞŶŝŵƉĂŝƌĞĚďĞĐĂƵƐĞ “ĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚĨŽƌŵŽĨŵŝƐƐŝŶŐ
information is the absence of experience with highly unusual events. Bank examiners 
rarely see a bank fail, nuclear technicians rarely see a meltdown, and airline 
ƉĞƌƐŽŶŶĞůƌĂƌĞůǇǁŝƚŶĞƐƐĂĐƌĂƐŚ ? ?35  For most participants the failure of a business 
they run or in which they have invested will be an uncommon or even unique event.  
It is submitted that even the most experienced serial phoenixer benefits from the 
perspective and experience of an insolvency professional.  The use of insolvency 
practitioners is known to facilitate smooth run downs, and forestall problems of set-
off and other complexities36, similarly it has been observed that preparation of a CVA 
is usually too technical for directors to prepare without the assistance of an 
Insolvency Practitioner.37  It is not controversial to suggest insolvency contains many 
opportunities for inexperience impairing decision making.  However, although 
administrators, bankers and lawyers have extensive experience of business failure 
from which the parties might profit, clients are unlikely to be in the right 
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psychological position to make proper use of that information until incorrect pattern 
recognition and consequent emotional tagging has been dealt with.  
The most practical recommendation to assist with this issue is not a change in the 
law or a requirement for formal mediation, but simply the recommendation that it 
become common practice for insolvency and turnaround professionals to receive 
some training in mediation techniques.  This would not have to represent a 
significant investment.  A simple two day training course might help them to gain a 
broader understanding of how to overcome faulty initial framing and also recognise 
and advise when formal mediation might be useful to resolve specific conflicts early 
in the process.  This sort of small adjustment to practice may not be glamorous but 
would only need to improve a small proportion of outcomes to reap significant 
rewards.   
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8.3 THE USE OF REINTEGRATIVE SHAMING TO RECOVER THE 
SENSE OF FAIRNESS 
The importance of an impression of fairness, and the idea procedural fairness can 
improve decision making, is supported by research into the notion of a preference 
for fairness by economists using the  ‘ƵůƚŝŵĂƚƵŵŐĂŵĞ ? ?/ŶĂƚǇƉŝĐĂůĞǆĂŵƉůĞƚŚĞ
proposer has $20 and may choose how to split this money with the responder.  The 
responder may then decide to accept this offer, so that both take the money as the 
proposer decided, or reject the offer, in which case both players get nothing.  The 
game theoretic solution to this is that the proposer should offer the lowest amount 
possible and that the responder should accept any positive offer.38  Initial empirical 
testing, however, discovered that this is not what people do.39  Further tests by 
Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler found that:     
Most allocators offered more than a token payment, and many offered an equal split.  Also, 
some positive offers were declined by recipients, indicating a resistance to unfair allocations 
and a willingness to pay to avoid them...  Fair allocations are observed even under conditions 
of complete anonymity and with no possibility of retaliation.  Of the 161 students, 122 (76%) 
divided the $20 evenly.
 40
  
&ĂŝƌŶĞƐƐŝƐƚĂŬĞŶƚŽŝŵƉůǇƚŚĂƚƐŽŵĞ “ŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚŝĞƐĨŽƌŐĂŝŶĂƌĞŶŽƚĞǆƉůŽŝƚĞĚ. ?41  
Perhaps players act upon an underlying sense of fairness, or perhaps it is for fear of 
future reprisals due to being recognized as being unfair.  Either way, as long a 
creditor is focusing on the difference between the money he invested and the return 
offered rather than the superiority of rescue to liquidation, and perceiving this as a 
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negotiation between himself and the debtor rather than a situation they are both 
facing together, he is likely to reject the offer as unfair.   
KahŶĞŵĂŶĞƚĂů ?ƐĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨĨĂirness has some resonance with the honour system 
Posner proposes enforces the credible threat of vengeance in primitive legal 
systems.42  It may also help explain the disproportionate importance placed on the 
parri passu principle in English law.  This was written into the law with the 1542 
^ƚĂƚƵƚĞŽĨĂŶŬƌƵƉƚ ?ƐƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚƉƌŽĐĞĞĚƐĨƌŽŵďĂŶŬƌƵƉƚĐǇĂƌĞƚŽďĞ
distributed among creditors  “ƌĂƚĞĂŶĚƌĂƚĞĂůŝŬĞ ?ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞƋƵĂŶƚŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞŝƌ
ĚĞďƚƐ ?43, and Ă “ĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞŽĨŝŶƐŽůǀĞŶĐǇůĂǁ ? ?44  Yet Goode immediately 
follows this claim by highlighting the range of exceptions to pari passu, principally in 
the form of priorities and costs, and the extent to which pari passu is at all 
descriptive has been questioned: 
The pari passu principle is rather less important than it is sometimes made out to be, and does 
not fulfil any of the functions is rather less important than it is sometimes made out to be, and 
does not fulfil any of the functions often attributed to it.  It does not constitute an accurate 
description of how the assets of insolvent companies are in fact distributed.  It has no role to 
play in ensuring an orderly winding up of such companies.  Nor does it underlie, explain, or 
justify distinctive features of the formal insolvency regime, notably, its collectivity.  The case-
law said to support the pari passu principle serves actually to undermine its importance.  And 
the principle has nothing to do with fairness in liquidation.
45
  
Whether it has ever really operated as described or not, the notion of parri passu 
being fundamental to law grants an impression of underlying fairness.  This in turn 
has an importance to player compliance.  Where creditors have the impression that a 
result is unfair then they can go to extraordinary lengths to see bankrupts brought to 
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justice  W consider the fortune creditors spent in the Pitkin Affair to hunt down and 
haul back a co-conspirator who had fled to Italy, in order to achieve a pitiful 
additional return of a little more than a shilling in the pound46.    This is only an act of 
rational maximisation if vengeance/fairness has some additional value not yet 
recognised.  The argument that they are acting to discipline the market is a hollow 
defence of a neo-classical model of the creditor, although it is often proposed, as the 
game theoretic analysis ƉŽŝŶƚƐƚŽĂƉƌŝƐŽŶĞƌ ?ƐĚŝůĞŵŵĂ PŵĂƌŬĞƚĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĞŝƐĂƉƵďůŝĐ
good and the optimal path in this one-shot game is to get the most you can for 
yourself and let someone else pay to discipline debtors. 
Instead parties to the insolvency are at least in part responding to fundamental 
physiological responses to threat.  A neurological study by Sanfey et al found that low 
ultimatum game offers triggered anger and disgust responses in the brain47, and 
Burnham48 connects this to the work by Clutton-Brock and Parker49 which shows that 
 “ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞƌĞĐŝƉƌŽĐŝƚǇŝƐƵƐĞĚďǇĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚĂŶŝŵĂůƐƚŽƌĞƐŝƐƚƐƵďŽƌĚŝŶĂƚĞŵĞŵďĞƌƐ
ĨƌŽŵŝŶĚƵůŐŝŶŐŝŶĂďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌƚŚĂƚƚŚƌĞĂƚĞŶƐƚŚĞĨŝƚŶĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ? ?50 
In ƵƌŶŚĂŵ ?Ɛown work he demonstrated that increasing the testosterone levels of 
men participating in the ultimatum game increased the frequency of rejection of low 
ŽĨĨĞƌƐ ?dŚŝƐĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞƐƚŚĂƚ “Ƶltimatum game rejections are caused, at least in 
part, by psychological mechĂŶŝƐŵƐ ? ?51  Posner himself speculated that there might 
be some genetic factor, and it certainly seems that our creditors are physiologically 
pre-programmed to enforce social fairness/vengeance mechanisms even in 
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environments where they cannot possibly benefit from them.  This fits growing 
evidence of the importance of social and emotional factors in white collar crime,52as 
ǁĞůůĂƐ<ĂĚĞŶ ?ƐĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶŽĨĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌĐŽŶƚƌŽůůĞĚŶŐůŝƐŚůĂǁĂƐĂǀĞŚŝĐůĞĨŽƌ
vengeance:  
Creditors wanted revenge, or they wanted the bankrupt to suffer, or they wanted him to serve 
ĂƐĂŶĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ƌĞĚŝƚŽƌƐǁĂŶƚĞĚƚŚĞĚĞďƚŽƌƚŽƉĂǇŚŝƐ “ǀŝĐƚŝŵƐ ?ĨŝŐƵƌĂƚŝǀĞůǇĂƐǁĞůůĂƐ
literally, and they wanted to make sure that bankruptcy was viewed with such horror and that 
community pressure alone would deter others.  At a certain rather visceral level, punishing 
was more important than ensuring cooperation.
53 
 
This thesis has highlighted many examples of insolvency proceedings provoking 
strong emotional responses.  &ƌŝƐďǇŽďƐĞƌǀĞƐ “ƚhe insolvency of a company inevitably 
generates dismay and in many cases resentment among a variety of stakeholders in 
ƚŚĞĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?54 Regardless of the criminality of otherwise of the insolvents 
conduct, the failure of a company can feel criminal; recall the outrage of the Farepak 
customer in Chapter 7 who declared that the directors ƚŚĞǇ “ƐŚŽƵůĚďĞƉƵŶŝƐŚĞĚ
through the justice system for that they have done, because with effect, they have 
ƐƚŽůĞŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ?ŵŽŶŝĞƐ ? ?55  Recall also that the courts responded in kind to 
the revocation of the overdraft by HBOS. 
dŚĞĐƌŝŵŝŶŽůŽŐŝƐƚƌĂŝƚŚǁĂŝƚĞĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚ “ƚŚĞŬĞǇƚŽĐƌŝŵĞĐŽŶƚƌŽůŝƐĐƵůƚƵƌĂů
commitments to shaming...  societies with low crime rates are those that shame 
potently and judiciously; individuals who resort to crime are those insulated from 
ƐŚĂŵĞŽǀĞƌƚŚĞŝƌǁƌŽŶŐĚŽŝŶŐ ? ?56  Reintegrative shaming brings together 
interdependent groups so that they are able to express their disapproval to the 
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wrongdoer, that all parties are able to gain a greater understanding of the reasons 
for and consequence of the crime, and that the wrongdoer has the opportunity to 
accept responsibility and express remorse.  The result is a reduction in recidivism by 
offenders and a greater incidence of victims achieving emotional closure (including a 
reduced desire for vengeance).  Although principally used as a technique for the 
management of youth offending, with notable success in New Zealand, research has 
shown its application to other crimes like  “ƚĂǆĐŚĞĂƚŝŶŐĂŶĚĚƌƵŶŬĚƌŝǀŝŶŐ. ?57  It is 
more ůŝŬĞůǇƚŽďĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŝŶ “ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐŽĨŚŝŐŚŝŶƚĞƌĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐǇďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞ
ĚŝƐĂƉƉƌŽǀĞƌĂŶĚƚŚĞĚŝƐĂƉƉƌŽǀĞĚ ?58 ?ďĞŝŶŐǁŚĞƌĞƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ “ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞŝŶŶĞƚǁŽƌŬƐ
ǁŚĞƌĞŝŶƚŚĞǇĚĞƉĞŶĚŽŶĞĂĐŚŽƚŚĞƌƚŽĂĐŚŝĞǀĞǀĂůƵĞĚĞŶĚƐ ? ?59 It is easy to see how 
business relationships can develop the same qualities. 
Chapter 6 explored the important historical role of shame in the management of 
bankruptcy.  Distinguishing innocent insolvency from fraudulent bankruptcy60  has 
always been and remains exceptionally difficult, and even when the state determines 
innocence the creditor is likely to continue to consider themselves a victim.  
Becoming a bankrupt is  “ĚĞĐĞŝƚĨƵů ?ƋƵĂƐŝ-criminal conduct in entering ?61, for which 
rape, dismemberment, slavery and hanging have all been considered reasonable 
retaliation, suggesting we should not underplay the seriousness of the emotional 
consequences of business failure.  Creditors of a failing firm like it or not, are 
participating in a network where they depend on each other to achieve the best 
possible outcome.  Appreciating the parallels with the use of reintegrative shaming 
techniques in criminal law can help us assist creditors in achieving best returns. 
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A highly successful application of reintegrative shaming has been the use of family 
conferences ŝŶEĞǁĞĂůĂŶĚƌŝŵŝŶĂů>Ăǁ “replacing court processing of juveniles 
ǁŝƚŚĐŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐĂƚƚĞŶĚĞĚďǇĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐǁŚŽĐĂƌĞŵŽƐƚĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞǇŽƵŶŐŽĨĨĞŶĚĞƌ ? ?62  
ŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇũƵĚŐĞŵĞŶƚŝƐĂƐŽůĚĂƐƚŚĞŽůĚĞƐƚŽĨŝŶƐŽůǀĞŶĐǇůĂǁƐ ?WŽƐŶĞƌ ?ƐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨ
medieval Icelandic ůĂǇũƵĚŐĞƐĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚŚŽǁ ?ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŶŐŝŶĂƐŽĐŝĞƚǇƚŚĂƚǁĂƐ “virtually 
stateless ?63, the claimant and the defendant would gather relatives and stand before 
a lay judge in a system of informal arbitration.  The court had no power to enforce its 
ruling, but judgement was made before and with the participation of kin.  Posner 
suggests that the presence of family would have a cooling effect, and the ruling 
ǁŽƵůĚďĞĞŶĨŽƌĐĞĚďǇƚŚĞƚŚƌĞĂƚƚŚĂƚŬŝŶǁŽƵůĚďĞ ‘ƌĂůůŝĞĚ ?ƚŽĞŶĨŽƌĐĞŝƚ ?dŚĞ
experience of the trial itselĨĐĂŶƐĂƚŝƐĨǇƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚ ?ƐĚĞƐŝƌĞĨŽƌũƵƐƚŝĐĞ ?
Family conferences achieve this by bringing the parties and their families together 
with an independent arbitrator, whose objective is to  “ůĞĂǀĞŽƉĞŶŵƵůƚŝƉůĞ
interpretations of responsibility while refusing to allow the offender to deny personal 
responsibility entirely...  the strategy is to focus on problem rather than person, and 
ŽŶƚŚĞŐƌŽƵƉĨŝŶĚŝŶŐƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐƚŽƚŚĞƉƌŽďůĞŵ ? ?64  Let us remind ourselves that in our 
dilemma the problem is twofold:  first, there is not enough money left for the parties 
to achieve full payment, and it is preferable for them to choose some money over no 
money at all; second, that the creditors desire for revenge and/or fairness prevents 
them for doing this.  Bringing the parties together helps creditors to focus on the 
actual problem (do you want £500 or nothing?), rather than the ultimatum they feel 
they have been given (I have taken £9,500 and offer you £500, will you accept this 
bargain?):   “focusing on the problem rather than the wrongdoer, in the context of a 
community of care and understanding for the wrongdoer, creates the structural 
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ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐĐŽŶĚƵĐŝǀĞƚŽƌĞŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝǀĞƐŚĂŵŝŶŐ ? ?65  Put more simply, putting people in 
a room together can help them understand the situation as it really is and 
concentrate on achieving the best possible outcome. 
It may not seem credible that the creditors of a bankrupt will be particularly 
interested in understanding the bankrupt, or that a creditor meeting might seem an 
acceptable substitute for criminal punishment.  Yet victims who see perpetrators go 
to trial: 
Often emerge from the experience deeply dissatisfied with their day in court. For victims and 
their supporters, this often means they scream ineffectively for more blood. But it makes no 
difference when the system responds to such people by giving them more and more blood, 
because the blood-lust is not the source of the problem; it is an unfocused cry from 
disempowered citizens who have been denied a voice. Reintegration ceremonies have a [dimly 
recognized] political value because, when well-managed, they deliver victim satisfaction that 
the courts can never deliver.66   
Victims of crime often feel both shame and fear.  While this is more intuitively 
evident for victims of violent crime, someone who has invested money and lost it will 
feel a mixture of foolishness and uncertainty that undermines the credit economy.  
The obvious window for this sort of approach in the insolvency process is the creditor 
meeting.  Creditor meetings are often regarded to be a waste of time, not least 
because you cannot be sure how many creditors will actually turn up.  They were a 
compulsory part of the administrative receivership procedure, but the new 
administration procedure offers a list of exceptions to the occasions where a creditor 
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meeting must be held as part of an administration67, such that the administrator 
need not hold such a meeting where: 
 (a)  He thinks creditors will be paid in full; or 
(b)  There is insufficient property to make a distribution to unsecured 
creditors; or 
(c) The company cannot be rescued as a going concern; or 
(d)  ďĞƚƚĞƌƌĞƐƵůƚĨŽƌƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ƐĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌƐĂƐĂǁŚŽůĞƚŚĂŶǁŽƵůĚďĞ
likely on winding up cannot be achieved. 
An interesting quality of the list of exceptions is that although it will be relatively 
common for an administrator to be able to justify not calling a creditor meeting, it 
remains compulsory in any rescue attempt (and equally should creditors holding 10% 
of the debt request one within the requisite period)68.   World Bank guidelines 
suggest that  “directors of a debtor corporation should be required to attend 
ŵĞĞƚŝŶŐƐŽĨĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌƐ ? ?69  Not holding a creditor meeting reduces the apparent cost 
of the administration, and so one can understand the attraction of not having one 
ǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌ ?ƐŽƉŝŶŝŽŶǁŝůůŚĂǀĞůŝƚƚůĞŝŵƉĂĐƚŽŶƚŚĞŽƵƚĐŽŵĞ ?ďƵƚƚŚĞƐŝŵƉůĞ
act of bringing the parties together and having them talk to each other has the 
potential to have a dramatic impact on creditor compliance.  This is perhaps another 
example of something that appears to be an essentially communitarian element to 
English law having a practical commercial benefit. 
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8.4 LETTER WRITING AND APOLOGIES 
This process of recognising and addressing the interpersonal barriers to negotiation 
ĐĂŶďĞŐŝŶƉƌŝŽƌƚŽĂŶǇĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌŵĞĞƚŝŶŐ ?tĞŶǌĞů ?ƐǁŽƌŬŽŶůĞƚƚĞƌƐǁƌŝƚƚĞŶƚŽ
Australians requiring that they pay a fine for breaking the tax code found that: 
The explicit or implicit principles for the design of reminder letters appear to be (1) brevity and 
conciseness, and (2) firmness and pressure. The former are based on the assumptions that 
taxpayers do not properly read, understand or act upon longer letters, and, taxpayers value, 
and have indeed a right to, have their compliance costs (which includes the reading of letters) 
kept to a minimum.70 
These principles will not be unfamiliar to the professional administrator, who acts 
under the acute awareness that every procedural cost incurred reduces the limited 
pot from which creditors can be repaid.  Yet Wenzel demonstrated that by adding to 
the letter elements that were informational;  “tŚǇĂƌĞǁĞƐĞŶĚŝŶŐǇŽƵƚŚŝƐůĞƚƚĞƌ ?
tŚǇĐĂŶ ?ƚǁĞďĞŵŽƌĞƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐŝŶƚŚŝƐůĞƚƚĞƌ?  Why do we impose penalties ? ?71, or 
interpersonal;  “tĞĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐe that times can be difficult, we do not want to make 
things more difficult for you ?72, both significantly increased compliance with the 
ĚĞŵĂŶĚĂŶĚƌĞĚƵĐĞĚůĞǀĞůƐŽĨĐŽŵƉůĂŝŶƚ ?tĞŶǌĞů ?ƐƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĚŝĚŶŽƚĞŶĐŽŵƉĂƐƐƚŚĞ
effect of combining informational and interpersonal aspects, but in the absence of 
further work it is reasonable to infer that the two would not cancel each other out.   
ǆƚƌĂƉŽůĂƚŝŶŐĨƌŽŵtĞŶǌĞů ?ƐƌĞĐŽŵŵĞŶĚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ŝŶŝƚŝĂůĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ
should include: 
x Information regarding their rights and responsibilities 
x An expression of sympathy for their situation 
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x A description of how and why the situation came to pass 
x An explanation of the harm being experienced by the other parties 
x An opportunity for the parties to express what impact the bankruptcy has 
had on them and their feelings about it, which should be seen by the other 
parties. 
There are a number of elements of the English insolvency process where it is possible 
to see how the reintegrative effects of information sharing could be taking place, for 
ĞǆĂŵƉůĞsƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůƐŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐ “ĂŶĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶĂƐƚŽǁŚǇŝŶƚŚĞĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐ ?ŽƉŝŶŝŽŶĂ
voluntary arrangement is desirable for the company and why creditors are expected 
ƚŽĐŽŶĐƵƌǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĂƌƌĂŶŐĞŵĞŶƚ ? ? 73  Small additional measures like those described 
above cost almost nothing but the aggregate of the marginal benefit would be 
significant. 
Having applied interpersonal elements to correspondence, brought parties face to 
face, and possibly even used mediation, the insolvency professional may still find that 
parties cannot agree.  At this point it is worth investigating the value of an apology.  
An effective shaming ceremony climaxes with an apology.  An apology allows the 
separation of the identity of the bankruƉƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĂƚŽĨƚŚĞŝŶƐŽůǀĞŶƚ P “ĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů
splits himself into two parts, the part that is guilty of an offence and the part that 
ĚŝƐĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞƐŝƚƐĞůĨĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĚĞůŝŶƋƵĞŶƚĂŶĚĂĨĨŝƌŵƐĂďĞůŝĞĨŝŶƚŚĞŽĨĨĞŶĚĞĚƌƵůĞ ? ?74  
Having to apologise can be a real punishment for the director of a company.  As 
Makkai and Braithwaite observe  “ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚĂƌĞĞǆƋƵŝƐŝƚĞůǇƐĞŶƐŝƚŝǀĞƚŽ
criticism. ?75  In an environment where parties have been able to discuss the causes 
and consequences of ƚŚĞ ‘ĐƌŝŵĞ ?relieves the perpetrator of the stigma of bankruptcy 
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(recalling that failure can be a traumatic experience for the bankrupt as well), and 
allows the creditor to disassociate the director as a person from the bankrupt as a 
construct.  Crucially ?ŝƚŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞƐĂŶĚƉĞƌŚĂƉƐĞǀĞŶŝŶĚƵĐĞƐƚŚĞ “ĚĞƐŝƌĞƚŽƉƵƚƚŚŝŶŐƐ
ƌŝŐŚƚ ?76 that creditors so long for, and which is the highest indicator of future reform. 
This also provides a unique opportunity to maintain creditor control at the heart of 
insolvency law.   Matching punishment to creditor outrage due to the two main ways 
in which one measures ƚŚĞƐŝǌĞŽĨƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ ?ĂƚĞŐŽƌǇƐĐĂůĞƐ “ĐŽŶƐŝƐƚŽĨĂďŽƵŶĚĞĚ
ƐĞƚŽĨŽƌĚĞƌĞĚƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐ ?ĂƐŝŶƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůŝĂƌĨŽƌŵĂƚŽĨŵĂŶǇŽƉŝŶŝŽŶƐƵƌǀĞǇƐ ? ?
whereas magnitude scales haǀĞ “ĂŵĞĂŶŝŶŐĨƵůǌĞƌŽĂŶĚŶŽƵƉƉĞƌďŽƵŶĚ ? ?77  While 
humans are excellent at comparing one thing with another (this rock is heavier than 
the other rock) they are poor at estimating magnitude (this rock weighs 15kg), and 
highly susceptible to arbitrary anchoring.  People are incapable of putting a price or a 
value to something without some frame of reference, and more disturbingly are 
highly susceptible to accepting entirely incidental values as the basis upon which to 
anchor their response78.  This is part of the reason why governments have struggled 
to match punishment to the outrage caused by bankruptcy.  It is surprisingly and 
counter-intuitively difficult for a jury to scale the difference between being made to 
wear a basket as a hat in public, having an ear nailed to a pillory, or being hung by the 
neck until dead (all punishments for bankruptcy at different periods in history, as 
described in Chapter 6). 
KahŶĞŵĂŶĞƚĂů ?ƐǁŽƌŬŽŶƉƵŶŝƚŝǀĞĚĂŵĂŐĞƐŝŶũƵƌǇƚƌŝĂůƐ, proposes an alternative: 
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Like other internal states that vary in intensity, outrage and punitive intent can be expressed 
either on category scales or on magnitude scales. For example, respondents could be asked to 
ĞǀĂůƵĂƚĞƚŚĞŽƵƚƌĂŐĞŽƵƐŶĞƐƐŽĨĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĂĐƚŝŽŶƐŽŶĂĐĂƚĞŐŽƌǇƐĐĂůĞƌĂŶŐŝŶŐĨƌŽŵ “ŶŽƚ 
ŽƵƚƌĂŐĞŽƵƐ ?ƚŽ “ĞǆƚƌĞŵĞůǇŽƵƚƌĂŐĞŽƵƐ ?79   
One might envisage a system which allowed, at the completion of a creditor meeting, 
creditors to vote on Ă ‘ƉƵŶŝƐŚŵĞŶƚ ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐ.  They might, for example, be 
ŐŝǀĞŶĂƌĂŶŐĞŽĨŽƉƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƐƚĂƌƚŝŶŐǁŝƚŚĂ ‘ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚ ?ŽƉƚŝŽŶǁŚŝĐŚƐŚŽƵůĚďĞƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ
along the lines of a formal written apology.  They would be then be given the option 
ƚŽƐĐĂůĞŝƚƵƉĨŽƌ ‘ƐĞǀĞƌĞ ?Žƌ ‘ǀĞƌǇƐĞǀĞƌĞ ?ĐĂƐĞƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚƐŚŽƵůĚŝŶĐůƵĚĞƚŚĞůŝŬĞƐŽĨĂ
public apology to be published in the press or even some degree of community 
service ?ďƵƚĂůƐŽŝŶƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶĨŽƌ ‘ŵŝůĚ ?Žƌ ‘ǀĞƌǇŵŝůĚ ?ĐĂƐĞƐǁŚĞƌĞĨĂƵůƚŝƐ
deemed not to lie with the bankrupt and a written apology might be replaced with a 
joint statement of fact or creditors might vote that a portion of the remaining fund 
be returned to the debtor to help them start over again (like the element of 
discharge removed from the law of 1706).   
It is essential to not that this process would not give creditors the power to prevent a 
pre-pack or overrule the administrator.  That would be unacceptably expensive.  This 
process simply gives creditors an outlet for their outrage.  An apology can be highly 
effective.  In the context of violent crime it has been observed that  “apology from the 
man who disrespected her is the most powerful way of resuscitating this self-esteem 
and community shaming of the disrespecting behaviour is also powerful affirmation 
ŽĨƚŚĞƌĞƐƉĞĐƚĨŽƌŚĞƌĂƐĂƉĞƌƐŽŶ ? ?80  Bankruptcy is not rape and the writer is not 
attempting to diminish the crime by making such a comparison.  Bankruptcy and 
business failure, however, do impact upon the self-esteem of the parties, and 
because of the cognitive difficulties with scaling described above and the physical 
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process of responding to status threats the value of reintegration still applies.  There 
is evidence of this approach being tested in English law already.  In response to the 
Farepak insolvency, a small scale insolvency with relatively minor losses that was 
ĐĂůůĞĚ “ĂŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƚƌĂŐĞĚǇĂŶĚĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐǇ ?81, Spalek reports that:   
A National Reporting Centre in the City of London police service has recently been established, 
offering a listening service to victims, where victims can also ask questions about what 
resources are available to help them, and where victims can also act about the progress of any 
investigations that are being conducted.
82
 
In terms of moving creditors to a place where they could come to accept (correctly) 
that receiving almost 50p in the pound was considered a "fantastic result"83 this was 
an excellent approach to take.  What this means for Orderly and Effective insolvency 
regimes is that qualities like specialist courts, the use of formal and informal spaces 
ĂƐĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞ ? ‘ǀŝĐƚŝŵ ?ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĂŶĚƌĞĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚŝǀĞŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĨŽƌƵŶĞƚŚŝĐĂů
behaviour, rather than being an undesirable delay that increases costs and reduces 
insolvency efficiency, actually improve efficiency.  They do this because they improve 
the pricing mechanism by reducing the incidence and impact of systemic cognitive 
error.  More research, ideally experimental empirical work, would be required to 
determine the best form and language for such a process but giving creditors a 
conduit to express and see some impact from their sense of injustice would be 
valuable.  An insolvency law that pays attention to the public sense of injustice will 
also more efficiently place resources in those best placed to use them.   
There are two final points that are important to make.  First, creditor inclusion is not 
necessary for successful insolvency proceedings, as demonstrated by Pre-packs.  As 
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emphasised in the discussion of what drives creditor returns in Chapter 4, the single 
most important factor is strong property rights and the rule of law.  The question for 
regimes that already have strong property rights and the rule of law is what will make 
for the very best creditor returns possible. 
It is submitted that the medium term survival of pre-packs would be improved if 
small measures were taken to improve creditor inclusivity.  It is clearly important not 
to interfere significantly with the efficiency benefits of a clean pre-pack by 
introducing measures like a possible creditor veto or a new prescribed part.  
However, optional expansions to the SIP 16 process such as a personal letter from 
the directors explaining why they feel this is the best option, how it compares to 
liquidation (similar to what is done with a CVA), and if it is the case that they regret 
the impact on unsecured creditors, may well make a difference to the success of the 
phoenix firm after the sale is completed.  This is not about whether creditor inclusion 
is necessary but whether creditor/debtor exclusion is optimal.  I believe I have 
submitted enough to demonstrate that it is not. 
^ĞĐŽŶĚ ?ƐŽŵĞƉĞŽƉůĞĂƌĞĂůŵŽƐƚĂƐŚŽƌƌŝĨŝĞĚďǇƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ “ƉƵŶŝƐŚŵĞŶƚ ?ĂƐ
ƚŚĞǇĂƌĞďǇƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ “ƌĞĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶ ? ?dŚŝƐŝƐǁŝƚŚŐŽŽĚƌĞĂƐŽn.  Punishment is a 
strong word, and redistribution itself often means harsh interference with private 
property.  Entrepreneurship is generally considered to be a good thing, and there is 
research to demonstrate that the prospect of sanctions and punishment of debtors 
ŝŵƉĂĐƚƐŽŶƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐǁŝůůŝŶŐŶĞƐƐƚŽƐƚĂƌƚďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐĞƐ ? Fan and White discovered a 35% 
increase in the probability of households owning businesses in US states with 
unlimited bankruptcy exemptions.84  ƌŵŽƵƌĂŶĚƵŵŵŝŶŐ ?s cross country study of 
the forgivingness of bankruptcy regimes shows a significant effect on self-
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employment rates85.  Punishment that marginally improves rescue rates at the cost 
of significant reductions in entrepreneurship would clearly be self-defeating. 
It is important when considering this chapter not to place too much weight on the 
ƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌĚƉƵŶŝƐŚŵĞŶƚ ?ƌŵŽƵƌĂŶĚƵŵŵŝŶŐ ?Ɛforgivingness is measured by 
levels of discharge and exemption available, all things that have substantial financial 
and personal consequences.  Although this research draws on the language and the 
theory of punishment, the central conclusion is that it is mild and re-integrative 
punishment that is most effective.   dŚŝƐŝƐĂůŽŶŐǁĂǇĨƌŽŵĐƵƚƚŝŶŐŽĨĨƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐĞĂƌƐ ?
sending them to prison, or confiscating their property.  Directors may be exquisitely 
sensitive, and an apology may be a real punishment.  But it is not credible to think it 
would have a significant impact on start-ups if new directors know that one day they 
might have to apologise for losing creditors money.  The point of recognising that, 
even in business, decision-making is not simply a question of rational maximisation 
but that there is also an important personal dimension, is to take advantage of what 
we know about personal decision-making.  Like any new husband quickly learns, a 
willingness to explain what happened, listen to the consequences, and apologise for 
any harm caused, can have significant benefits.  This lesson is equally applicable in 
business. 
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CONCLUSION 
The International Monetary Fund 1 and World Bank2 Guidelines promoting Orderly 
and Effective insolvency were written in the wake of the Asian financial crisis with a 
view to promoting stable economies that were attractive to overseas investment.  
Given that the IMF recommendations reflected long standing characteristics of 
English Insolvency Law3, not to mention our status as forum de jour for 
incorporation4 ĂŶĚ “ďƌŽƚŚĞů ?5 for corporate insolvency, it seems almost tautologous 
to describe English law as Orderly and Effective.  This thesis sought to address certain 
assumptions about the reasons why English law is effective at maximising returns to 
creditors. 
Understanding how English insolvency law impacts upon investment and business 
turnaround is particularly relevant in the current economic climate, where businesses 
are struggling for credit and in many cases simply struggling to survive. This thesis has 
argued that changes in the Enterprise Act to increase inclusivity and credit pro-
activity6 have improved returns to investors in distressed firms, contrary to a 
significant body of law and economics theory that suggests that distribution and 
ǁĞĂůƚŚŵĂǆŝŵŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŽƉĞƌĂƚĞŝŶƚĞŶƐŝŽŶƚŽŽŶĞĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ?ŶŐůŝƐŚůĂǁ ?s effectiveness is 
not because of some ruthless pursuit of allocative efficiency via priority for secured 
creditors, but rather sensitivity to creditor driven solutions and provision of 
frameworks that facilitate collaborative, inclusive solutions. 
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The ideal of efficient insolvency has been hugely influential, particularly through the 
work of law and economics scholars such as Jackson, Baird, and Rasmussen, who 
have  “ĚŽŵŝŶĂƚĞĚƚŚĞĨŝĞůĚŝŶƚŚĞƉĂƐƚ ? ?ǇĞĂƌƐ ? ?7  It draws on the concept of 
allocative efficiency and the first welfare theorem, which suggests that conditions of 
perfect competition will always achieve a pareto-optimal outcome8.  Coase theorem9 
then suggests that it is only where there is market failure that assets will fail to end 
up in the hands of those best able to use them.  This has been applied by insolvency 
efficiency proponents, at their most extreme, to suggest that  “ƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶŽĨ
bankruptcy is to allow unpaid creditors to seize the iŶƐŽůǀĞŶƚĚĞďƚŽƌ ‘ƐĂƐƐĞƚƐ ?ƐĞůů
ƚŚĞŵĂŶĚŝŶǀĞƐƚƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞĞĚƐŝŶŽƚŚĞƌǀĞŶƵĞƐ ?10, removing the concept of state-led 
rescue from the law altogether.   
The accepted role of the state is enforcing collectivism, particularly through the 
mechanism of stays in ordeƌƚŽƉƌĞǀĞŶƚĂ “ŐƌĂďƌĂĐĞ ? ?11  This is a type of market 
failure known as a prisoner ?s dilemma where the equilibrium is not the optimal 
solution.   Beyond collectivism in this limited sense, any distributions made by law are 
inefficient where they do not refůĞĐƚ “ƚŚĞŬŝŶĚŽĨĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚƚŚĂƚĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌƐǁŽƵůĚĂŐƌĞĞ
ƚŽŝĨƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞĂďůĞƚŽŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚĞǁŝƚŚĞĂĐŚŽƚŚĞƌďĞĨŽƌĞĞǆƚĞŶĚŝŶŐĐƌĞĚŝƚ ? ?12   Being 
inefficient they are considered ultimately unjust, as they cost more to society as a 
whole than having the parties who directly benefit decide.13  This leads to the 
conclusion that the only just role for insolvency law is to reduce the cost of credit.14  
                                                          
7
 Keay AR and Walton P (2008), p25 
8
 Anand P (2006), p222 
9
 Coase R (1960) 
10
 Brogi R and Santella P (2004), p9 
11
 IMF (1999), 2- General Objectives and Features of Insolvency Procedures, p12 
12
 Jackson TH (1986), p17 
13
 Schwartz A (1998), p1817-1818 
14
 Ibid, p1819 
  
244 
 
In turn the economic and social heartache caused by business failure is not properly a 
question for insolvency law.15   
TŚŝƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚŚĂƐƌĞĐĞŝǀĞĚĂŐƌĞĂƚĚĞĂůŽĨĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵ ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŝƚŵĂŬĞƐ “ƵƐĞŽĨ
theoretical constructs to reach policy conclusions without any attempt being made to 
ǀĞƌŝĨǇďǇĞŵƉŝƌŝĐĂůĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞƚŚĞƉƌĞŵŝƐĞƐƵƉŽŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞǇĂƌĞďĂƐĞĚ ?16, and that 
their economic analysis of the law is stuck in 19th century notions of laissez-faire 
economics17 ?ƚŚĂƚƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇƚŚĞŝƌĂŶƐǁĞƌƐĂƌĞ “ƚŽŽĐůĞĂƌ-ĐƵƚĂŶĚŐůŝď ?18 and based 
upon a weakness for the seductive quality of easy answers19.  Yet the analysis 
remains enormously influential in the Orderly and Effective model, and particularly 
the notion that distributive or communitarian measures are made at the cost of 
efficiency and thereby wealth maximisation.  Legal regimes may choose to protect 
workers or prescribe a part to be distributed to unsecured creditors, but in doing so 
they reduce returns to secured creditors and thereby increase the cost of credit and 
ƌĞĚƵĐĞŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚ ?dŚĞ “ƐĞĐƵƌĞĚĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌŝƐĂĐĐŽƌĚĞĚƉƌŝŽƌŝƚǇďĞĐĂƵƐĞŚĞďĂƌŐĂŝŶĞĚ
ĨŽƌŝƚ ?20, and his ability to enforce his claim as a creditor reduces the risk of giving 
ĐƌĞĚŝƚĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ “ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞƐƚŚĞĂǀĂŝůĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨĐƌĞĚŝƚĂŶĚƚŚĞŵĂŬŝŶŐŽĨ
ŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚŵŽƌĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇ ? ?21   
Empirical exploration of how English law is Orderly and Effective reveals a number of 
flaws in this analysis.  The notion of orderliness demands that insolvency regimes 
ĞŶƐƵƌĞƚŚĞĂůůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƌŝƐŬŝŶĂ “ƉƌĞĚŝĐƚĂďůĞ ?ĞƋƵŝƚĂďůĞ ?ĂŶĚƚƌĂŶƐƉĂƌĞŶƚŵĂŶŶĞƌ Q
[so as not to undermine] willingness to make credit and other investment 
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 Jackson TH (1986), p25 
16
 Goode R (2011), p72 
17
 Pettet B (1995), p143 
18
 Keay A and Walton P (2008), p27 
19
 Warren E (1987), p797 
20
 Goode R (2005), p59 
21
 IMF (1999), 2 - General Objectives and Features of Insolvency Procedures, p3 
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ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ ? ?22  The efficiency model suggests that this is simply a question of 
preventing a grab race, after which participants will proceed to make the decision on 
the basis of a simple cost function and pick the alternative that grants them the 
greatest utility.  Even if this is accepted, the notion that freedom of choice in a 
scenario that allows optimisation of utility will lead to the maximisation of monetary 
is not a safe assumption.  Utility does not directly translate into price.  The enormous 
leap of faith required to imagine that it does is illustrative of the extent to which 
ŝŶƐŽůǀĞŶĐǇĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇƉƌŽƉŽŶĞŶƚƐ ?ƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůƐĂƌĞ “ĚƌŝǀĞŶďǇŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞǀĂůƵĞƐ ?23, in 
particular a fierce belief in aggregate rationality and efficient markets.   
An orderly insolvency law must take into account the  “quasi-criminal ?24 quality of 
insolvency, because participants in an insolvency are driven by a great deal more 
than monetary values.  The ancestry of insolvency is in the act of bankruptcy25, which 
taints the most innocent insolvent.  BusineƐƐĨĂŝůƵƌĞ “inevitably generates dismay 
and, in many cases, resentment, among a variety of stakeholders in the 
ĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?26, and decisions made under conditions of stress and shame are very 
different from those made when calm and collected (and often lead to very different 
outcomes than stakeholders would objectively prefer). 27  Overcoming this problem 
requires a deliberate and structured means to identify bias based upon strengthened 
group decision-making processes.28  Specialist courts, highly trained insolvency 
professionals and procedures that require formal processes force a more considered 
response to failure.  It is essential to note that collaborative rescue procedures are 
only likely to be beneficial if the appropriate legal infrastructure and strong property 
                                                          
22
 /D& ? ? ? ? ? ) ? “ ?- 'ĞŶĞƌĂůKďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐĂŶĚ&ĞĂƚƵƌĞƐŽĨ/ŶƐŽůǀĞŶĐǇWƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞƐ ? ?Ɖ ? 
23
 Warren E (1987), p812, in this case talking specifically about the work of Baird, although she makes it clear she 
considers his co-conspirators, such as Jackson, equally culpable. 
24
 Efrat R (2006), p369 
25
 Trieman I (1938) 
26
 Frisby S (2011), p350 
27
 Dickerson SS and Kemeny ME (2004), p337 
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 Campbell A, Whitehead J, Finkelstein S (2003), p64 
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rights are already in place.  Countries that are still struggling with judicial corruption, 
significant economic change or political change, or inadequate rule of law generally, 
will most likely simply saddle themselves with a more expensive liquidation 
procedure.29  However, once effective and efficient rule of law is in place and has had 
some time to inspire confidence in its durability, the most effective insolvency law is 
not one of absolute secured creditor priority but one that best enables inclusive 
creditor and debtor led solutions. 
A central pillar of the insolvency efficiency application of Coase Theorem is process 
independence.  Process independence suggests that the means by which allocations 
are achieved is unimportant.  This has been strongly refuted by procedural justice 
theory where preferences for adversarial over inquisitorial justice, regardless of 
outcome, have been established because it gave a greater opportunity for 
stakeholders  to put what they felt was important in front of a judge.30  McEwen and 
Maiman31 have demonstrated that parties to litigation are attracted to process 
advantages like the opportunity to express how they feel about what has happened, 
attention being paid to what clients feel are the key issues, and facilitating client 
involvement in shaping an agreement, which provides an alternative explanation to 
the finding that during the Asian financial crisis  “ƚŚĞŵĂƌŬĞƚŚĂƐƌĞĂĐƚĞĚŵŽƐƚ
ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞůǇƚŽŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞƐƚŚĂƚďƌŝŶŐĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌƐĂŶĚĚĞďƚŽƌƐƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ?32  This is the heart 
of inclusivity. 
An effĞĐƚŝǀĞŝŶƐŽůǀĞŶĐǇůĂǁ ?ĂƐĚĞĨŝŶĞĚďǇƚŚĞ/D& ?ŝƐŽŶĞƚŚĂƚŽƉĞƌĂƚĞƐ “ƚŽƉƌŽƚĞĐƚ
and maximise value for the benefit of all interested parties and the economy in 
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 Djankov et al (2008), p1146 
30
 Thibaut J, Walker L, Latour S, Houlden P (1973) 
31
 McEwen CA and Maiman RJ (1981) 
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ŐĞŶĞƌĂů ?33, an objective that is achieved not only through rescue of viable businesses 
but also by the fashion in which unviable firms are liquidated.  English law aims to 
achieve best returns for creditors, but public interest communitarian values were 
also explicitly recognised in the Cork Report.34  A strict insolvency efficiency approach 
would consider this to be inefficient: 
[B]argaining succeeds with respect to money: Renegotiation after insolvency will shift tangible 
wealth to the estate when it is efficient to do so but not otherwise, whether or not a 
ŵĂŶĚĂƚŽƌǇƌƵůĞŝƐƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ QďĂŶŬƌƵƉƚĐǇƐǇstems should function to maximise the monetary 
value of the estate.
35 
On this basis it would be a reasonable hypothesis that changes like the prescribed 
part, which prima facie reduce returns to secured creditors, in turn fail to maximise 
the monetary value of the estate and are therefore ineffective.  Exploration of 
empirical data regarding insolvency suggests that this is not the case.  The Enterprise 
Act has improved gross returns, and whilst the improvement in gains has been for 
the time being cancelled out be increased costs returns are now being realised 
significantly faster. 
Chapter 3 identified three hypotheses for why the shift to an administration based 
system in the Enterprise Act might be producing better overall returns.  First, 
reduction in secured creditor control might have been offset by infrastructural 
improvements to the efficiency of the judicial system, but given that the data 
available comes from the period of transition from the old law to the new  W during 
which infrastructure changes are more likely to create additional cost than benefit  W 
this is not a particularly strong argument.  Second, the argument that the Enterprise 
Act made no significant practical difference to the position of secured creditors is 
                                                          
33
 /D& ? ? ? ? ? ) ? “ ?- 'ĞŶĞƌĂůKďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐĂŶĚ&ĞĂƚƵƌĞƐŽĨ/ŶƐŽůǀĞŶĐǇWƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞƐ ? ?Ɖ ? 
34
 Goode R (2011), p75 
35
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refuted by interview evidence, particularly the changed position of HMRC has had a 
significant strategic impact and there is a great deal of evidence of a cultural shift in 
practice amongst clearing banks.  Regarding the third hypothesis, however, there is 
evidence that absolute secured creditor priority does not improve secured creditor 
returns in a linearly positive fashion, and that surrendering some element of control 
actually results in greater returns.  There is evidence of a tension between levels of 
security and probability of rescue36, which leads to uncertainty:   “ĂůĂƌŐĞƌƉƌŽďĂďŝůŝƚǇ
ŽĨĚĞĨĂƵůƚĚŽĞƐŶŽƚŵĞĂŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞůĞŶĚĞƌƐ ?Ğǆ-post losses are greater.  With the 
greater probability of default but greater protection (e.g. smaller losses) in the case 
of default, ůĞŶĚĞƌƐ ?ĂĐƚƵĂůůǇlosses may either rise or fall ? ?37  Returns are not simply a 
linear function of the level of security. 
Part of the reason for the misconception about how insolvency law operates to 
maximise wealth is due to an apparent difficulty with probabilistic reasoning.  Wealth 
maximisation for the economy in general, and for repeat players like institutional 
creditors, is not a question of returns in the individual case but what gets the best 
returns in the aggregate.  In any individual case it is impossible to know in advance 
whether a rescue effort will achieve better returns than a liquidation, and impossible 
to be certain afterwards whether the chosen path achieved the best outcome.  In the 
aggregate and all other things being equal, an administration housed CVA is the most 
effective device for wealth maximisation, a process that depends on inclusivity and 
includes interventionist distribution.  In a situation where it is uncertain if a business 
is viable, the best strategy is administration, because only a small proportion of them 
have to succeed to cover the costs of those that fail.  This is not simply because of the 
highly favourable returns from trading CVAs, but also that asset sales via 
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 Houston JF, Lin C, Lin P and Ma Y (2010), p504 
37
 Ibid, p489, emphasis added. 
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administration may be preferable to direct liquidation (such that it has been argued 
that CVLs are becoming redundant38 and removing the procedure altogether in 
ĨĂǀŽƵƌŽĨĂ “ƐŝŶŐůĞŐĂƚĞǁĂǇ. ? 39)  For a repeat player the gains made from a successful 
trading CVA are so much better than a liquidation that the additional cost of 
attempting is worth the speculation in any case where viability is possible.  This was 
envisaged by the framers of the act: 
The imposition of wider accountability on the insolvency practitioner was designed to increase 
the realizable value of the company's assets by addressing the problem of perverse incentives; 
the streamlining of administration was designed to make the procedure more flexible and 
easily accessible, and to reduce costs. The expectation of policymakers was that this twin 
approach would promote corporate rescue and, by increasing gross realizations and reducing 
the costs of formal rescue, produce better net outcomes for creditors across the board.
40
  
The important addition is that by reframing the concept of orderliness to include the 
need to manage stress and shame issues surrounding business failure and their 
impact upon decision making, it is clear that the perverse incentives that the 
effective law manages are not only materialistic but also normative.  The 
administration housed CVA is considered  “the only genuine insolvency rescue 
ŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵ ?41 in the post Enterprise Act regime, and is predicated both upon a 
requirement of ƚŚĞĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌƐ ?ĂĐƚŝǀĞĂƉƉƌŽǀĂůŽĨƚŚĞƌĞƐĐƵĞƉůĂŶ ?42 and equally upon a 
statutory distribution to unsecured creditors43 (which has the consequence that all 
parties to a trading CVA achieve some degree of return).  The long term survival of a 
firm depends on maintaining relationships with creditors, and also helping parties 
make decisions in their best interests under adverse conditions, whether they are the 
bank or the taxman, suppliers or customers.  Getting the cooperation of the 
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40
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unsecured creditors increases the chances of the rescue, and so once again it is 
worthwhile introducing inclusivity if it improves the chance of a wealth maximising 
rescue.   
The trick is to have enough inclusivity to engage important stakeholders without 
exposing the process to excessive cost or the irrationality of non-institutional 
creditors.  The final chapter of this thesis sought to argue that implementing 
techniques learned from mediation, addressing questions like the potential need for 
an apology and giving both parties an opportunity to explain their side of the story 
and hear the impact, would improve insolvency outcomes by improving stakeholder 
decision making.  The advantages of the proposed techniques is that they are of 
sufficiently low cost that even a small increase in aggregate returns would more than 
pay for them.   
A common characterisation of English law is that it is laissez-faire in that it  “ŽƉĞƌĂƚĞƐ
ǁŝƚŚĂƌĞŐĂƌĚƚŽƚŚŽƐĞƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐƚŚĂƚĚĞǀĞůŽƉǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŵŵĞƌĐŝĂůǁŽƌůĚ ? ?44  
Institutional creditors operate as oligopolies, strategically co-ordinating to get the 
best results, and part of how this has manifested is in the London Approach:  an 
ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐĞĚŶŽƌŵĚĞƌŝǀĞĚ “ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞůĞŐĂůƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐŽĨ
ƚƌĂĚĞĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůďŽĚŝĞƐ ? ?45  Insolvency practitioners feel 
 “ĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶĞĚby professional regulation and reputational concerns to "do the job 
ƉƌŽƉĞƌůǇ ? ? ?46  English insolvency process seems to be heavily influenced by normative 
values that favour informal collaborative workouts, and all the evidence points 
towards a preference for maintaining relationships47 and preserving reputation48, 
alongside a willingness to make significant investment on the chance of successful 
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  “ůĂƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶŶĞůůĞĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞĚƵůĠŐŝƐůĂƚĞƵƌĂŶŐůĂŝƐĚĞ UůĂŝƐƐĞƌ-ĨĂŝƌĞ ?ăů ?ĠŐĂƌĚĚĞƐƉƌĂƚŝƋƵĞƐĚĠǀĞůŽƉƉĠĞƐ
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45
 Santella P (2002), p30 
46
 Armour J, Hsu A, Walters A (2008), p164 
47
 Ibid, p157 
48
 Frisby (2006), p12 
  
251 
 
ƌĞƐĐƵĞ ?/ƚŝƐƐƵďŵŝƚƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƉƌŝǀĂƚĞƐĞĐƚŽƌ ?ƐƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞĨŽƌŝŶĐůƵƐŝǀŝƚǇŝƐƐƚƌŽŶŐ
evidence that it is wealth maximising. 
If normative strategic co-operation out of court is so successful, what is the place of 
formal insolvency?  First and foremost, the critique of contractualism does not 
undermine the importance of preventing grab races and enforcing collectivism.  
However, collectivism must also be a forum for augmented negotiation, with 
measures to improve communication and information sharing (the SIP 16 is an 
excellent innovation in this direction), and providing professional assistance to 
participants.   Parties in particular will be more likely to comply if they have had the 
opportunity to say how they have been affected, to hear why decisions have been 
taken, and feel they have some substantive role in decision making.  There is also an 
enormous normative value to state authority, providing institutional certainty around 
which private players can order themselves.  This must, however, be distinguished 
from outcome certainty.  The court is in an important position to provide oversight 
by removing rogues and fools from the process, overruling in cases of irrationality or 
bad faith and thus improving confidence in insolvency professionals, but should not 
engage in the uncertain business of diagnosing the reasons for commercial failure on 
the grounds of public interest. 
The rapid increase in the use of empiricism in insolvency law has finally given law and 
economics an opportunity to emerge from the 19th century, and that naturally opens 
many avenues for future research.   As Warren put it  “ǁĞƐŚŽƵůĚŐĞƚĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞ
business of asking harder questions, looking for better evidence, and approximating 
ďĞƚƚĞƌĂŶƐǁĞƌƐ ? ?49  There is a pressing need to improve the empirical base from 
which we draw conclusions about the impact of insolvency law. 
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The first line of research that must be pursued is an expansion of the existing 
insolvency outcomes research50so as to produce a time-series analysis of outcomes 
rather than the current  “ƐŶĂƉƐŚŽƚ ? ?51  This would, amongst other things, make it 
possible to identify the impact of adaptation to the new regime, increase the sample 
size to sufficient that smaller increases in returns could be judged statistically 
significant, and explore how outcomes have changed as incidences of administrative 
receivership have been phased out.  
A second worthwhile investigation would be a broader empirical investigation of the 
strategic role of HMRC, and how they are using their new position of champion of the 
unsecured creditor.  This might best be achieved ethnographically, embedding a 
researcher in order to explore perspectives and approaches, and ideally quantify 
levels of investment and return. 
A third and potentially very interesting avenue would be the use of experimental 
economics to examine the impact of inclusivity on compliance, similar to the work by 
behavioural economists to explore the nature of decision making under conditions of 
ƌŝƐŬ ?ƐŝŵƉůĞĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨƚŚŝƐƐŽƌƚŽĨĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚǁĂƐŐŝǀĞŶŝŶŚĂƉƚĞƌ ? ?ƐĞǆƉůŽƌĂƚŝŽŶ
of willingness to pay, but with funding for more sophisticated group based 
experiments it would be possible to test and quantify the degree to which offering an 
apology improves compliance, or whether explaining the reasons why a business 
failed makes consumers look more favourably upon a pre-pack, or indeed explore 
any number of process based questions. 
Rapid developments in our ability to quantify and empirically explore commercial 
questions make this an exciting time for insolvency theory.  Institutional creditors 
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increasingly recognise the importance investing in collaborative and inclusive 
approaches to workouts that identify and support economically viable firms.  English 
insolvency law is Orderly and Effective because it has been sensitive to these actual, 
practical developments in business and finance.   It is crucial that insolvency theory 
follow suit. 
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